Reply To David Godden’S Commentary On “Splitting A Difference Of Opinion”, 2016 University of Groningen
Reply To David Godden’S Commentary On “Splitting A Difference Of Opinion”, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Reply To “Macpherson’ Commentary On Santibanez’S “Strategically Wrong: Bias And Argumentation”, 2016 Universidad Diego Portales
Reply To “Macpherson’ Commentary On Santibanez’S “Strategically Wrong: Bias And Argumentation”, Cristian Santibanez Yanez
OSSA Conference Archive
Macpherson highlights that: “Santibanez does not take the further step of saying this explicitly. At the same time, the language used by the author throughout the paper suggests that he may assent to the claim that such lies are morally wrong: For example, even when discussing more benign forms of deception such as deceiving oneself into believing that they are a very good professor or a soccer player’s deceiving their opponents about their intent, there is reference to ‘damage’ and to the ‘victim’ of the deception.
The Willingness To Be Rationally Persuaded, 2016 Unversidade Nova de Lisboa
The Willingness To Be Rationally Persuaded, Michael D. Baumtrog
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I argue that underlying phronêsis is the more foundational virtue of a willingness to be rationally persuaded (WTRBP). A WTBRP is a virtue in the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by falling between two vices – never sticking to your position and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in this way also helps address problems phronêsis faces in light of implicit bias research.
Commentary On John R. Welch’S “Conclusions As Hedged Hypotheses”, 2016 Lund University
Commentary On John R. Welch’S “Conclusions As Hedged Hypotheses”, Frank Zenker
OSSA Conference Archive
without abstract
Arguments From Expert Opinion And Persistent Bias, 2016 Florida Institute of Technology - Melbourne
Arguments From Expert Opinion And Persistent Bias, Moti Mizrahi
OSSA Conference Archive
Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments are reliable, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In my (2013), I considered a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are more likely to be true than novice judgments, and discussed empirical evidence suggesting that expert judgments are not more reliable than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not …
Mark Twain, Argumentation Theorist, 2016 Hendrix College
Mark Twain, Argumentation Theorist, Chris Campolo
OSSA Conference Archive
Commentators have read Twain’s Is Shakespeare Dead? as the strained work of a man worried about his own literary legacy. But it is actually an essay about argumentation. Twain writes about the burden of argument, premise relevance, understanding and inference, and norms and practices of argumentation. I will argue that what is taken to be a thoroughgoing cynicism on Twain’s part is best understood as a thoughtful scepticism about the scope of reasoning.
Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments, 2016 Trent University
Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments, Patrick Bondy
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper is about bias and ad hominem arguments. It will begin by rehearsing some reasons for thinking that there are both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominems, as well as reasons for thinking that biases can be both justified and unjustified. It will explain that justified biases about people with certain social identities can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem attacks, while unjustified biases only give rise to illegitimate ad hominems.
The paper will then describe Audrey Yap’s view that even when an unjustified bias is made explicit and shown to be unjustified, it can still make …
On The Very Concept Of An Enthymeme, 2016 University of Windsor
On The Very Concept Of An Enthymeme, G.C. Goddu
OSSA Conference Archive
An enthymeme is often defined as an argument with a missing component or an argument with an unexpressed component. Roy Sorensen, in “Are Enthymemes Arguments?”, argues against the possibility of enthymemes being arguments at all, but he assumes that arguments are abstract objects. I shall present and explore some more metaphysically neutral arguments against enthymemes as arguments and ultimately conclude that while not conclusive, the most viable option is Sorensen’s—enthymemes are not arguments.
“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, 2016 Universidad Diego Portales
“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez
OSSA Conference Archive
The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context.
Damed If You Do; Damed If You Don’T: Cohen’S “Missed Opportunities”, 2016 Critical Inquiry Group
Damed If You Do; Damed If You Don’T: Cohen’S “Missed Opportunities”, Sharon Bailin, Mark Battersby
OSSA Conference Archive
In his paper, “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation,” Daniel Cohen has in his sights a “curious” asymmetry in how we evaluate arguments: while we criticize arguments for failing to point out obvious objections to the proposed line of reasoning, we do not consider it critically culpable to fail to take into account arguments for the position. Cohen views this omission as a missed opportunity, for which he lays the blame largely at the metaphorical feet of the “Dominant Adversarial Model” of argumentation – the DAM account. We argue here that, while Cohen criticizes the DAM account for conceptualizing arguments as …
Emotional Legal Arguments And A Broken Leg, 2016 UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE GOIÂNIA
Emotional Legal Arguments And A Broken Leg, Rubens Damasceno-Morais
OSSA Conference Archive
We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and …
Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, 2016 University of Ontario Institute of Technology
Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, Ami Mamolo
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper presents an overview of several years of my research into individuals’ reasoning, argumentation, and bias when addressing problems, scenarios, and symbols related to mathematical infinity. There is a long history of debate around what constitutes “objective truth” in the realm of mathematical infinity, dating back to ancient Greece (e.g., Dubinsky et al., 2005). Modes of argumentation, hindrances, and intuitions have been largely consistent over the years and across levels of expertise (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Fischbein et al., 1979, Tsamir, 1999). This presentation examines the interrelated complexities of notions of objectivity, bias, and argumentation as manifested in …
A Ludological Perspective On Argument, 2016 University of Windsor
A Ludological Perspective On Argument, Michael A. Yong-Set
OSSA Conference Archive
This introductory paper explores a new perspective on argumentation that draws upon the resources of ludology – the critical and academic of study of games qua games. In the Philosophical Investigations, one of the later Wittgenstein’s more mysterious suggestions is that if one understands how games work, then one would be able to understand how natural language works. Similarly, it will be argued that if we look to how games function as games, we will be able to understand how the ‘argument-game’ functions. The epistemic importance of rhetorical argumentation rather than analytic demonstration becomes apparent if we consider ‘argument’ …
Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, 2016 Saint Mary's University - Canada
Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein
OSSA Conference Archive
Zero tolerance policies are often mistakenly thought to be the best way to deal with pressing social problems. However, most arguments for zero tolerance policies are either based on inaccurate premises or they commit the zero tolerance fallacy. This paper explores ways that we might counteract the bias in favor of zero tolerance policies by adding a query list to the choice architecture.
Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, 2016 University of the Fraser Valley
Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster
OSSA Conference Archive
I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.
Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, 2016 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd
OSSA Conference Archive
This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition (form, stance, and content) with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.
America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, 2016 Oakland University
America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, Ilon Lauer, Thomas Lauer
OSSA Conference Archive
: Our study of public argumentation surrounding iPhone encryption addresses the argumentative function of the metonym. Metonyms accomplish general and specific argumentative purposes. Generally, metonyms help define and redefine the argumentative framework for a dispute. Within a controversy, metonyms operate as inference generators. We isolate and analyze several metonyms and elaborate their warrant-generating valences. Metonyms are inference generating tools capable of instantiating normative frameworks, invoking flexible and indeterminate senses of causality.
Levels Of Depth In Deep Disagreement, 2016 York University
Levels Of Depth In Deep Disagreement, Claudio Duran
OSSA Conference Archive
The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Richard Fogelin in a 1985 paper published in Critical Thinking. Since then, about 12 papers have been published in journals or presented in conferences on argumentation theory.
All these papers relate back to the initial Fogelin paper. Andrew Lugg’s 1986 critical response to Fogelin introduces significant questions concerning his views. Peter Davson-Galle in 1992, takes a more positive approach to them. The more extensive publication on deep disagreement can be found in a 2005 issue of Critical Thinking dedicated entirely to this topic. Most of the 5 papers found here take …
Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, 2016 University of Siena
Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, Christoph Lumer
OSSA Conference Archive
The contribution critically discusses Walton's (and Reed’s and Macagno’s) argumentation scheme approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from an epistemological standpoint.
Compassion, Authority And Baby Talk: Prosody And Objectivity, 2016 Trent University
Compassion, Authority And Baby Talk: Prosody And Objectivity, Leo Groarke, Gabrijela Kišiček
OSSA Conference Archive
Recent work on multimodal argumentation has explored facets of argumentation which have no obvious analogue in the written arguments which were emphasized in traditional accounts of argument. One of these facets is prosody: the structure and quality of the sound of spoken language. Prosodic features include pitch, temporal structure, pronunciation, loudness and voice quality, rhythm, emphasis and accent. In this paper, we explore the ways that prosodic features may be invoked in arguing.