Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Robert Bork's Controversial Legacy, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Judge Robert Bork was undeniably one of the towering figures in antitrust history. He advanced the field positively in many respects, articulating a serious critique of excesses of an earlier social-political approach to antitrust. But as one of the conservative movement’s intellectual godfathers he also shares responsibility for many of their own excesses that have transformed our nation in harmful ways. This short essay explores some of the effects of his overall approach to antitrust: his preoccupation with economic efficiency.

In Name Only: How Major League Baseball's Reliance On Its Antitrust Exemption Is Hurting The Game, Samuel G. Mann

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Editorial – Both Sides Now, Stephen Calkins, Marek Martyniszyn

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law ” Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi ” involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …

Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled.

The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate …

Killing Them With Kindness: Examining "Consumer-Friendly" Arbitration Clauses After At&T; Mobility V. Concepcion, Myriam E. Gilles

Articles

The article focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court case AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which California's "Discover Bank rule" was struck by the Court under the Federal Arbitration Act, which was upheld by the California Supreme Court in the court case Discover Bank v. Superior Court. It provides information that the rule is a judge-made rule which depicts that class action waivers are unforceable in arbitration agreements if such agreements are mentioned in standard form consumer contracts.

Legal Framework For Soviet Privatization, Olga Floroff, Susan Tiefenbrun

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does A Cartel Aim Expressly? Trusting Calder Personal Jurisdiction When Antitrust Goes Global, Larry Dougherty

Florida Law Review

This Note suggests that while Calder jurisdiction fits well with some types of antitrust allegations, the Calder analogy weakens when charges of broad-based anticompetitive conduct collide with the long-arm statutes of particular states. The risk of forcing the analogy too far, of course, is a violation of due process. Part II of this Note reviews the facts and holding of Calder, and some of the key cases that followed it. Part III addresses the question of how the effects test might be different for antitrust complaints. Part IV reviews one type of anticompetitive conduct that seems to place particular …

Much Ado About Nothing? The Antitrust Implications Of Private Equity Club Deals, Jessica Jackson

Florida Law Review

This Note addresses the antitrust issues that clubbing raises and argues that the antitrust laws should not restrict clubbing—absent some egregious conduct—and that courts should apply rule of reason analysis rather than per se rules to these sorts of antitrust claims. Part II provides a general background of antitrust law and the various standards that courts apply to private equity clubs. Part III explains private equity and fleshes out what a club deal is and how it works. Part IV discusses antitrust law within the context of joint ventures and sets out the varying standards that could apply to private …

Telecommunications: Communications Law Reform, Jonathan Baker, Robert Mcdowell, Ajit Pai, Daniel Crane, Maureen Ohlhausen, Jennifer Elrod

Presentations

The transcript was published on 2013 Journal of Law, Technology & Policy University of Illinois Issue 1.

Prospects For Satisfactory Dispute Resolution Of Private Commercial Disputes Under The North American Free Trade Agreement, Jonathan I. Miller

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federal Judicial And Legislative Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm Of U.S. Antitrust Law And Viable Solutions Beyond The Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, Michael G. Mckinnon

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The 2012 Us Model Bit And What The Changes (Or Lack Thereof) Suggest About Future Investment Treaties, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In April of this year the US State Department released a new version of its model bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This text, like the various models the US has used over roughly the past 3 decades, represents the US’s basic policy position when it starts negotiations on investment treaties with other countries, and is therefore an important benchmark for the outcome US investors might hope for as a result of ongoing and potential future talks with countries such as China, Russia, and India. Overall, this new model text follows the approach taken by the US in its investment treaties over …

Inching Towards Consensus: An Update On The Uncitral Transparency Negotiations, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

From October 1-5, 2012, a working group of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) met in Vienna to continue work on how to ensure transparency in treaty-based investor-state arbitration. It was the working group’s fifth week-long meeting on the topic, but will not be the last. Although some issues were settled, many very significant ones remain contentious, and will be picked up again by the working group when it meets in February 2013.

How The Ftc Could Beat Google, Robert H. Lande, Jonathan L. Rubin

All Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission is rumored to be deciding whether to bring a “pure Section 5” case against Google as a result of complaints that the company unfairly favors its own offerings over those of its rivals in its search results. But the case will fail miserably at the hands of a reviewing court and the agency will be confined to relatively non-controversial enforcement violations if the FTC fails to impose upon itself a tightly bounded and constrained legal framework that contains clear limiting principles. The only way a court will allow the FTC to pursue a pure Section …

The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

In late June 2012, Barclays entered into a $453 million settlement with UK and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of Libor between 2005 and 2009. Among the agencies that investigated Barclays is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as other antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world). Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm.

We are cautious to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the …

Competitive Harm From Mfns: Economic Theories, Jonathan Baker

Presentations

No abstract provided.

Race, Markets, And Hollywood's Perpetual Antitrust Dilemma, Hosea H. Harvey

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article focuses on the oft-neglected intersection of racially skewed outcomes and anti-competitive markets. Through historical, contextual, and empirical analysis, the Article describes the state of Hollywood motion-picture distribution from its anticompetitive beginnings through the industry's role in creating an anti-competitive, racially divided market at the end of the last century. The Article's evidence suggests that race-based inefficiencies have plagued the film distribution process and such inefficiencies might likely be caused by the anti-competitive structure of the market itself, and not merely by overt or intentional racial-discrimination. After explaining why traditional anti-discrimination laws are ineffective remedies for such inefficiencies, the …

A New Prescription To Balance Secrecy And Disclosure In Drug-Approval Processes, Gerrit M. Beckhaus

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

To obtain approval to market a drug, a manufacturer must disclose significant amounts of research data to the government agency that oversees the approval process. The data often include information that could help advance scientific progress, and are therefore of great value. But current laws in both the United States and Europe give secrecy great weight. This Article proposes an obligatory sealed-bid auction of the sensitive information based on the experience with similar auctions in mergers and acquisitions, to balance manufacturers' interest in secrecy and the public interest in disclosure.

Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught and convicted. Based upon a sample of 75 international cartels, the authors calculate that the expected profits from price fixing almost always exceed the penalties. No wonder businesses often try to fix prices.