Narration As Argument,
2013
National University for Distance Learning (UNED), Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science
Narration As Argument, Paula Olmos
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I explore the possibilities of acknowledging the argumentative character of (at least some cases of) narration. Two basic models will be revised: 1) primary (core) narratives, regarding issues and facts under discussion, which may work as implicit arguments about the coincidence between discourse and reality via their own internal plausibility and 2) secondary narratives, imaginatively inserted in discourse, and serving as evidence for diverse lines of (either stated or unstated) analogical or exemplary argumentation.
Commentary On: Paula Olmos' "Narrative As Argument",
2013
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Commentary On: Paula Olmos' "Narrative As Argument", Christopher W. Tindale
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Commentary On: Steve Oswald And Christopher Hart's "Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies",
2013
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Commentary On: Steve Oswald And Christopher Hart's "Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies", Pierre J. Boulos
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies,
2013
University of Neuchâtel, Cognitive Science Centre
Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper advances a cognitive account of the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacious arguments and takes the example of source-related fallacies. Drawing on cognitive psychology and evolutionary linguistics, we claim that a fallacy enforces accessibility and epistemic cognitive constraints on argument processing targeted at preventing the addressee from spotting its fallaciousness, by managing to prevent or circumvent critical reactions. We address the evolutionary bases of biases and the way that these are exploited in fallacious argumentation.
Commentary On: Fabio Paglieri's "Argumentation, Decision And Rationality",
2013
Marygrove College, Department of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Humanities
Commentary On: Fabio Paglieri's "Argumentation, Decision And Rationality", Steven W. Patterson
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Argumentation, Decision And Rationality,
2013
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISTS-CRN), Instituto di Scienze e Technologie della Cognizione, Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL)
Argumentation, Decision And Rationality, Fabio Paglieri
OSSA Conference Archive
From a decision theoretic perspective, arguments stem from decisions made by arguers. Despite some promising results, this approach remains underdeveloped in argumentation theories, mostly because it is assumed to be merely descriptive. This assumption is mistaken: considering arguments as the product of decisions brings into play various normative models of rational choice. The challenge is rather to reconcile strategic rationality with other normative constraints relevant for argumentation, such as inferential validity and dialectical appropriateness.
Response To My Commentator,
2013
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISTS-CRN), Instituto di Scienze e Technologie della Cognizione, Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL)
Are Arguments Abstract Objects?,
2013
Marygrove College, Department of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Humanities
Are Arguments Abstract Objects?, Steven W. Patterson
OSSA Conference Archive
Geoff Goddu's 2010 paper "Is 'Argument' subject to the process/product ambiguity?" and Paul Simard-Smith and Andrei Moldovan's 2011 paper “Arguments as abstract objects” have revived the dialogue about what might be called the "metaphysics of argument". Both papers are important. Both also seem to me to be open to significant objections. In this paper I will lay out some of these objections and give, in rough outline, the kernel of an alternative approach.
Commentary On: Steven W. Patterson's "Are Arguments Abstract Objects?",
2013
University of Richmond
Commentary On: Steven W. Patterson's "Are Arguments Abstract Objects?", G C. Goddu
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
The Failure Of Certainty: Why Economics Needs Rhetoric,
2013
Utah Valley University, Department of English
The Failure Of Certainty: Why Economics Needs Rhetoric, Jerry Petersen
OSSA Conference Archive
Privileging deductive first principles over inductive contingencies, I argue, contributed to the economic meltdown of late and will continue to limit the range of reasonable solutions available to solve entrenched economic problems. I cite Toulmin’s critique of scientific certainty and the rancor over the demise of the ninth planet Pluto to posit a role for rhetoric in making valid claims across all fields of study, calling for more productive uncertainty subject to vigorous argumentation.
Commentary On: Jerry Petersen's "The Failure Of Certainty: Why Economics Needs Rhetoric",
2013
University of Copenhagan, Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, Rhetoric Section
Commentary On: Jerry Petersen's "The Failure Of Certainty: Why Economics Needs Rhetoric", Christian Kock
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
The Abuses Of Argument: Understanding Fallacies On Toulmin's Layout Of Argument,
2013
McMaster University, Department of Philosophy
The Abuses Of Argument: Understanding Fallacies On Toulmin's Layout Of Argument, Andrew Pineau
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper provides a preliminary account of fallacies on Toulmin’s model of argument, one that improves upon previous attempts to understand fallacies on this argument scheme. To do this I examine Johnson and Blair’s (1983) taxonomy of three basic fallacies (irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion and problematic premise) on Toulmin’s layout.
Commentary On: Andrew Pineau's "The Abuses Of Argument: Understanding Fallacies On Toulmin's Layout Of Argument,
2013
University of Amsterdam, Speech communication, Argumentation theory and Rhetoric
Commentary On: Andrew Pineau's "The Abuses Of Argument: Understanding Fallacies On Toulmin's Layout Of Argument, Bart Garssen
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Commentary On: Laura Elizabeth Pinto's "When Politics Trump Argumentation: Financial Literacy Education Policy,
2013
University of Oslo, Department of Educational Research
Commentary On: Laura Elizabeth Pinto's "When Politics Trump Argumentation: Financial Literacy Education Policy, Tone Kvernbekk
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
When Politics Trump Argumentation: Financial Literacy Education Policy,
2013
Niagara University, College of Education
When Politics Trump Argumentation: Financial Literacy Education Policy, Laura Elizabeth Pinto
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper analyzes a corpus of political rhetoric to identify the rationale for Ontario’s financial literacy education (FLE) policy decisions that came about in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. The complex politics of FLE were shaped and legitimized by special-interest coalitions’ mobilization of power, characterized by unsubstantiated claims about its efficacy. The rhetoric amounted to ‘truthiness’ over argumentation through the neglect of empirical evidence.
Response To My Commentator,
2013
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Commentary On: Robert Pinto's "Truth And The Virtue Of Arguments",
2013
Vanderbilt University, Department of Philosophy
Commentary On: Robert Pinto's "Truth And The Virtue Of Arguments", Scott F. Aikin
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
T(R)Opical Patterns In Advertising,
2013
University of Lugano, Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics
T(R)Opical Patterns In Advertising, Chiara Pollaroli
OSSA Conference Archive
This research aims at unraveling relationships between rhetorical devices from elocutio and argumentative topoi from inventio in advertising. Studies on this topic have attempted to demonstrate not only that rhetorical devices condense argumentation schemes, but also that they have a strong argumentative force. I will try to achieve my goal by applying the Argumentum Model of Topics (a tool allowing to unveil inferential patterns behind arguments) to a corpus of award-winning advertisements.
Truth And The Virtue Of Arguments,
2013
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Truth And The Virtue Of Arguments, Robert C. Pinto
OSSA Conference Archive
In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments or inferences must have is not that they be truth-preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two reasons there why such a conception of argument virtue is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim, and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defence than was offered in that paper.
Response To My Commentator,
2013
University of Lugano, Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics
