Response To My Commentator,
2013
Dalhousie University, Department of Philosophy
Commentary On: Adam Auch's "Virtuous Argumentation And The Challenges Of Hype",
2013
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Commentary On: Adam Auch's "Virtuous Argumentation And The Challenges Of Hype", Ralph H. Johnson
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Identifying Argumentative Acts Within The Classroom Amongst Engineering Students,
2013
Antioquia School of Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering
Identifying Argumentative Acts Within The Classroom Amongst Engineering Students, Juan Fernando Barros-Martinez
OSSA Conference Archive
Students’ arguments surrounding a scientific topic are analyzed. This analysis comes from research developed in the classroom where dialogic interaction was promoted. The purpose of this study has not only been to identify argumentative elements used by students during the sessions but principally to the process of discussion. Three different ways have been proposed for this analysis: speech acts, acts of argumentative process and acts of learning process, with the intention of establishing relationships between them.
Critical Thinking And Cognitive Biases,
2013
Capilano University, Department of Philosophy
Critical Thinking And Cognitive Biases, Mark Battersby, Sharon Bailin
OSSA Conference Archive
We argue that psychological research can enhance the identification of reasoning errors and the development of an appropriate pedagogy to instruct people in how to avoid these errors. In this paper we identify some of the findings of psychologists that help explain some common fallacies, give examples of fallacies identified in the research that have not been typically identified in philosophy, and explore ways in which this research can enhance critical thinking instruction.
Considering The Roles Of Values In Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation,
2013
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy of Language (IFL)
Considering The Roles Of Values In Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation, Michael D. Baumtrog
OSSA Conference Archive
Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argument evaluation.
Commentary On: Mark Battersby And Sharon Bailin's "Critical Thinking And Cognitive Biases",
2013
Lund University, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Commentary On: Mark Battersby And Sharon Bailin's "Critical Thinking And Cognitive Biases", Frank Zenker
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Commentary On: Michael Baumtrog's "Considering The Roles Of Values In Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation,
2013
Hendrix College, Department of Philosophy
Commentary On: Michael Baumtrog's "Considering The Roles Of Values In Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation, Chris Campolo
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Some Practical Values Of Argumentation,
2013
McMaster University, Department of Philosophy
Some Practical Values Of Argumentation, Laura M. Benacquista
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, I identify two sets of practical values of argumentation from a standpoint that places a premium on maximal participatory democracy. The first set includes pedagogical values for both teachers and learners. The second set of values are transformative and include: facilitating openness as both tolerance and opportunity; facilitating understanding of one’s own positions, other’s positions, and the conceptual frameworks underlying them; and, finally, fostering motivation by encouraging action.
Commentary On: Laura M. Benacquista's "Some Practical Values Of Argumentation",
2013
University of Lethbridge, Philosophy (Emerita)
Commentary On: Laura M. Benacquista's "Some Practical Values Of Argumentation", Trudy Govier
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Assessing Presumptions In Argumentation: Being A Sound Presumption Vs. Being Presumably The Case,
2013
University of Granada, Department of Philosophy I
Assessing Presumptions In Argumentation: Being A Sound Presumption Vs. Being Presumably The Case, Lilian Bermejo-Luque
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper is an attempt to identify and provide the normative conditions for presumptions and for presumptive inferences. Basically, the idea is adopting the distinction between epistemic and ontological qualifiers proposed in Bermejo-Luque (2011) in order to explain the difference between something being a correct presumption and something being presumably the case.
Commentary On: Lilian Bermejo-Luque's "Assessing Presumptions In Argumentation: Being A Sound Presumpion Vs. Being Presumably The Case",
2013
Edgewood College, Communication Studies
Commentary On: Lilian Bermejo-Luque's "Assessing Presumptions In Argumentation: Being A Sound Presumpion Vs. Being Presumably The Case", Fred J. Kauffeld
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Are Conductive Arguments Really Not Possible?,
2013
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Are Conductive Arguments Really Not Possible?, J. Anthony Blair
OSSA Conference Archive
In “Are conductive arguments possible?” Jonathan Adler argued that conductive argu-ments (those balancing considerations for a claim, C, against counter-considerations against C) are not possible because they are committed to two incompatible propositions: (I) C is reached without nullifying the counter-considerations; (II) C is accepted is true, which issues in belief, so C is detached from these premises. This paper offers an analysis and an assessment of Adler’s case for his thesis.
Commentary On: Patrick Bondy's "The Epistemic Approach To Argument Evaluation: Virtues, Beliefs, Commitments",
2013
Wayne State University, Department of Philosophy
Commentary On: Patrick Bondy's "The Epistemic Approach To Argument Evaluation: Virtues, Beliefs, Commitments", Bruce Russell
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Commentary On: J. Anthony Blair's "Are Conductive Arguments Really Not Possible?",
2013
Sun Yat-sen University, Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosohy
Commentary On: J. Anthony Blair's "Are Conductive Arguments Really Not Possible?", Yun Xie, Min Ghui Xiong
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
The Epistemic Approach To Argument Evaluation: Virtues, Beliefs, Commitments,
2013
McMaster University, Department of Philosophy
The Epistemic Approach To Argument Evaluation: Virtues, Beliefs, Commitments, Patrick Bondy
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper will have two parts. In the first, it will point out the agreement between lists of paradigm epistemic and argumentative virtues, and it will take that agreement as prima facie support for the epistemic approach to argument evaluation. Second, it will consider the disagreement over whether successful argument resolution requires change of belief or whether it only requires change of commitment. It turns out that the epistemic approach is neutral on that question.
Commentary On: David Botting's "Interpretative Dilemmas",
2013
Northeastern Illinois University, Department of Philosophy
Commentary On: David Botting's "Interpretative Dilemmas", John Casey
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Commentary On: Tracy Bowell And Justine Kingsbury's "Critical Thinking And The Argumentational And Epistemic Virtues",
2013
Baker University, Department of Philosophy
Commentary On: Tracy Bowell And Justine Kingsbury's "Critical Thinking And The Argumentational And Epistemic Virtues", Donald Hatcher
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Interpretative Dilemmas,
2013
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy of Language (IFL)
Interpretative Dilemmas, David Botting
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I claim that the reason we are reluctant to call many informal fallacies fallacies of relevance is because we can interpret them as providing contextual information about how the argument is to be interpreted. This interpretative dilemma is that the logical form is determined in part by whether the analyst wishes to be charitable to the proponent or the opponent. The evaluation of the argument is nonetheless purely logical.
Critical Thinking And The Argumentational And Epistemic Virtues,
2013
University of Waikato, Philosophy Program
Critical Thinking And The Argumentational And Epistemic Virtues, Tracy Bowell, Justine Kingsbury
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper we argue that while a full-blown virtue-theoretical account of argumentation is implausible, there is scope for augmenting a conventional account of argument by taking a character-oriented turn. We then discuss the characteristics of the good epistemic citizen, and consider approaches to nurturing these characteristics in critical thinking students, in the hope of addressing the problem of lack of transfer of critical thinking skills to the world outside the classroom.
Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement,
2013
Hendrix College, Department of Philosophy
Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo
OSSA Conference Archive
The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.
