Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Kuwait: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 26, 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) announced that it would support Gulf Bank, the country’s third-largest bank, which had sustained losses on clients’ derivatives trades. In the same announcement, it said it would ask the government to guarantee all banking deposits to shore up confidence in banks and to keep Kuwait’s banking system competitive with those of other countries, including neighboring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had already announced unlimited deposit guarantees. The legislature passed an unlimited deposit guarantee bill eight days later. Kuwait did …

Latvia: Deposit Guarantee Fund, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Latvian authorities raised the country’s deposit-insurance cap from EUR 20,000 to EUR 50,000 (USD 26,800 to USD 67,000) in response to international calls to bolster deposit-insurance systems. They passed the measure on October 16, 2008, and it came into effect two days later. The Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC), Latvia’s prudential supervisor and existing deposit administrator, oversaw the guarantee. The FCMC covered most types of deposit accounts and insured all Latvian-registered deposit-taking institutions, including some foreign-bank branches operating in Latvia. The FCMC charged quarterly premiums on insured accounts and could levy additional fees …

Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

To address the risk of capital flight to neighboring countries during the Global Financial Crisis, the Indonesian government raised the limit on insured deposits 20-fold from IDR 100 million to IDR 2 billion per account (about USD 200,000). The President issued two government regulations on October 13, 2008. The first was an emergency decree that authorized the government, in consultation with the Indonesian Parliament, to alter the limit in times of systemic financial distress. The second was a government regulation enacting the actual increase, which has remained in effect since the crisis. All banks operating within Indonesia, including branches of …

Hungary: National Deposit Insurance Fund, Zijin (Phoebe) Lei, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Hungary announced changes to its deposit-insurance system on October 8, 2008. The government said that it would increase the deposit-insurance cap from HUF 6 million to HUF 13 million (about USD 31,000 to about USD 68,000), the equivalent of roughly EUR 50,000 (about USD 68,000), in line with a European Union (EU) recommendation. Hungary’s finance minister also announced that the state would temporarily provide an unlimited deposit guarantee, following the actions of several European countries. The unlimited guarantee was political, meaning it was not implemented through official legislation. It was effective …

Iceland: Depositors’ And Investors’ Guarantee Fund, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, Iceland’s three largest banks accumulated assets totaling several times the size of Iceland’s GDP and financed their growth through foreign borrowing. As wholesale funding dried up in 2007, they replaced this borrowing by rapidly gathering deposits through foreign branches and subsidiaries located in the European Union, primarily in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the summer and fall of 2008, international credit markets froze and the Icelandic banks were unable to roll over their maturing liabilities. On October 6, Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced a full guarantee of domestic deposits. …

Greece: Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Responding to general financial and economic volatility during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Greek government in November 2008 sought to shore up public confidence in the banking system by raising the deposit-insurance limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (127,000 USD) per depositor for three years. The Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund (HDGF) was responsible for administering this adjustment, which was accompanied by a fivefold increase in the percentages used for calculating member institutions’ annual contributions. All credit institutions that were authorized to operate in Greece, including branches of foreign banks without their own coverage, were required to participate in …

Hong Kong Sar: Full Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a run on Hong Kong’s fifth-biggest bank in September 2008, the Hong Kong government announced that it would use its Exchange Fund to extend full insurance temporarily to depositors at approved banks. The existing Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS) would continue to insure the first 100,000 Hong Kong dollars (HKD; about USD 13,000) per depositor at each bank; the new program would cover the rest. It also covered a broader set of institutions. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) administered the program, overseen by the Hong Kong Deposit Protection Board (HKDPB); the HKMA was also responsible for managing the Exchange …

France: Deposit Guarantee Fund, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European Union (EU) officials urged member states to raise their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to at least EUR 50,000 (USD 68,000) to promote confidence in banks. France did not need to increase its deposit-insurance cap to meet this target, as it already guaranteed EUR 70,000. The following year, EU officials passed a directive that required all member states to permanently increase their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010. French authorities complied with the EU’s directive on September 29, 2010. The Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD), a private …

Belgium: Protection Fund/Special Protection Fund, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in fall 2008, the Belgian government increased the coverage limits of its deposit guarantee to restore faith in its banking system, protect savers and depositors, and safeguard financial stability. Belgium joined the European Union’s (EU) efforts to strengthen deposit guarantee systems. The measures complemented the Belgian government’s other efforts to secure domestic banks. The government implemented the emergency measures in October and November 2008 through royal decrees, which Parliament later incorporated into law. In a five-week span, Belgian authorities increased the deposit guarantee from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 26,820 …

Brazil: Time Deposits With Special Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

Uncertainty from the Global Financial Crisis spread to the Brazilian financial system in 2008, triggering a flight to quality toward assets with explicit or implicit government guarantees. In the Brazilian context, this meant depositors pulled funds from small and medium-size banks and parked them in larger banks that investors believed the government was more likely to backstop. The National Monetary Council (CMN) created the Time Deposits with Special Guarantee program (DPGE) in March 2009 to bolster liquidity in small and medium-size banks. The CMN put the country’s existing deposit insurer, the Credit Guarantee Fund (FGC), in charge of administering the …

Austria: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

After Germany and Ireland implemented unlimited deposit guarantees, Austrian officials passed a law on October 26, 2008, that removed deposit-insurance limits for individual depositors, fearing that Austrians would move their money to countries with higher deposit coverage. The government established the program using the country’s existing, mandatory deposit-insurance system (DIS), which was private, ex post funded, and segmented into sectoral schemes that covered different kinds of financial institutions. During payouts, the schemes covered the first EUR 50,000 (USD 67,000) of guaranteed funds to a given depositor, and the government the government covered the rest. The government required all financial institutions …

Broad-Based Emergency Liquidity Programs, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Sean Fulmer, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In this paper, we analyze broad-based emergency liquidity (BBEL) programs. Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who are considering establishing a BBEL program in designing the most effective program possible as efficiently as possible. Our insights are derived from 33 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic.

Liquidity provision is a long-established mandate of central banks and was a function that private entities performed even before the establishment of central banks. We survey a sampling of cases from the 19th through 21st centuries, drawn from 10 countries and regions, to distill …

Australia: Financial Claims Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, the Australian government intervened in its own banking system, both to support domestic depositors and to keep its banking system competitive with those in countries whose regulators had already intervened. On October 12, 2008, the Australian government announced the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) to insure bank depositors. The deposit guarantee automatically insured depositors at all authorized deposit-taking institutions and covered a range of deposit accounts. As initially announced, the FCS would provide a blanket guarantee to all depositors with no fee for participation. This blanket guarantee, however, prompted a migration …

Market Support Programs: Covid-19 Crisis, June Rhee, Lily S. Engbith, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish a market support program (MSP). Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who have already made the decision to use an MSP in designing the most effective program possible. Our insights derive from 23 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic.

By the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), market-based finance and traditional banking systems were significantly intertwined, and the panic in market-based finance threatened to spread quickly to both traditional banks and the real economy. In response, …

Dividends And Bank Capital In The Global Financial Crisis Of 2007–2009, Viral V. Acharya, Irvind Gujral, Nirupama Kulkarni, Hyun Song Shin

Journal of Financial Crises

The headline numbers appear to show that even as banks and financial intermediaries suffered large credit losses in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, they raised substantial amounts of new capital, both from private investors and from government-funded capital injections. However, on closer inspection, the composition of bank capital shifted radically from one based on common equity to that based on debt-like hybrid claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt. The erosion of common equity was exacerbated by large-scale payments of dividends, in spite of widely anticipated credit losses. Dividend payments represent a transfer from creditors (and potentially taxpayers) …

Account Guarantee Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Adam Kulam, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs across 14 Key Design Decisions. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG programs on other parts of the financial system or other jurisdictions, (b) the ability to address moral hazard through heightened supervision, which removes a potential obstacle to adopting AG programs in response to the acute phase of crises, (c) the necessity of developing guarantees that are credible and timely, and (d) the need to design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will function during crises.

Does Finance Make Us Less Social?, Henrik Cronqvist, Mitch Warachka, Frank Yu

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Informal risk sharing within social networks and formal financial contracts both enable households to manage risk. We find that financial contracting reduces participation in social networks. Specifically, increased crop insurance usage decreased local religious adherence and congregation membership in agricultural communities. Our identification utilizes the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 that doubled crop insurance usage nationally within a year, although changes in usage varied across counties. Difference-in-difference and Spatial First Difference tests confirm that households substituted insurance for religiosity. This substitution was associated with reductions in crop diversification and crop yields, indicating an increase in moral hazard.

A Primer On The Income Tax Consequences Of The Ncaa’S Name, Image And Likeness (Nil) Earnings For College Athletes, Marena M. Messina, Frank M. Messina

Journal of Athlete Development and Experience

NCAA domestic college athletes can now financially benefit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL). The purpose of this article is to “educate” athletes on the new NIL rules in financial literacy. With new NIL income flowing to athletes, federal income tax consequences of these transactions must be addressed. This article results in a detailed introduction to the applicable federal tax rules regarding NIL income for athletes to stay in compliance with those laws. From understanding NIL income, to how the tax formula works, what tax forms apply, and what taxes may be due, this article provides a comprehensive toolkit …

“Fiscal Trap”, The Case Of Greece, Titos Ritsatos

Southern University College of Business E-Journal

Present research aims at the introduction of the term “Fiscal Trap” in economic literature, as a comprehensive definition of the economic situation in which any available combination of fiscal-only policy measures (tax increases and austerity measures), would fail to fulfill fiscal targets during periods of recession. Using recent experience from the case of Greece, an ex-post evaluation of adopted policy effectiveness is pursued. Fiscal austerity and increased taxation enforced in Greece during the years 2009-2012, resulted in decreased tax revenues, lower GDP and increased debt-to-GDP ratio. In order to slip away from the vicious cycle generated by austerity and tax …

The Terrorist Laffer Curve:Rationality And Insurgency In Iraq, 2004-2008, Dennis S. Edwards

Southern University College of Business E-Journal

While the original framework by Arthur Laffer focused on tax rates and the resulting revenue from such taxation, the Laffer curve has been applied to other studies in behavior as well. This paper details evidence of a Laffer curve in Iraq with respect to terrorist violence and Iraqi public support of that violence against the U.S.-led coalition forces. As insurgents began killing more Iraqi citizens in their attacks on U.S.-led forces, the increased lethality caused initial support of such violence to erode. As a result, the high-level terrorist hierarchy has suggested that its operatives reduce lethality and indiscriminate bombings.