The Influences Of Strategic Management On Antitrust Discourse,
2014
University of Connecticut School of Law
The Influences Of Strategic Management On Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao
Faculty Articles and Papers
This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit from ideas developed in the academic strategy field. Because accurate assessment and prediction of the effects of firm conduct depend in part on understanding individual firm capabilities, knowledge from the strategy field and other business fields complements the contributions from industrial organization economics (10). These business fields also offer theoretical and empirical challenges to the 10 paradigm, which dominates antitrust analysis. The article begins with a comparison between strategy and 10 and then illustrates how the strategy field can contribute to antitrust merger analysis. The article then assesses the influence …
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy,
2014
University of Michigan Law School
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …
The Next Generation Of Trade And Environment Conflicts: The Rise Of Green Industrial Policy,
2014
Duke Law School
The Next Generation Of Trade And Environment Conflicts: The Rise Of Green Industrial Policy, Mark Wu, James Salzman
Faculty Scholarship
A major shift is transforming the trade and environment field, triggered by governments’ rising use of industrial policies to spark nascent renewable energy industries and to restrict exports of certain minerals in the face of political economy constraints. While economically distorting, these policies do produce significant economic and environmental benefits. At the same time, they often violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, leading to increasingly harsh conflicts between trading partners.
This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of these emerging conflicts, arguing that they represent a sharp break from past trade and environment disputes. It examines the causes of the shift …
“Antitrust's Least Glorious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act,
2014
University of Florida
“Antitrust's Least Glorious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act, Roger D. Blair, Christina Depasquale
UF Law Faculty Publications
In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork explored many of antitrust’s misadventures. Specifically, Bork severely criticized the Robinson-Patman Act, which he characterized as “antitrust’s least glorious hour.” In this paper, we explore Bork’s criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act along with those of other legal scholars and economists. We analyze the central prohibitions of the act and explore their competitive implications. We also show that the act’s unfortunate prohibitions have been muted by the antitrust agencies’ benign neglect and three recent Supreme Court decisions.
The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union,
2014
University of Florida Levin College of Law
The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
To date, and despite pressures toward convergence, the United States and the European Union have taken different paths with respect to the enforcement of antitrust laws by private parties and, therefore, differ dramatically in levels of functional standing. U.S. law is more encouraging to private enforcement than E.U. law but has a narrower view of whom those private parties are permitted to be. In the European Union, the eligible parties are broad but the motivation of any single party to bring an action is quite low. In the United States, the substantive law and much of the procedural law flow …
Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury,
2014
University of Florida Levin College of Law
Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
In a 2013 opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James Robart calculated “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or RAND royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for licenses to use Motorola patents that were essential to two industry standards. Although the case involved only a claim for breach of contract, Judge Robart’s opinion regulated monopoly pricing, a task courts try to avoid in other contexts, claiming institutional incapacity. In this instance, however, Judge Robart identified standards that he believed adequately guided him in the task. He recognized that the economic purposes of the RAND commitment were to prevent owners of standards-essential patents …
Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic,
2014
American University Washington College of Law
Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
No abstract provided.
Intellectual Property Experimentalism By Way Of Competition Law,
2014
Columbia Law School
Intellectual Property Experimentalism By Way Of Competition Law, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
Competition law and Intellectual Property have divergent intellectual cultures – the former more pragmatic and experimentalist; the latter influenced by natural law and vested rights. The US Supreme Court decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis is an intellectual victory for the former approach, one that suggests that antitrust law can and should be used to introduce greater scrutiny of the specific consequences of intellectual property grants.
Rebalancing Pay-For-Delay: Why No-Authorized Generic Agreements Should Be Subject To Higher Antitrust Scrutiny,
2014
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Rebalancing Pay-For-Delay: Why No-Authorized Generic Agreements Should Be Subject To Higher Antitrust Scrutiny, David C. Kurlander
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Rethinking Trademark Functionality As A Question Of Fact,
2014
Saint Louis University School of Law
Rethinking Trademark Functionality As A Question Of Fact, Yvette Joy Liebesman
All Faculty Scholarship
Trade dress functionality stands for a reasonable premise: features which are essential to the use or purpose of an article, which affect the cost or quality of the article, or whose exclusive use would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage, are not protectable as signifiers of source or sponsorship. Functionality has broad implications, as a product’s shape can be its most identifiable feature.
The problems plaguing the functionality doctrine have been examined from a substantive point of view; however until the standard by which functionality is determined is changed, these problems are likely to continue to persist. When adjudicating …
Entire Issue Vol. 3 No. 1,
2014
Wydział Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego/Faculty of Management University of Warsaw
Entire Issue Vol. 3 No. 1
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)
Entire issue vol 3(1)
Patent Dialogue,
2014
American University Washington College of Law
Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
This Article examines the unique dialogic relationship that exists between the Supreme Court and Congress concerning patent law. In most areas of the law, Congress and the Supreme Court engage directly with each other to craft legal rules. When it comes to patent law, however, Congress and the Court often interact via an intermediary institution: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In patent law, dialogue often begins when Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a dialogic catalyst, signaling reform priorities to which the Federal Circuit often responds.
Appreciating the unique nature of patent dialogue has important …
Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit,
2014
American University Washington College of Law
Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the dominant institution in patent law. The court’s control over patent law and policy has led to a host of academic proposals to shift power away from the court and towards other institutions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and federal district courts. Surprisingly, however, academics have largely dismissed Congress as a potential institutional check on the Federal Circuit. Congress, it is felt, is too slow, too divided, and too beholden to special interests to effectively monitor changes in innovation and respond with appropriate reforms. …
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust,
2014
Notre Dame Law School
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
Behavioral antitrust – the application to antitrust analysis of empirical evidence of robust behavioral deviations from strict rationality – is increasingly popular and hotly debated by legal scholars and the enforcement agencies alike. This Article shows, however, that both proponents and opponents of behavioral antitrust frequently and fundamentally misconstrue its methodology, treating concrete empirical phenomena as if they were broad hypothetical assumptions. Because of this fundamental methodological error, scholars often make three classes of mistakes in behavioral antitrust analyses: First, they fail to appreciate the variability and heterogeneity of behavioral phenomena; second, they disregard the concrete ways in which markets, …
Joe Bauer Presented "Enforcement Issues Under American Antitrust Laws" At The University Of Tilburg (Holland) Center For Law And Economics On December 19, 2013,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Joe Bauer Presented "Enforcement Issues Under American Antitrust Laws" At The University Of Tilburg (Holland) Center For Law And Economics On December 19, 2013, Joseph P. Bauer
Faculty Lectures and Presentations
Joe Bauer presented a seminar at the University of Tilburg (Holland) Center for Law and Economics on December 19. His topic was Enforcement Issues under American Antitrust Laws. View PowerPoint slides of lecture by clicking pdf link.
Policing The Firm,
2013
University of Florida Levin College of Law
Policing The Firm, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers. Cartels are hard both to find and punish. Research into other kinds of corporate wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incentives within the firm to deter wrongdoing. Thus far, antitrust scholarship and policy have ignored this insight in the cartel context. This Article suggests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing enforcement efforts on changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.
A Channel Worth Changing? The Individual Regional Sports Network: Proliferation, Profits, Parity, And The Potential Administrative And Antitrust Issues That Could Follow,
2013
Pepperdine University
A Channel Worth Changing? The Individual Regional Sports Network: Proliferation, Profits, Parity, And The Potential Administrative And Antitrust Issues That Could Follow, Stephen Dixon
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
No abstract provided.
League Structure & Stadium Rent Seeking—The Role Of Antitrust Revisited,
2013
Northwestern University School of Law
League Structure & Stadium Rent Seeking—The Role Of Antitrust Revisited, David Haddock, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag
Florida Law Review
Professional North American sporting teams receive enormous public funding for new and renovated stadiums after threatening to depart their hometowns, or by actually moving elsewhere. In contrast, English sporting teams neither receive much public money for such projects, nor move towns. This Article argues that no inherent cultural or political transatlantic variations cause the differences; rather, it is the industrial organization of sports in the two countries—the structure of league control—that enables rent-seeking by American teams but not by their English counterparts. Cross-country time series data contrasting American professional football and baseball stadiums with English soccer grounds support our claim, …
Inconsistency In Antitrust,
2013
University of Kentucky College of Law
Inconsistency In Antitrust, Ramsi Woodcock
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
When the price of a good is too high, consumers who can afford to pay cost, including enough profit to make production worth the manufacturer's while, but cannot pay enough to meet the high price, are forced to do without. Economics teaches that efficiency would increase if price were to fall to cost because at cost the manufacturer would still be glad to produce and consumers could now afford to purchase more of the good. Efficiency requires that where more for less is possible, more must be had for less.
Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement,
2013
University of San Francisco
Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
The conventional wisdom is that private antitrust enforcement lacks any value. Indeed, skepticism of private enforcement has been so great that its critics make contradictory claims. The first major line of criticism is that private enforcement achieves too little — it does not even minimally compensate the actual victims of antitrust violations and does not significantly deter those violations. A second line of criticism contends that private enforcement achieves too much — providing excessive compensation, often to the wrong parties, and producing overdeterrence. This article undertakes the first ever systematic evaluation of these claims. Building upon original empirical work and …
