Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Predation Analysis And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

The Federal Trade Commission's pending antitrust case against Intel challenges a number of Intel's discounting and rebating practices. The Commission appears poised to apply a cost-price test to the challenged practices, but proposes to include "fixed sunk costs" in the appropriate measure of cost. This paper explains the importance of using cost-price screens to assess unilaterally imposed prices and analyzes the futility of including sunk costs in the relevant cost measure.

Ashcroft In A Defendant's Wonderland: Redefined Pleading Standards In Ashcroft V. Iqbal, Cassidy M. Flake

Mercer Law Review

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is the Court's awaited clarification of its earlier decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. In the wake of Twombly, courts and commentators debated its application to cases other than antitrust disputes. The Court announced in Iqbal that the Twombly complaint requirement of facial plausibility applies to all civil actions filed in federal court, not just antitrust cases. Accordingly, Iqbal currently governs the standards by which all plaintiffs in federal court must draft complaints to state a legally sufficient claim for relief and survive a defendant's motion to …

Splitting Scales: Conflicting National And Regional Attempts To Manage Commercial Aquaculture In The Exclusive Economic Zone, Brandee Ketchum

Journal of Food Law & Policy

Like other environmental resources subject to public use, various interest groups struggle over joint management of scarce fisheries resources. Further, differing goals for resource management, such as financial goals versus conservation goals, frequently pit regional groups against one another. In some cases, regional interests may conflict with overall national interests. As goes the water and the air, so go the fish.

The Nba And The Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, Michael A. Mccann

Law Faculty Scholarship

This Article will explore the relationship between the National Basketball Association, its independently-owned teams, and associated corporate entities, including the Women’s NBA, NBA Properties, NBA Developmental League, NBA China, and single entity analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 chiefly aims to prevent competitors from combining their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm consumers, be it in terms of raised prices, diminished quality, or limited choices. Single entities are exempt from section 1 because they are considered “one,” rather than competitors, and thus their collaboration does not implicate anticompetitive concerns.

In American Needle …

2009 International Trade Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Patrick A. Fitch

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Internet Governance And Democratic Legitimacy, Oliver Sylvain

Federal Communications Law Journal

Even as the Internet goes pop, federal policymakers continue to surrender their statutory obligation to regulate communications in the first instance to extralegal nongovernmental organizations comprised of technical experts. The FCC's adjudication of a dispute concerning a major broadband service provider's network management practices is a case in point. There, in the absence of any enforceable legislative or regulatory rule, the FCC turned principally to the transmission principles of the Internet Engineering Taskforce, the preeminent nongovernmental Internet engineering standard-setting organization. This impulse to defer as a matter of course to such an organization without any legal mechanism requiring as much …

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Vanderbilt Law Review

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …

Expanding The Nafta Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement System: A Way To Declaw Trade Remedy Laws In A Free Trade Area Of The Americas?, Stephen J. Powell

UF Law Faculty Publications

Chapter 19 of the NAFTA transfers judicial review of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican government investigations under the controversial anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws from national courts to binational panels of private international law experts. The system stands as a unique surrender of judicial sovereignty to an international body, a hybrid of national courts and international dispute settlement with as yet no parallel in the world of international trade or other international law regimes. Binational panel decisions have been controversial because agencies chafe at their intimate examination of agency findings and supporting evidence. Panels also are viewed as substantially more …

Designing Antitrust Agencies For More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn From Restaurant Guides, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the factors that lead to improving agency quality. Such studies, however, often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other part of the equation: what do non-government users of the antitrust system think about the quality of antitrust agencies? This Symposium Essay advocates the use of a ratings guide by antitrust practitioners for antitrust agencies to add to the tools in …

Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson

Faculty Publications

This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal - when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim, but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the harsh results …

Pro-Competitive Or Protective? The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, Implications For The United States, And Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation As An Effective Response, Benjamin Ryberg

Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law

The note examines the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of the People's Republic of China, highlighting its structure, enforcement mechanisms, and potential implications for international trade and competition. It compares the AML with the U.S. Sherman Act, noting similarities and differences, particularly in market share thresholds and exemptions. The analysis also explores the potential benefits and challenges of a bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement between the U.S. and China, emphasizing the role of positive comity in fostering fair competition and addressing anticompetitive practices. The note raises concerns about the AML's broad provisions and the risk of protectionism, while suggesting that such an agreement …

The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision (Updated), Alan J. Meese, Barak Richman

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Analyzing Refusal-To-Deal Cases Under Brooke Group’S Predatory Pricing Test: The Tenth Circuit Misses The Mark In Christy Sports, Llc V. Deer Valley Resort Co. , Paul Jones

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Insider Trading And Soft Information: U.S. V. Nacchio, Andrew Law

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-09 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

This introductory essay for a symposium on antitrust enforcement during economic crises provides a brief historical overview of the failures of antitrust enforcement during major economic crises and wars in the first half of the twentieth century. It then considers the reasons that historical narrative breaks off in the second half of the twentieth century and asks whether there is evidence of its revival during the recent economic crisis.

Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen

William & Mary Business Law Review

The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and justifications for the "per se'" and "rule of reason" results. …

Ftc V. Intel: Applying The "Consumer Choice" Framework To "Pure" Section 5 Allegations, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short article analyzes the "pure" Section 5 allegations in the recent FTC complaint against Intel. It first shows that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is more encompassing than the Sherman Act and why this breath is in the public interest. It next analyzes allegations from the Intel Complaint, showing why each appears to be in the public interest yet might not be permitted by the Sherman Act. It also discusses other advantages that would arise if these charges were litigated under Section 5 rather than the Sherman Act.

The article notes assertions by Intel and others …

Intel And The Death Of U.S. Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) new legal attack on Intel threatens to leave the company a shell of its former self. The Commission claims that Intel violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by giving discounts and rebates to customers in a manner that harmed its main rival AMD, by designing its products in a way that disadvantages rivals, and acting too aggressively in protecting its intellectual property. The remedies the FTC is seeking would impose broad restrictions on pricing, product design, and protection of intellectual property.

The FTC’s claims are not well founded in U.S. antitrust law, though they …

Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper explores the policy implications of the FTC's decision to file its enforcement action against Intel under Section 5 of the FTC Act and declare that it has the power to go further under Section 5's "unfair competition" prong than it could under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Intel is an inappropriate case for the Commission to make a bid for Section 5 independence since none of the Commission's institutional advantages over Article III courts justifies a departure from ordinary Section 2 norms in this case. Indeed, the Intel case has the potential to set …

Anthropology, History And The "More Economic Approach" In European Competition Law - A Review Essay, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

In several works over the last decade, Wolfgang Fikentscher has reminded us that there are ways of viewing competition law that need not begin and end with economics—its concepts, its language, and its science-based normative stance. Discussions of competition law in the United States and increasingly in Europe generally dismiss or marginalize views of competition law that are not circumscribed by economic science. In the works reviewed here, Fikentscher takes issue with the so-called “more economic approach” to law, particularly, competition law. As he has said on other occasions, he favors “a less economic approach” to competition law. Many in …