Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

The Influence Of Unbundling On The Activity Of Polish Power Grid Enterprises, Krzysztof Żebryk

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

The legal environment applied to Polish energy companies, operating within vertically integrated structures, has significantly changed after Poland’s accession to the EU. Previously, the subject of the activity of the then power plants (operating as state-owned enterprises property of the State Treasury, and then transformed into sole-shareholder companies of the State Treasury) included both: transmission or distribution of energy as well as its sale or production. The functioning of these enterprises as monopolists in transmission or distribution of energy, and at the same time operating in the sphere of energy sales, was at that time diagnosed as the main barrier …

Competition In Public Procurement Act After The Amendment – Selected, Beata Zwolińska

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

Polish Public Procurement Act contains many references to its competition law. There are references to the Competition and Consumer Protection Act and to the Combating Unfair Competition Act. These laws include definitions of terms such as “bid rigging”, “capital group”, “unfair competition act” or “trade secret”. In the article, the author examines links between Public Procurement Act, the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection and the Act on Combating Unfair Competition. The author recalls also changes introduced by the amendment of the Public Procurement Act in the field of competition law.

Assessment Of The ‘Significance Of The Restriction Of Competition’ Premise In The Context Of Defining Relevant Markets In The Case-Law On Concentration Control Of Entrepreneurs, Monika Bychowska

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

Control of concentration is one of the competences of the President of the Polish competition authority. The exercise of this competence is intended to prevent competition restrictions resulting from structural behaviors of entrepreneurs. A ‘significant restriction of competition’ is the premise examined during the adjudication process in matters related to the control of concentrations. There are no uniform tests that would allow a clear determination of the fulfillment of this premise. A significant restriction of competition is always analyzed in an individual case of an actual concentration.

Economic Evidence In The Assessment Of Concentrations On The Example Of Taking Control Over Edf Polska S.A. By Pge Polska Grupa Energetyczna Sa, Władysław Hydzik

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

The article discusses the issue of assessing the economic effects of a vertical concentration, with particular emphasis on the possibility of restricting access to the factor of production. An example of a concentration in the power sector was selected for the analysis – the takeover of EDF’s assets by the Polish Energy Group PGE. The issues raised above all relate to economic evidence that indicated the possibility of restricting access to the wholesale electricity market after the concentration of PGE and the EDF Group and to identify the unexplained factors in accordance with the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal …

Are Changes Coming Concerning The Approach Of Competition Authorities Regarding Conditional Rebates Applied By Dominant Companies? Judgment Of The Court (Grand Chamber) Dated 6 September 2017 In Case C413/14 P Intel Corp. Inc. Vs. European Commission, Teresa Kaczyńska-Kochaniec

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

This article provides a concise description of the main competition problems related to the proceedings initiated by the European Commission against the Intel Corporation Inc., the world leader in the market for computer processors. The purpose of this article is to outline the proceedings up to now in the context of the use by dominant companies of conditional rebates, in particular loyalty rebates. Within the framework of this article, the author has assessed the ECJ’s judgment and noted both the positive and negative aspects of this ruling.

Daria Kostecka-Jurczyk, Concentration In The Form Of A Joint Venture And The Competitive Risk In The Light Of Competition Law, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2017, Pp. 304, Rajmund Molski

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

No abstract provided.

Seminar “Challenges In Trade Relations In The Food Supply Chain After The Entry Into Force Of The Law On Contractual Advantage”, March 7th, 2018, Faculty Of Management Of The University Of Warsaw, Adam Jasser

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

No abstract provided.

Dariusz Aziewicz, Assessment Of The Market Power Of An Entrepreneur Within The Supervision Of Horizontal Concentrations Of Entrepreneurs, University Of Warsaw Faculty Of Management Press, Warsaw 2017, Pp. 329, Cezary Banasiński

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

No abstract provided.

Applying The Rule Of Reason To Two–Sided Platform Businesses, David S. Evans, Richard Schmalensee

University of Miami Business Law Review

In recent years, the federal courts’ analysis of the competitive effects of conduct challenged under the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, which generally includes market definition as a critical step, has been properly guided by sensitivity to business reality and sound economic analysis of the conduct at issue. When it comes to two–sided platforms, the courts should adhere to that same flexible but principled approach and avoid rigid alternatives that would apply regardless of the platform, conduct, or fact–pattern.

In Ohio v. American Express Co., (Case No. 16–1454), now before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Department of Justice …

Assessing The Competitive Effects Of Surcharging The Use Of Payment Mechanisms, Steven Semeraro

University of Miami Business Law Review

The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking the non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant contracts contends that point–of–sale competition on the price of making a purchase with a credit card is an instrument creating economic efficiency. That is, the economy would run more efficiently, and consumers would be better off, if merchants were free to charge variable prices for different types of credit cards. After all, charging different prices for using different types of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of presumptively positive price competition.

The Second Circuit rejected that conclusion, recognizing that in …

Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood

University of Miami Business Law Review

The Second Circuit ruled that American Express did not have market power because it operated in a two-sided market and any leverage it exercised over merchants derived from its successful competition for cardholders. As a result, the relevant market had to include both sides of a credit card transaction, the company’s market share was modest, and it could not exploit both merchants and cardholders. In Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming in B.U. L. REV.), I propose a new approach that infers market power from the likely effects of the challenged conduct. This approach shows that American Express clearly exercised …

Law School News: 'Marketplace Of Ideas' Imperiled (04-05-2018), David A. Logan

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Clarifications And Gratitude, Chris Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Certain things in this book plainly require clarification to avoid misunderstanding. In fact, I think this little discussion was among three people who mostly agree with each other, except that the reviewers may not have known it because I failed to explain myself well enough. Because I didn't, they mostly didn't discuss what I always intended to be the book's real contribution and its most interesting material.

I start out in Part I by trying to restate what I see as the problem that is the book's only immediate concern. That restatement is a first draft for how I will …

An Examination Of Product Hopping By Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem And A Proposed Solution, Daniel Burke

Cleveland State Law Review

The balance between incentivizing innovation through exclusivity protection and maintaining competitive market conditions—including prices for consumers—is a difficult line to toe. Product hopping has characteristics that constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because companies can maintain monopoly power in the pharmaceutical market. While some monopoly power is justified as an incentive for incredibly costly innovation, extended periods of exclusivity harms consumers by keeping prescription drug prices artificially inflated. Allowing generic drug manufacturers to compete sooner in the prescription drug market by disallowing product hopping by name-brand pharmaceutical drug companies will aid in driving down prices. Courts should adopt …

Football In London? An Antitrust Examination Of The National Football League’S International Expansion Efforts, Michael Scott

Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review

The NFL's potential international expansion to the UK presents significant antitrust challenges in both the US and the UK, requiring careful navigation of legal frameworks and strategic planning to avoid scrutiny.

Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari

Pepperdine Law Review

Healthcare companies are consolidating at an alarming rate. From hospitals, to providers’ offices, to insurance companies, there are increasingly fewer consumer choices and more monopolies, which calls for heightened antitrust enforcement. Interestingly, antitrust enforcement authority in the healthcare industry is shared between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which presides over hospital and provider mergers, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which presides over health insurance mergers. Although the FTC has challenged many hospital and provider mergers, the DOJ has only challenged six health insurance mergers. Furthermore, last year, the DOJ ultimately approved all health insurance mergers. In 2017, in United …

Antitrust As Corporate Governance: Why A Firm's Mission Is To Earn No Profit, Ramsi Woodcock

Law Faculty Popular Media

The consumer welfare standard in antitrust law requires that firms maximize the margin between price and product quality, a quantity called consumer welfare by economists. This standard, adopted in the 1970s, resolves the long-running debate about which corporate constituency has a right to the profits of the firm, because profits and consumer welfare are a zero-sum game: Profits can be generated only by reducing the margin between price and quality, in effect redistributing wealth from consumers to firms. The rule that consumer welfare must be maximized therefore means that profits must be minimized. The consumer welfare standard requires that firms …

Antitrust's Unconventional Politics, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

For the first time in a generation, political pressure is growing to reform antitrust in a considerably more interventionist direction. To the bafflement of many observers, these political pressures are emerging simultaneously from both wings of the political spectrum. Although unconventional in presentist right/left terms, antitrust's ideological ambiguity has longstanding historical roots. This Essay examines three historical friction points that help explain the current political dislocations around antitrust reform: (1) the coupling of ideological aversion to large scale in government and business; (2) the shifting meaning of the word "monopoly," from exclusive governmentally granted privilege to privately obtained market power; …

Change Has More Than One Name, Anna Piszcz

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

From the Editor-in-Chief.

Prevention Of The Abuse Of Significant Market Power In The Sale Of Agricultural And Food Products In The Czech Republic – Selected Issues, Małgorzata Salitra

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

The article presents an outline of regulations concerning the abuse of significant market power in the sale of agricultural and food products in the Czech Republic. The article presents selected, most significant – in the author’s opinion – changes introduced as a result of the amendment of the Significant Market Power Act in the sale of agricultural and food products and its abuse. The publication focuses mainly on material and legal rules, in particular: the subjective and objective scope of the Act, the definition of ‘significant market power’, the list of practices that constitute an abuse of significant market power, …