Philosophy Commons^™

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.

On Distinguishing Between An Objection And A Criticism, Ralph H. Johnson

OSSA Conference Archive

One way in which the arguer can satisfy the demands of objectivity is by taking into account appropriate dialectical material such as objections, criticisms, counterarguments, alternative positions etc. In this paper, I will argue that there are important differences between a criticism and an objection; that is to say, we should make a distinction between them. In the paper, I will do the following. First, I will review some pertinent literature. Second, I will give my reasons for thinking there is a distinction. Here I will be relying on insights from J. L. Austin and L. Wittgenstein. Third, I will …

America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, Ilon Lauer, Thomas Lauer

OSSA Conference Archive

: Our study of public argumentation surrounding iPhone encryption addresses the argumentative function of the metonym. Metonyms accomplish general and specific argumentative purposes. Generally, metonyms help define and redefine the argumentative framework for a dispute. Within a controversy, metonyms operate as inference generators. We isolate and analyze several metonyms and elaborate their warrant-generating valences. Metonyms are inference generating tools capable of instantiating normative frameworks, invoking flexible and indeterminate senses of causality.

Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition (form, stance, and content) with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.

Levels Of Depth In Deep Disagreement, Claudio Duran

OSSA Conference Archive

The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Richard Fogelin in a 1985 paper published in Critical Thinking. Since then, about 12 papers have been published in journals or presented in conferences on argumentation theory.

All these papers relate back to the initial Fogelin paper. Andrew Lugg’s 1986 critical response to Fogelin introduces significant questions concerning his views. Peter Davson-Galle in 1992, takes a more positive approach to them. The more extensive publication on deep disagreement can be found in a 2005 issue of Critical Thinking dedicated entirely to this topic. Most of the 5 papers found here take …

Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, Christoph Lumer

OSSA Conference Archive

The contribution critically discusses Walton's (and Reed’s and Macagno’s) argumentation scheme approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from an epistemological standpoint.

Where Is The Reasonable? Objectivity And Bias Of Practical Argument, Marcin Lewinski

OSSA Conference Archive

The paper offers a theoretical investigation regarding the sources of normativity in practical argument from the following perspective: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good” argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I will address this problem by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties. I will argue that given the structure proposed, biased advocacy upholds reasonableness whenever the argumentative activity is adequately designed.

Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr.

OSSA Conference Archive

Arguments sometimes appeal to sex by invoking the sexuality of a model or a person or the promise of sexual gratification. When sexual gratification is not a relevant consideration, the appeal seems to be fallacious.

We will address when this may be an appropriate line of reasoning -- there is such a thing as “sex appeal”--and when it may be biased to assume the relevance of sexuality. Advertising, which provides infinite examples of appeal to sex, may be questionable as a case of argumentation, as opposed to some other sort of negotiation or communication, especially perhaps in its reliance on …

Virtue Argumentation And Bias, Andrew Aberdein

OSSA Conference Archive

Virtue Argumentation and Bias

PAPER

Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) are a burgeoning programme [2]. Bias is a familiar impediment to good argument, which has drawn renewed attention as a result of psychological research demonstrating the prevalence of cognitive biases and implicit associations. Despite some attempts to utilise the resources of VTA to address bias, there has been little acknowledgement of the obstacle that bias presents to VTA. Specifically, VTA seems vulnerable to a situationist challenge, analogous to similar challenges in virtue ethics and epistemology, that behavioural dispositions are too sensitive to specific situations for virtues to be psychologically plausible …

Compassion, Authority And Baby Talk: Prosody And Objectivity, Leo Groarke, Gabrijela Kišiček

OSSA Conference Archive

Recent work on multimodal argumentation has explored facets of argumentation which have no obvious analogue in the written arguments which were emphasized in traditional accounts of argument. One of these facets is prosody: the structure and quality of the sound of spoken language. Prosodic features include pitch, temporal structure, pronunciation, loudness and voice quality, rhythm, emphasis and accent. In this paper, we explore the ways that prosodic features may be invoked in arguing.

Transsubjectivity, David Hitchcock

OSSA Conference Archive

I describe and evaluate Harald Wohlrapp’s framing of “reasonable argumentation” in The Concept of Argument as argumentation guided by the “principle of transsubjectivity ... that, beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up for consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other”, and thus as having a quasi-religious meaning.

Conclusions As Hedged Hypotheses, John R. Welch

OSSA Conference Archive

How can the objectivity of an argument’s conclusion be determined? To propose an answer, this paper builds on Betz’s (2013) view of premises as hedged hypotheses. If an argument’s premises are hedged, its conclusion must be hedged as well. But how? The paper first introduces a two-dimensional critical grid. The grid’s vertical dimension is inductive, reflecting the argument’s downward flow from premises to conclusion. It specifies the inductive probability (or plausibility) of the conclusion given the premises. The grid’s horizontal dimension is epistemic, focusing on the premises without dropping down to the conclusion. It evaluates the epistemic probability (or plausibility) …

Why Not Teach Critical Thinking., Benjamin Hamby Ph.D.

OSSA Conference Archive

There is a mounting case to be made for not teaching critical thinking. Given recent evidence suggesting that cognitive biases are intractable, that students who receive comprehensive, long term, explicit instruction for critical thinking “across the curriculum” reap negligible benefits, and meta-analyses that suggest only certain limited approaches to critical thinking instruction produce meaningful gains, this paper offers a critical challenge to teaching critical thinking, especially as a general education requirement for a baccalaureate degree.

The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman

OSSA Conference Archive

L. J. Cohen has presented an understanding of appraising argument strength which applies to a variety of types of defeasible reasoning. This method can be used to explicate how a body of information may back a warrant and to rank different bodies of evidence on strength of backing. We shall argue that this method allows backing warrants objectively, whether they are inductive warrants backed by observation or moral warrants backed in part a priori. The method also suggests where arguments employing these warrants may be vulnerable to bias bias but need not be infected by it.

What's In A Good Argument About Evaluative Claims? Argumentation In Accountability Practices, Dima Mohammed

OSSA Conference Archive

What counts as a good defence of the conduct of a political agent? I formulate an answer combining insights from argumentation scholarship on the different types of standpoints and the schemes suitable to defend them with insights from philosophical literature (fact vs. value, theoretical vs. practical reasoning … etc). The goal is to make a proposal that is best suitable for examining the type of evaluative claims that is typically discussed in accountability practices.

Objectivity In Newsmaking: An Argumentative Perspective, Marta Zampa

OSSA Conference Archive

Objectivity is a key concept in journalism studies, yet a controversial one. Scholars (e.g., Clayman and Heritage 2002; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Schudson 1978; 2001) disagree on what it precisely implies (distinguishing facts from opinions? Reporting only true facts? Being balanced in presenting positions?) and on how strictly journalists should stick to it. I claim that adopting an argumentative perspective enables to see how journalists deal with objectivity in everyday work. In fact, the objectivity requirement plays the role of endoxical premise in argumentative reasoning that takes place during newsroom decision-making. In the present paper, this is shown by analyzing …

Couples’ Dialogue Orientations, Dale Hample, Ioana A. Cionea

OSSA Conference Archive

Walton has distinguished among several sorts of argumentative dialogues (persuasion, negotiation, information seeking, deliberation, inquiry, and eristic). This paper continues the project of measuring individuals’ self-reported preferences for each dialogue type. In this study, long-term romantic couples were surveyed to examine if their dialogue preferences matched, and whether their preferences were, in turn, related to their relational satisfaction.

Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles, Eugen Octav Popa

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover (or claimed to have discovered) fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 1984) view of normativity.

Inducing A Sympathetic (Empathic) Reception For Exhortation, Fred J. Kauffeld, Beth Innocenti

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay explores ways arguers can afford potentially unsympathetic addressees good reason to empathetically entertain exhortative discourse. First, we illuminate the essential structure and underlying constitutive pragmatics of exhortation. Second, we show that the persuasive force of Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address derives from his use of exhortation. By doing so we add to recent scholarship that accounts for the persuasive force of civically significant speech acts.

Splitting A Difference Of Opinion, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe

OSSA Conference Archive

When unable to resolve a conflict of opinion about the objective worth of an action proposal, discussants may choose to negotiate for a compromise. Is it legitimate to abandon the search for a resolution, and instead enter into a negotiation that aims at settling the difference of opinion? What is the nature of a compromise, in contradistinction to a resolution? What kinds of argument do participants typically put to use in their negotiation dialogues?