Correspondence Between Haptic And Visual Perception Of Stand-On-Ability: Do Hills Look As Steep As They Feel?,
2016
University of Southern Mississippi
Correspondence Between Haptic And Visual Perception Of Stand-On-Ability: Do Hills Look As Steep As They Feel?, Jonathan Kenealy Doyon
Master's Theses
Vision and haptics play a central role in perceiving environmental layout to guide action. Hajnal, Wagman, Doyon, and Clark (2016) demonstrated that visual perception of stand-on-ability is accurate compared to action capabilities, whereas haptic perception of stand-on-ability reliably underestimates action capabilities. This finding contradicts Gibson’s (1979) theory of equivalence in perceptual systems, which suggests that perception should be equivalent regardless of modality. Previous comparisons of visual and haptic perception tested the modalities in isolation. The current experiment directly compares visual to haptic perception of stand-on-ability by using one perceptual system to estimate the other. Observers viewed a surface set to …
How Do Designers Of The Built Environment Attempt To Make Ecological Sustainability Sensory Legible?,
2016
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
How Do Designers Of The Built Environment Attempt To Make Ecological Sustainability Sensory Legible?, Carly L. Bartow
Architecture Undergraduate Honors Theses
This paper attempts to provide a theoretical framework for making ecosystem function and ecologically sustainable design more perceptible or sensible to people through architecture and the built environment. Design features of the Bertschi School Science Wing and the Bullitt Center in Seattle, Washington are incorporated to illustrate the sensory legibility of ecological sustainability criteria.The criteria are available to designers to help educate a building's occupants on environmentally sustainable design and motivate more sustainable behavior.
An Investigation Into Hybrid Models Of Mindreading: A Dual Type Theory Account,
2016
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
An Investigation Into Hybrid Models Of Mindreading: A Dual Type Theory Account, Alexandra Jewell
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
Mindreading, or attributing mental states to others, involves instances of simulation and theory; but there is controversy over which one of these methods is the primary, or default, mechanism. I propose that mindreading is a theory-based process, such that we utilize theory over simulation when both are available and reliable. To argue my position, I suggest that theory has been inaccurately portrayed in past discussion and that we possess two types: a connectionist network (tt1) and a traditional, conceptual folk-psychology (tt2). By dividing theory in this way, we can explain common phenomena of mindreading that other theory-based accounts do not …
Animals In The Wild,
2016
Brittany Samson
Animals In The Wild, Brittany Samson
The STEAM Journal
As a photographer, I am extremely interested in the concept of perception and I let this concept drive most of my artistic work. I present four images from my photographic series “Animals in the Wild,” which explore this idea of perception. These four images: Giraffe, Dinosaur, Buffalo, and Bunny—are drastically varied photos that include no real animals, but instead beg the mind to perceive shapes, colors, figure, and coincidence as an animal.
Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences,
2016
Macquarie University, Australia
Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form …
Dissociable Early Attentional Control Mechanisms Underlying Cognitive And Affective Conflicts,
2016
Sichuan University
Dissociable Early Attentional Control Mechanisms Underlying Cognitive And Affective Conflicts, Taolin Chen, Keith M. Kendrick, Chunliang Feng, Shiyue Sun, Xun Yang, Xiaogang Wang, Wenbo Luo, Suyong Yang, Xiaoqi Huang, Pedro A. Valdes-Sosa, Qiyong Gong, Jin Fan, Yue-Jia Luo
Publications and Research
It has been well documented that cognitive conflict is sensitive to the relative proportion of congruent and incongruent trials. However, few studies have examined whether affective conflict processing is modulated as a function of proportion congruency (PC). To address this question we recorded eventrelated potentials (ERP) while subjects performed both cognitive and affective face-word Stroop tasks. By varying the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials in each block, we examined the extent to which PC impacts both cognitive and affective conflict control at different temporal stages. Results showed that in the cognitive task an anteriorly localized early N2 component occurred …
Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology,
2016
Nanyang Technological University
Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Reber’s axiom: “Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” does not seem to be supported by things we know and the logic of evolutionary biology. The latter leads to the conclusion that conscious species are flexible in their behavior (rather than in their cell walls), as argued in Ng (1995, 2016). Locomotion may be completely hard-wired and need not involve consciousness. It is hard enough to explain how consciousness could emerge in a sophisticated brain: Isn’t it a harder problem to show …
The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits,
2016
San Francisco State University
The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes
Animal Sentience
Theoretical frameworks in which consciousness is an inherent property of the neuron must account for the contrast between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain and address how neural events can ever be unconscious if consciousness is a property of all neurons. Other approaches have sought answers regarding consciousness by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes and through investigating the complex interactions between the two kinds of processes, as occurs most notably in human voluntary action. In voluntary action, consciousness is associated most, not with motor control or low-level perceptual processing, but with the stage of processing known as action selection.
Sms Derived Vs. Public Perceived Risk In Aviation Technology Acceptance (Literature Review),
2016
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Sms Derived Vs. Public Perceived Risk In Aviation Technology Acceptance (Literature Review), Paul L. Myers Iii
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace
Aviation technology progressed from the first airplane flight to landing on the moon in just 63 years with continued progress today. Thus, organizations like commercial airlines and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) that use a Safety Management System (SMS) are periodically implementing technology changes. Typically, two different processes are used to derive SMS and public perceived risk. Disparity between the two processes coupled with dissimilar influencing factors has, at times, frequently slowed or halted technology implementation. Understanding both processes and influencing factors using a literature review allows for a more proactive approach in implementing technology, aids in gauging …
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle,
2016
University of British Columbia
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
With the exception of the commentary by Key, the commentaries on Reber have a common feature: the commenters feel, with varying levels of enthusiasm, that there is at least some virtue in the core assumption of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) theory that consciousness (or subjectivity or sentience) accompanies the earliest forms of life. The model has two important entailments: (a) it resolves the (in)famous Hard Problem by redirecting the search for the biochemical foundations of sentience away from human consciousness; and (b) it reduces the need for an emergentist miracle to a far simpler scale than is currently …
No Help On The Hard Problem,
2016
University of St Andrews
No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball
Animal Sentience
The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about …
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?,
2016
The University of Southern Indiana
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Animal Sentience
Rowlands argues that many nonhuman animals are “persons,” contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy which rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. He argues that self-awareness bifurcates into two importantly different forms — reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-awareness — and that many animals can have the latter, which is sufficient for personhood. I agree that there is good reason to think that many animals can have pre-reflective self-awareness, but I think Rowlands is mistaken about its nature. His account runs the risk of leading to an infinite regress objection, and his notion of pre-reflective self-awareness …
A Validation Of The Efficacy Of Descriptive Instrumental Collective Case Study Research Methodology For Examining Pilot Cognitive Functioning,
2016
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Worldwide
A Validation Of The Efficacy Of Descriptive Instrumental Collective Case Study Research Methodology For Examining Pilot Cognitive Functioning, Clint R. Balog
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace
The research conducted developed a descriptive understanding of how the cognitive processes of risk assessment, problem solving, and decision making, as well as other supportive processes, are employed by pilots-in-command (PICs) during the experience of extended, extreme, in-flight emergencies. This understanding is then applied to similar dynamic, operational environments. The research also validated the applicability and efficacy of Robert Stake’s 1995 descriptive, instrumental, collective case study methodology as a tool for investigating such phenomenon and developing such an understanding. Specifically, the research details the necessary procedures for employing this methodology successfully, and provides example of those procedures, and their results, …
The Psychological Concept Of “Person”,
2016
York University Animal Sentience
The Psychological Concept Of “Person”, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
Reluctance to overextend personhood seems to drive many of the skeptical responses in the first round of commentaries on Rowlands's target article. Despite Rowlands’s straightforward Response that we already accept some nonhumans as persons, there is still hesitation to accept that other nonhuman animals are persons. Rowlands's argument is sound but the skeptics don’t accept the Lockean notion of person. The metaphysical sense of person is a psychological one, however, and psychological properties grant one moral status according to many ethical theories.
Is The Smartphone A Smart Choice? The Effect Of Smartphone Separation On Executive Functions,
2016
Singapore Management University
Is The Smartphone A Smart Choice? The Effect Of Smartphone Separation On Executive Functions, Andree Hartanto, Hwajin Yang
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Despite a huge spike in smartphone overuse, the cognitive and emotional consequences of smartphone overuse have rarely been examined empirically. In two studies, we investigated whether separation from a smartphone influences state anxiety and impairs higher-order cognitive processes, such as executive functions. We found that smartphone separation causes heightened anxiety, which in turn mediates the adverse effect of smartphone separation on all core aspects of executive functions, including shifting (Experiment 1) and inhibitory control and working-memory capacity (Experiment 2). Interestingly, impaired mental shifting was evident regardless of the extent of smartphone addiction, whereas smartphone addiction significantly moderated the negative effect …
Angels And Demons: Using Behavioral Types In A Real-Effort Moral Dilemma To Identify Expert Traits,
2016
Chapman University
Angels And Demons: Using Behavioral Types In A Real-Effort Moral Dilemma To Identify Expert Traits, Hernan Bejerano, Ellen P. Green, Stephen Rassenti
ESI Publications
In this article, we explore how independently reported measures of subjects' cognitive capabilities, preferences, and sociodemographic characteristics relate to their behavior in a real-effort moral dilemma experiment. To do this, we use a unique dataset, the Chapman Preferences and Characteristics Instrument Set (CPCIS), which contains over 30 standardized measures of preferences and characteristics. We find that simple correlation analysis provides an incomplete picture of how individual measures relate to behavior. In contrast, clustering subjects into groups based on observed behavior in the real-effort task reveals important systematic differences in individual characteristics across groups. However, while we find more differences, these …
Creativity And Cognitive Skills Among Millennials: Thinking Too Much And Creating Too Little,
2016
Chapman University
Creativity And Cognitive Skills Among Millennials: Thinking Too Much And Creating Too Little, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hernán-González
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Organizations crucially need the creative talent of millennials but are reluctant to hire them because of their supposed lack of diligence. Recent studies have shown that hiring diligent millennials requires selecting those who score high on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and thus rely on effortful thinking rather than intuition. A central question is to assess whether the push for recruiting diligent millennials using criteria such as cognitive reflection can ultimately hamper the recruitment of creative workers. To answer this question, we study the relationship between millennials' creativity and their performance on fluid intelligence (Raven) and cognitive reflection (CRT) tests. …
Inner Self,
2016
Vocational Training Council
Inner Self
SIGNED: The Magazine of The Hong Kong Design Institute
Hong Kong artist Pak Sheung Chuen is burnishing his already impressive reputation by creating work that seeks to understand the part of the self that is inaccessible through reasoning.
In What Sense Are You A Person?,
2016
University of the Balearic Islands
In What Sense Are You A Person?, Pamela Barone, Antoni Gomila
Animal Sentience
According to Rowlands, personhood in nonhuman animals calls for a unified mental life and pre-reflective self-awareness provides this. The concept of “person” is fuzzy. Any attempt to define it with necessary and sufficient conditions faces the problem of borderline cases satisfying only some of the conditions to varying degrees. We ask about the implications of a metaphysical sense of personhood for its moral and legal sense. Finally, we address Rowlands’s reliance on pre-reflective self-awareness and present our own criteria for personhood.
“Hot” So Fast,
2016
University of Missouri
“Hot” So Fast, Alex Howe
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands’s target article offers a lucid, systematic treatment of a notion of personhood that has had significant influence in philosophy. The orthodox interpretation of this notion of personhood has been that it requires cognitive capacities not possessed by animals. Rowlands disputes this. However, I think his objections to the orthodox, higher-order thought (HOT) theories of mental unity may be too quick. In this commentary, I show two separable places where Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories of mental unity falls short.
