Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Bargaining Over Loyalty, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

Contracts between suppliers and customers frequently contain provisions rewarding the customer for exhibiting loyalty to the seller. For example, suppliers may offer customers preferential pricing for buying a specified percentage of their requirements from the supplier or buying minimum numbers of products across multiple product lines. Such loyalty-inducing contracts have come under attack on antitrust grounds because of their potential to foreclose competitors or soften competition by enabling tacit collusion among suppliers. This article defends loyalty inducement as a commercial practice. Although it can be anticompetitive under some circumstances, rewarding loyal customers is usually procompetitive and price- reducing. The two …

The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Transaction cost economics ("TCE") has radically altered industrial organization's explanation for so-called "non-standard contracts, "including "exclusionary" agreements that exclude rivals from access to inputs or customers. According to TCE, such integration usually reduces transaction costs without producing anticompetitive harm. TCE has accordingly exercised growing influence over antitrust doctrine, with courts invoking TCE's teachings to justify revision of some doctrines once hostile to such contracts. Still, old habits die hard, even for courts of increasing economic sophistication. This Article critiques one such habit, namely, courts'continuing claim that firms use market or monopoly power to impose exclusionary contracts on unwilling trading partners. …

The Federal Antitrust Implications Of Local Rent Control: A Plaintiff's Primer, Steven G. Churchwell

Pepperdine Law Review

The proliferation of rent control laws in many California cities has led to a furious debate concerning its legal, economic, and social consequences. Leading scholars believe that rent control only exacerbates existing housing shortages and excludes the poor, the minority and the elderly from scarce rental housing. This article sets forth the proposition that the fixing of rent ceilings by a local government violates the federal antitrust laws and can be invalidated in federal court.

The Commercialization Of College Football: The Universities Of Oklahoma And Georgia Learn An Antitrust Lesson In Ncaa V. Board Of Regents, Suzanne E. Rand

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And California's New Preferred Provider Organization Legislation: A New Alternative In Health Care Cost Containment , Carol A. Woo

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Greater International Convergence And The Behavioural Antitrust Gambit, Maurice E. Stucke

Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Reasoning Per Se And Horizontal Price Fixing: An Emerging Trend In Antitrust Litigation?, Joseph W. Defuria Jr.

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Boiler Room Fraud: An Operational Plan Utilizing The Injunction Against Fraud Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. §1345 , Robert M. Twiss

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Implications Of Medical Peer Review: Balancing The Competing Interests , Joan M. Ruane

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Arbitration Of Federal Domestic Antitrust Claims: How Safe Is The American Safety Doctrine?, Bruce R. Braun

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Department Of Justice Merger Guidelines: A Critique And A Proposed Improvement, R. Preston Mcafee, Michael A. Williams

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Saving The First Amendment From Itself: Relief From The Sherman Act Against The Rabbinic Cartels, Barak D. Richman

Pepperdine Law Review

America’s rabbis currently structure their employment market with rules that flagrantly violate the Sherman Act. The consequences of these rules, in addition to the predictable economic outcomes of inflated wages for rabbis and restricted consumer freedoms for the congregations that employ them, meaningfully hinder Jewish communities from seeking their preferred spiritual leader. Although the First Amendment cannot combat against this privately-orchestrated (yet paradigmatic) restriction on religious expression, the Sherman Act can. Ironically, however, the rabbinic organizations implementing the restrictive policies claim that the First Amendment immunizes them from Sherman Act scrutiny, thereby claiming the First Amendment empowers them to do …

Anti-Competitive Agreements: The Meaning Of “Agreement”, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

The trend towards convergence of substantive antitrust doctrine means that most jurisdictions now condemn agreements among competitors that fix prices. But that same convergence means that those same jurisdictions must wrestle with the problem of how to establish the existence of an agreement, especially in an oligopolistic industry where high prices could, at least in theory, be the result simply of oligopolistic interdependence. Do we condemn such interdependence? Do we ignore it and require an explicit agreement? Or is there some middle ground? This chapter explores how the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, the EU, have approached the problem …

Asia And Global Competition Law Convergence, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Protection Of Foreign Direct Investments In Developing And Emerging Markets Through The Instrumentality Of Arbitration: Fair Game?, Florence Shu-Acquaye

Faculty Scholarship

Investment treaties have tripled in the twenty-first century with over 170 countries signing onto bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Most BITs are made between a developed and a developing country, whereby a host country promises to protect home country's foreign direct investment (FDI) in exchange for the prospect of increased capital in the future. Hence, BITs tend to reduce the expected risks to FDI in that they stabilize a host country's existing investment environment, as well as provide a substitute for weak domestic laws and institutions that are often ill-equipped to protect FDI.

Antitrust Law And Economic Theory: Finding A Balance, Edward D. Cavanagh

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

Over the past forty years, the federal courts have relied more and more on economic theory to inform their antitrust analyses. Economic theory has indeed provided guidance with respect to antitrust issues and assisted the courts in reaching rational outcomes. At the same time, infusion of economic evidence into antitrust cases has made these cases more complex, lengthier, more expensive to litigate, and less predictable.

This Article argues that courts need to restore the balance between facts and economic theory in undertaking antitrust analysis. The problem is not that judges and juries cannot reach good outcomes in antitrust cases, but …

Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen F. Ross

Utah OnLaw: The Utah Law Review Online Supplement

Short of its two critical premises—that sports labor restraints may harm players but benefit fans and the sport’s popularity, and that the Sherman Act must always step aside to protect the “entire collective bargaining process”—Professor LeRoy’s thorough research loses much of its normative force. This provocative contribution is particularly revealing in one respect that he does not explicitly mention, however, akin to Sherlock Holmes’ famous insight that the telling clue was that the sleeping dog did not bark.34 All of the lawsuits Professor LeRoy studied involved challenges by union-represented players; none involved challenges by the principal beneficiaries of the Sherman …

A Portrait Of The Insider Trader As A Woman, Joan Macleod Heminway

Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Fairness And Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, Thomas J. Horton

McGeorge Law Review

No abstract provided.

Publiczne I Prywatne Egzekwowanie Zakazów Praktyk Ograniczających Konkurencję, Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka

Monografie CARS/CARS Monographs

Monografia autorstwa dr Agaty Jurkowskiej-Gomułki podejmuje problematykę korelacji prywatnego egzekwowania reguł konkurencji, rozumianego jako możliwość sądowego dochodzenia roszczeń wynikających z naruszenia prawa ochrony konkurencji, i publicznego egzekwowania reguł konkurencji, realizowanego przez organy publiczne.

Autorka podjęła próbę zaprogramowania - możliwego do aplikowania w warunkach polskiego systemu prawnej ochrony konkurencji - zrównoważonego modelu współistnienia publicznego i prywatnego egzekwowania zakazów praktyk ograniczających konkurencję. Relacje między publicznym i prywatnym egzekwowaniem reguł konkurencji określone zostały jako komplementarne, subsydiarne lub dekomplementarne. Za podstawę zrównoważonego modelu egzekwowania reguł konkurencji przyjęta została triada wartości: efektywność – spójność – równość.

Założenia teoretyczne modelu zostały częściowo przełożone na kierowane do …