Immunity Through Bankruptcy For The Sackler Family, 2024 S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah; Harvard Law School
Immunity Through Bankruptcy For The Sackler Family, Daniel G. Aaron, Michael S. Sinha
All Faculty Scholarship
In August 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court temporarily blocked one of the largest public health settlements in history: that of Purdue Pharma, L.P., reached in bankruptcy court. The negotiated bankruptcy settlement approved by the court would give a golden parachute to the very people thought to have ignited the opioid crisis: the Sackler family. As the Supreme Court considers the propriety of immunity through bankruptcy, the case has raised fundamental questions about whether bankruptcy is a proper refuge from tort liability and whether law checks power or law serves power.
Of course, bankruptcy courts often limit liability against a distressed …
Cross Border Restructuring And Bankruptcy Litigation Ft. Kobre & Kim Llp, 2024 Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law
Cross Border Restructuring And Bankruptcy Litigation Ft. Kobre & Kim Llp, Cardozo International Law Society (Cils)
Flyers 2023-2024
No abstract provided.
Law In Books Versus Law In Action In The Landmark Shenzhen, China, Personal Bankruptcy Regime, 2024 Emory University School of Law
Law In Books Versus Law In Action In The Landmark Shenzhen, China, Personal Bankruptcy Regime, Jason J. Kilborn
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
The first personal bankruptcy regime in Mainland China celebrated its second anniversary on March 1, 2023. An empirical assessment of the law in action during these first two years reveals some troubling deviations from the early promises of the new law on the books. In the first year, a handful of judges were charged with an arduous in-person review process for over 1,000 applicants, and they accepted only twenty-five for case initiation. In the second year, initial case review was delegated to an administrative body—an important efficiency enhancement that tripled the number of opened cases. Nonetheless, most debtors continue to …
Shareholder Primacy Versus Shareholder Accountability, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Shareholder Primacy Versus Shareholder Accountability, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
When corporations inflict injuries in the course of business, shareholders wielding environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) principles can, and now sometimes do, intervene to correct the matter. In the emerging fact pattern, corporate social accountability expands out of its historic collectivized frame to become an internal subject matter—a corporate governance topic. As a result, shareholder accountability surfaces as a policy question for the first time. The Big Three index fund managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, responded to the accountability question with ESG activism. In so doing, they defected against corporate legal theory’s central tenet, shareholder primacy. Shareholder primacy builds …
Public Primacy In Corporate Law, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Public Primacy In Corporate Law, Dorothy S. Lund
Seattle University Law Review
This Article explores the malleability of agency theory by showing that it could be used to justify a “public primacy” standard for corporate law that would direct fiduciaries to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of the public. Employing agency theory to describe the relationship between corporate management and the broader public sheds light on aspects of firm behavior, as well as the nature of state contracting with corporations. It also provides a lodestar for a possible future evolution of corporate law and governance: minimize the agency costs created by the divergence of interests between management and …
Corporate Law In The Global South: Heterodox Stakeholderism, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Corporate Law In The Global South: Heterodox Stakeholderism, Mariana Pargendler
Seattle University Law Review
How do the corporate laws of Global South jurisdictions differ from their Global North counterparts? Prevailing stereotypes depict the corporate laws of developing countries as either antiquated or plagued by problems of enforcement and misfit despite formal convergence. This Article offers a different view by showing how Global South jurisdictions have pioneered heterodox stakeholder approaches in corporate law, such as the erosion of limited liability for purposes of stakeholder protection in Brazil and India, the adoption of mandatory corporate social responsibility in Indonesia and India, and the large-scale program of Black corporate ownership and empowerment in South Africa, among many …
Robo-Voting: Does Delegated Proxy Voting Pose A Challenge For Shareholder Democracy?, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Robo-Voting: Does Delegated Proxy Voting Pose A Challenge For Shareholder Democracy?, John Matsusaka, Chong Shu
Seattle University Law Review
Robo-voting is the practice by an investment fund of mechanically voting in corporate elections according to the advice of its proxy advisor— in effect fully delegating its voting decision to its advisor. We examined over 65 million votes cast during the period 2008–2021 by 14,582 mutual funds to describe and quantify the prevalence of robo-voting. Overall, 33% of mutual funds robo-voted in 2021: 22% with ISS, 4% with Glass Lewis, and six percent with the recommendations of the issuer’s management. The fraction of funds that robo-voted increased until around 2013 and then stabilized at the current level. Despite the sizable …
The Esg Information System, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
The Esg Information System, Stavros Gadinis, Amelia Miazad
Seattle University Law Review
The mounting focus on ESG has forced internal corporate decision-making into the spotlight. Investors are eager to support companies in innovative “green” technologies and scrutinize companies’ transition plans. Activists are targeting boards whose decisions appear too timid or insufficiently explained. Consumers and employees are incorporating companies sustainability credentials in their purchasing and employment decisions. These actors are asking companies for better information, higher quality reports, and granular data. In response, companies are producing lengthy sustainability reports, adopting ambitious purpose statements, and touting their sustainability credentials. Understandably, concerns about greenwashing and accountability abound, and policymakers are preparing for action.
In this …
Stakeholder Governance On The Ground (And In The Sky), 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Stakeholder Governance On The Ground (And In The Sky), Stephen Johnson, Frank Partnoy
Seattle University Law Review
Professor Frank Partnoy: This is a marvelous gathering, and it is all due to Chuck O’Kelley and the special gentleness, openness, and creativity that he brings to this symposium. For more than a decade, he has been open to new and creative ways to discuss important issues surrounding business law and Adolf Berle’s legacy. We also are grateful to Dorothy Lund for co-organizing this gathering.
In introducing Stephen Johnson, I am reminded of a previous Berle, where Chuck allowed me some time to present the initial thoughts that led to my book, WAIT: The Art and Science of Delay. Part …
Stakeholder Capitalism’S Greatest Challenge: Reshaping A Public Consensus To Govern A Global Economy, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Stakeholder Capitalism’S Greatest Challenge: Reshaping A Public Consensus To Govern A Global Economy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Michael Klain
Seattle University Law Review
The Berle XIV: Developing a 21st Century Corporate Governance Model Conference asks whether there is a viable 21st Century Stakeholder Governance model. In our conference keynote article, we argue that to answer that question yes requires restoring—to use Berle’s term—a “public consensus” throughout the global economy in favor of the balanced model of New Deal capitalism, within which corporations could operate in a way good for all their stakeholders and society, that Berle himself supported.
The world now faces problems caused in large part by the enormous international power of corporations and the institutional investors who dominate their governance. These …
Delegated Corporate Voting And The Deliberative Franchise, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Delegated Corporate Voting And The Deliberative Franchise, Sarah C. Haan
Seattle University Law Review
Starting in the 1930s with the earliest version of the proxy rules, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has gradually increased the proportion of “instructed” votes on the shareholder’s proxy card until, for the first time in 2022, it required a fully instructed proxy card. This evolution effectively shifted the exercise of the shareholder’s vote from the shareholders’ meeting to the vote delegation that occurs when the share-holder fills out the proxy card. The point in the electoral process when the binding voting choice is communicated is now the execution of the proxy card (assuming the shareholder completes the card …
A Different Approach To Agency Theory And Implications For Esg, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
A Different Approach To Agency Theory And Implications For Esg, Jonathan Bonham, Amoray Riggs-Cragun
Seattle University Law Review
In conventional agency theory, the agent is modeled as exerting unobservable “effort” that influences the distribution over outcomes the principal cares about. Recent papers instead allow the agent to choose the entire distribution, an assumption that better describes the extensive and flexible control that CEOs have over firm outcomes. Under this assumption, the optimal contract rewards the agent directly for outcomes the principal cares about, rather than for what those outcomes reveal about the agent’s effort. This article briefly summarizes this new agency model and discusses its implications for contracting on ESG activities.
Stakeholder Governance As Governance By Stakeholders, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Stakeholder Governance As Governance By Stakeholders, Brett Mcdonnell
Seattle University Law Review
Much debate within corporate governance today centers on the proper role of corporate stakeholders, such as employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and local communities. Scholars and reformers advocate for greater attention to stakeholder interests under a variety of banners, including ESG, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, and stakeholder governance. So far, that advocacy focuses almost entirely on arguing for an expanded understanding of corporate purpose. It argues that corporate governance should be for various stakeholders, not shareholders alone.
This Article examines and approves of that broadened understanding of corporate purpose. However, it argues that we should understand stakeholder governance as extending well …
The Need For Corporate Guardrails In U.S. Industrial Policy, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
The Need For Corporate Guardrails In U.S. Industrial Policy, Lenore Palladino
Seattle University Law Review
U.S. politicians are actively “marketcrafting”: the passage of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act collectively mark a new moment of robust industrial policy. However, these policies are necessarily layered on top of decades of shareholder primacy in corporate governance, in which corporate and financial leaders have prioritized using corporate profits to increase the wealth of shareholders. The Administration and Congress have an opportunity to use industrial policy to encourage a broader reorientation of U.S. businesses away from extractive shareholder primacy and toward innovation and productivity. This Article examines discrete opportunities within the …
Capitalism Stakeholderism, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Capitalism Stakeholderism, Christina Parajon Skinner
Seattle University Law Review
Today’s corporate governance debates are replete with discussion of how best to operationalize so-called stakeholder capitalism—that is, a version of capitalism that considers the interests of employees, communities, suppliers, and the environment alongside (if not before) a company’s shareholders. So much focus has been dedicated to the question of capitalism’s reform that few have questioned a key underlying premise of stakeholder capitalism: that is, that competitive capitalism does not serve these various constituencies and groups. This Essay presents a different view and argues that capitalism is, in fact, the ultimate form of stakeholderism. As such, the Essay urges that the …
Table Of Contents, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Seattle University Law Review
Table of Contents
The Structure Of Corporate Law Revolutions, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
The Structure Of Corporate Law Revolutions, William Savitt
Seattle University Law Review
Since, call it 1970, corporate law has operated under a dominant conception of governance that identifies profit-maximization for stockholder benefit as the purpose of the corporation. Milton Friedman’s essay The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, published in September of that year, provides a handy, if admittedly imprecise, marker for the coronation of the shareholder-primacy paradigm. In the decades that followed, corporate law scholars pursued an ever-narrowing research agenda with the purpose and effect of confirming the shareholder-primacy paradigm. Corporate jurisprudence followed a similar path, slowly at first and later accelerating, to discover in the precedents and …
The Limits Of Corporate Governance, 2024 Seattle University School of Law
The Limits Of Corporate Governance, Cathy Hwang, Emily Winston
Seattle University Law Review
What is the purpose of the corporation? For decades, the answer was clear: to put shareholders’ interests first. In many cases, this theory of shareholder primacy also became synonymous with the imperative to maximize shareholder wealth. In the world where shareholder primacy was a north star, courts, scholars, and policymakers had relatively little to fight about: most debates were minor skirmishes about exactly how to maximize shareholder wealth.
Part I of this Essay discusses the shortcomings of shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance, arguing that neither of these modes of governance provides an adequate framework for incentivizing corporations to do good. …
Chapter 13: Let’S Call The Whole Thing Off, 2024 Emory University School of Law
Chapter 13: Let’S Call The Whole Thing Off, Lawrence Ponoroff
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
Courts cannot agree on much of anything about chapter 13, and legislators cannot agree and are confused over what to do about it. This state of affairs benefits no one and shows no signs of abating. So, in this Article, I propose to throw in the towel by imagining a world without chapter 13. Spoiler alert: although I am not superstitious, with just a few tweaks and tucks to chapter 7, I think the Bankruptcy Code might just be better off operating like a high-rise elevator that goes directly from floor twelve to floor fourteen. I will lay it out …
Safe Harboring Sloppiness: The Scope Of, And Available Remedies Under, Sections 363(M) And 364(E), 2024 Emory University School of Law
Safe Harboring Sloppiness: The Scope Of, And Available Remedies Under, Sections 363(M) And 364(E), Vishal Patel
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
No abstract provided.