Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy of Mind Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

1,003 Full-Text Articles 689 Authors 235,582 Downloads 106 Institutions

All Articles in Philosophy of Mind

Faceted Search

1,003 full-text articles. Page 1 of 37.

Adhd And The Deficit Of Knowing: What?, Katie N. Schenk 2019 Kansas State University

Adhd And The Deficit Of Knowing: What?, Katie N. Schenk

Crossing Borders: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship

This research-based essay explores the author’s experience with ADHD, as the essay’s formatting and usage of space evolves into a visual representation of the ADHD mind and questions the human capacity to identify, label, and differentiate inaccessible experiences. The common, often misinformed understanding of ADHD is disputed through in depth analyses of various brain functions. In particular, the atypical development of the executive functions housed in the ADHD person’s frontal lobe are explored through both contemporary research and personal experience, which are variously compared and contrasted to the supposed neurotypical experience. Consideration of ADHD’s lifelong stigma ...


Quantum Uncertainty Reduction (Qur) Theory Of Attended Access And Phenomenal Consciousness, Anatoly V. Nichvoloda 2019 The Graduate Center, City University of New York

Quantum Uncertainty Reduction (Qur) Theory Of Attended Access And Phenomenal Consciousness, Anatoly V. Nichvoloda

All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

In this dissertation I defend a theory of perceptual consciousness titled “Quantum Uncertainty Reduction” (QUR[1]) Theory of Attended Access and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Consciousness is widely perceived as a phenomenon that poses a special explanatory problem for science. The problem arises in the apparent rift between an immediate first-person acquaintance with consciousness and our lack of ability to provide an objective/scientific third-person characterization of consciousness.

I begin by reviewing philosophical ideas of Ned Block, David Chalmers and Jesse Prinz whose characterizations of consciousness provide a conceptual framework that the proposed theory aims to satisfy. Block and Chalmers argue that ...


A Defense Of Pure Connectionism, Alex B. Kiefer 2019 The Graduate Center, City University of New York

A Defense Of Pure Connectionism, Alex B. Kiefer

All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Connectionism is an approach to neural-networks-based cognitive modeling that encompasses the recent deep learning movement in artificial intelligence. It came of age in the 1980s, with its roots in cybernetics and earlier attempts to model the brain as a system of simple parallel processors. Connectionist models center on statistical inference within neural networks with empirically learnable parameters, which can be represented as graphical models. More recent approaches focus on learning and inference within hierarchical generative models. Contra influential and ongoing critiques, I argue in this dissertation that the connectionist approach to cognitive science possesses in principle (and, as is becoming ...


Are Knowledge Ascriptions Sensitive To Social Context?, Alexander Jackson 2019 Boise State University

Are Knowledge Ascriptions Sensitive To Social Context?, Alexander Jackson

Alexander Jackson

Plausibly, the stakes in a practical task at hand can affect how people ascribe knowledge. I propose a new psychological account of the effect. My hypothesis is motivated by empirical research on how people’s judgements are sensitive to their social context. Specifically, people’s evaluations are sensitive to their ‘psychological distance’ from the scenarios they are considering. Experimental philosophy has found that what’s at stake for a fictional character in a fictional scenario has little effect on how participants ascribe knowledge to them. My hypothesis predicts this finding. (This illustrates a general problem for X-phi: one should not ...


Reply To Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather, Jonardon GANERI 2019 San Jose State University

Reply To Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather, Jonardon Ganeri

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Review Of Attention, Not Self By Jonardon Ganeri, Carlos MONTEMAYOR, Abrol FAIRWEATHER 2019 San Francisco State University

Review Of Attention, Not Self By Jonardon Ganeri, Carlos Montemayor, Abrol Fairweather

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Inference, Perception, And Recognition: Kaśmīr Śaivism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Joshua STOLL 2019 University of Hawaii West Oahu

Inference, Perception, And Recognition: Kaśmīr Śaivism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Joshua Stoll

Comparative Philosophy

This paper will explore competing intuitions behind the problem of other minds. On the one hand, consciousness is strictly a self-manifest, first-person phenomenon: subjectivity is in each case one’s own. On the other hand, it is obvious, on the basis of their behavioral activity, that others are conscious agents despite this coming across through objective determinations. The tension between these intuitions is what grounds the problem of other minds. Attempts to navigate this problem generally neglect one of these intuitions and so are inadequate accounts of intersubjectivity. As such, and given the paradox involved in accepting each intuition, I ...


Inferring And Explaining, Jeffery L. Johnson 2019 Portland State University

Inferring And Explaining, Jeffery L. Johnson

PDXOpen: Open Access Textbooks

Inferring and Explaining is a book in practical epistemology. It examines the notion of evidence and assumes that good evidence is the essence of rational thinking. Evidence is the cornerstone of the natural, social, and behavioral sciences. But it is equally central to almost all academic pursuits and, perhaps most importantly, to the basic need to live an intelligent and reflective life.

The book further assumes that a particular model of evidence— Inference to the Best Explanation—not only captures the essence of (good) evidence but suggests a very practical, and pedagogically useful, procedure for evidence evaluation. The book is ...


Animal Sentience Is Not Enough To Motivate Conservation, Irene M. Pepperberg 2019 Harvard University

Animal Sentience Is Not Enough To Motivate Conservation, Irene M. Pepperberg

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that humans’ views of their own superiority are a source of their callousness toward the environment. I do not disagree but point to a number of other issues that must be addressed for conservation efforts to succeed.


Humans: Uniquely Responsible For Causing Conservation Problems, Uniquely Capable Of Solving Them, Michael L. Wilson, Clarence L. Lehman 2019 University of Minnesota

Humans: Uniquely Responsible For Causing Conservation Problems, Uniquely Capable Of Solving Them, Michael L. Wilson, Clarence L. Lehman

Animal Sentience

We share Chapman & Huffman’s views on the importance of promoting animal welfare and conservation. We disagree with their implication, however, that reverence for life and concern for the wellbeing of global ecosystems depend on a belief that other living things are similar to humans in any of their capacities. Humans exhibit special traits — language, cumulative culture, extraordinary capacity for cooperation when we are at our best, and ever-advancing technological developments — that enabled them to dominate the planet, resulting in the current conservation crisis. It is precisely the fact that humans have become unique that provides hope for finding conservation ...


Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff 2019 East Tennessee State University

Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the world not caused by any other species. The ability to conceive of and articulate a claim of rights is an example. However, possession of superior cognitive ability does not entitle humans to superior moral status. It is sentience, not cognitive complexity, that is the basis for the assignment of rights and the protections under the law that accompany them.


Our Brains Make Us Out To Be Unique In Ways We Are Not, Matthew J. Criscione, Julian Paul Keenan 2019 Montclair State University

Our Brains Make Us Out To Be Unique In Ways We Are Not, Matthew J. Criscione, Julian Paul Keenan

Animal Sentience

Humans have long viewed themselves in a favorable light. This bias is consistent with a general pattern of self-enhancement. Neural systems in the medial prefrontal cortex underlie this way of thinking, which, even when false, may be beneficial for survival. It is hence not surprising that we often disregard contrary evidence in believing ourselves superior.


Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude 2019 Vassar College

Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for determining ...


Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch 2019 University of Wyoming

Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that judgments of human superiority underlie our cruelty to animals. It might be useful to examine how such judgments operate within the human community. Children arguably have a potential for developing “superior” capacities but are outperformed on many tasks by animals. There is a continuum of development in children’s capacities. Perhaps there are interspecies evolutionary continua too. This highlights the complexity of reasoning about humans, animals, and moral inclusion.


More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers 2019 University of New England

More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman have highlighted observations of animals performing, in nature, complex behaviour once thought to be unique to humans. Just as relevant to their argument are examples of cognition shown by domesticated species tested in controlled conditions. These strengthen the case for human/nonhuman similarities in behaviour and cognition. Recent research has brought to our attention the ability of nonhuman species to perform many tasks previously considered to be the hallmark of humans. Even though different species may use different ways of solving these tasks, the very fact that they can do it undermines the notion of human superiority.


Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk 2019 Oakland University

Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Humans are certainly unique among living species. This is evident in the transformation of human environments and its resulting impact on other animals. However, many of the traits unique to humans are costly as well as adaptive and should certainly not be used to elevate their status above that of other species.


Non-Human Animals Providing Rescue In Medical Emergencies, Rainer Spiegel 2019 University of Tuebingen (Germany), BG Trauma Hospital Tuebingen

Non-Human Animals Providing Rescue In Medical Emergencies, Rainer Spiegel

Animal Sentience

In their target article, Chapman & Huffman challenge the quotation of Sir William Osler that the desire to take medication distinguishes humans from non-human animals. They provide examples of self-medication in non-human animals. Based on these examples, it can be inferred that non-human animals practice at least some form of medicine for symptom control. I would like to extend this view by showing that non-human animals not only provide self-medication, but also rescue others facing emergencies.


Mirror Neurons And Humanity’S Dark Side, Gisela Kaplan 2019 University of New England,Armidale,Australia

Mirror Neurons And Humanity’S Dark Side, Gisela Kaplan

Animal Sentience

The last two decades have revealed brain mechanisms in birds and primates showing that, contrary to earlier prejudices, some birds can do things (cognitive and affective) on par with or even better than great apes and humans. The old dichotomies are breaking down; but the dark side is that these insights come at a time in the Anthropocene when humans have caused and continue to cause mass extinctions.


Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant, Eze Paez 2019 University of Minho

Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant, Eze Paez

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals, cruelty to animals is not justified. Though I agree with their conclusion, I do not think their argument works. Many human beings do have some capacities that animals do not have and are greater in some respects, in the sense of having superior abilities. It is a better argument to deny that any of that is morally relevant. Sentience suffices for moral consideration, and for deriving a moral duty not to harm other animals and to assist them when they are in need.


Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. McGrew 2019 School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews

Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew

Animal Sentience

Arguments about human uniqueness apply not only to extant species but also to extinct ones, that is, the hominin predecessors of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Thus, unique and superior are doubly relative terms, in past and present. The scope for empirical comparison faces a spectrum of difficulty, from material (e.g., artefacts) to non-material (e.g., concepts) phenomena.


Digital Commons powered by bepress