Administrative Law Commons^™

Accreditation Under Fire: How Striking A Balance Between Accreditor Accountability And Autonomy Can Strengthen Educational Quality, Tyler J. Bishoff

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

“Officers” In The Supreme Court: Lucia V. Sec, Jennifer L. Mascott

Scholarly Articles

This article appeared in the Cato Supreme Court Review addressing the Court's October Term 2017. The article addresses the Court's June 2018 opinion in Lucia v. SEC, which held that administrative law judges in the Securities and Exchange Commission are "Officers of the United States" within the meaning of the Constitution's Appointments Clause. Significant portions of this article are based on my earlier study of the original meaning of the Appointments Clause that the Stanford Law Review published in February 2018, see 73 Stan. L. Rev. 443 (2018).

Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, And Market Failure, John J. Chung

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Faa’S Mental Health Standards: Are They Reasonable?, Katie Manworren

Journal of Air Law and Commerce

No abstract provided.

Safety Meets Efficiency: The Medical Device Drone’S Role In Bringing About A Workable Regulatory Framework For Commercial Drones, Luke Strieber

Journal of Air Law and Commerce

No abstract provided.

Panel Effects In Administrative Law: A Study Of Rules, Standards, And Judicial Whistleblowing, Morgan Hazelton, Kristin E. Hickman, Emerson Tiller

SMU Law Review

In this article, we consider whether “panel effects”—that is, the condition where the presence, or expected voting behavior, of one judge on a judicial panel influences the way another judge, or set of judges, on the same panel votes—varies depending upon the form of the legal doctrine. In particular, we ask whether the hand of an ideological minority appellate judge (that is, a Democrat-appointed judge with two Republican appointees or a Republican-appointed judge with two Democrat appointees) is strengthened by the existence of a legal doctrine packaged in the form of a rule rather than a standard. Specifically, we unbundle …

If Established By Law, Then An Administrative Judge Is An Officer, Jennifer L. Cotton

Georgia Law Review

Administrative Judges (AJs) are a large and often overlooked group of federal agency adjudicators. While courts have examined Article II Appointments Clause challenges to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), courts have yet to encounter a legal challenge to the constitutionality of AJs’ appointment procedures. The constitutionality of any federal government actor’s appointment is dependent upon whether that actor is an “officer” or an “employee” under the Article II Appointments clause. It is apparent that the current “significant authority” test that the Supreme Court has espoused to distinguish between officers and employees is unworkable. This Note endeavors to set forth a bright-line …

Visual Rulemaking, Elizabeth G. Porter, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

Visual politics are seeping into the technocracy. Rulemaking stakeholders—including agencies, the President, and members of the public—are deploying politically tinged visuals to push their agendas at every stage of high-stakes, often virulently controversial, rulemakings. These images, GIFs, and videos usually do not make it into the official rulemaking record, so this new “visual rulemaking” world has not been discussed much by scholars or others.

In this article, we explore the new visual rulemaking culture that emerged in Obama’s presidency, providing examples and discussing relevant policy implications. Although we recognize some risks, we argue that, on balance, visual rulemaking is a …

Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler

Georgia Law Review

This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …

Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler

Scholarly Works

This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …

Transparency's Ideological Drift, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

In the formative periods of American "open government" law, the idea of transparency was linked with progressive politics. Advocates of transparency understood themselves to be promoting values such as bureaucratic rationality, social justice, and trust in public institutions. Transparency was meant to make government stronger and more egalitarian. In the twenty-first century, transparency is doing different work. Although a wide range of actors appeal to transparency in a wide range of contexts, the dominant strain in the policy discourse emphasizes its capacity to check administrative abuse, enhance private choice, and reduce other forms of regulation. Transparency is meant to make …

How Constitutional Norms Break Down, Josh Chafetz, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

From the moment Donald Trump was elected president, critics have anguished over a breakdown in constitutional norms. History demonstrates, however, that constitutional norms are perpetually in flux. The principal source of instability is not that these unwritten rules can be destroyed by politicians who deny their legitimacy, their validity, or their value. Rather, the principal source of instability is that constitutional norms can be decomposed – dynamically interpreted and applied in ways that are held out as compliant but end up limiting their capacity to constrain the conduct of government officials.

This Article calls attention to that latent instability and, …

The Administrative Threat To Civil Liberties, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative power is the greatest threat to civil liberties in our era. Traditionally, the most systematic threats to civil liberties came in attacks on particular groups, and this remains a problem. But increasingly, there are also broader threats, which affect the civil liberties of all Americans, and administrative power is the primary example of this broad sort of danger. No single development in our legal system deprives more Americans of more constitutional rights. It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that it is our greatest threat to civil liberties.

Chevron On Stilts: A Response To Jonathan Siegel, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Whither Chevron? For several years, some justices of the Supreme Court have been questioning Chevron deference, partly on the basis of my constitutional critique of it. It was inevitable that someone would stand up in defense of that doctrine, and I am glad to say that my estimable former colleague Jonathan Siegel has stepped up to the plate. But the defense of the indefensible is not easy.

Although the long-standing conventional critique of Chevron was that it violates the separation of powers and federalism, my criticism is that Chevron deference corrupts the judicial process. As adumbrated in my 2014 …

The Administrative Evasion Of Procedural Rights, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative power does profound harm to civil liberties, and nowhere is this clearer than in the administrative evasion of procedural rights. All administrative power is a mode of evasion, but the evasion of juries, due process, and other procedural rights is especially interesting as it most concretely reveals the administrative threat to civil liberties.

In contemporary doctrine, due process and most other procedural rights are understood mainly as standards for adjudication in the courts. Traditionally, however, they were understood, at least as much, to bar adjudication outside the courts. That is, they were understood to block evasions of the courts …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this Essay explores how …

Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of agency statutory …

Our Regionalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

This article provides an account of Our Regionalism to supplement the many accounts of Our Federalism. After describing the legal forms regions assume in the United States — through interstate cooperation, organization of federal administrative agencies, and hybrid state-federal efforts — it explores how regions have shaped American governance across the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

In the years leading up to the New Deal, commentators invoked regions to resist centralization, arguing that state coordination could forestall expansion of the federal government. But regions were soon deployed to a different end, as the federal government relied on regional administration to …

Protecting The Environment In An Era Of Federal Retreat: The View From New York City, Rebecca Bratspies

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Come Hell And High Water: Climate Change Policy In The Age Of Trump, Brigham Daniels

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.