Economic Theory Commons^™

Does A Better Running Back Mean More Rushing? Game Theory And The Nfl, Eric Lofquist

Honors Scholar Theses

In this paper I attempt to answer the question of whether or not teams in the National Football League (NFL) rush less with a better running back. This seems counterintuitive, but game theory supposes that this is true. Defenses facing a better running back will generally expect the offense to rush more and therefore defend the run more often. The offense, foreseeing the defense’s actions, will choose to pass more to counteract the run defense. This is the basis of the difference between the strategic effect and the direct effect in mixed strategies. The direct effect is when a player …

Robust Jump Regressions, Jia Li, Viktor Todorov, George Tauchen

Research Collection School Of Economics

We develop robust inference methods for studying linear dependence between the jumps of discretely observed processes at high frequency. Unlike classical linear regressions, jump regressions are determined by a small number of jumps occurring over a fixed time interval and the rest of the components of the processes around the jump times. The latter are the continuous martingale parts of the processes as well as observation noise. By sampling more frequently the role of these components, which are hidden in the observed price, shrinks asymptotically. The robustness of our inference procedure is with respect to outliers, which are of particular …

Gender, Punishment, And Cooperation: Men Hurt Others To Advance Their Interests, Terence C. Burnham

ESI Working Papers

A laboratory experiment that reports on gender, cooperation, and punishment in two repeated public goods game using high-powered punishment. In a repeated public goods game with punishment, no statistically significant differences between men and women are reported. In a modified game that adds an explicit payoff for relative performance, men punish more than women, men obtain higher rank, and punishment by males decreases payoffs for both men and for women. These results contribute to the debate about the origins and maintenance of cooperation.

Comparing A Risky Choice In The Field And Across Lab Procedures, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova

ESI Publications

Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues regarding the reliability of such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. The second pertains to the impact the payment procedure has on observed behavior. This paper adds empirical insight into both issues. Using data from the promotional campaign of a bank and a laboratory experiment that closely mimics the same decision, we find similar levels of risk taking controlling for gender and age. We also compare behavior on this same risky choice across three …

Coronary Atherosclerosis In Indigenous South American Tsimane: A Cross-Sectional Cohort Study, Hillard Kaplan, Randall C. Thompson, Benjamin C. Trumble, L. Samuel Wann, Adel H. Allam, Bret Beheim, Bruno Frohlich, M. Linda Sutherland, James D. Sutherland, Jonathan Stieglitz, Daniel Eid Rodriguez, David E. Michalik, Chris J. Rowan, Guido P. Lombardi, Ram Bedi, Angela R. Garcia, James K. Min, Jagat Narula, Caleb E. Finch, Michael Gurven, Gregory S. Thomas

ESI Publications

Background—Conventional coronary artery disease risk factors might potentially explain at least 90% of the attributable risk of coronary artery disease. To better understand the association between the pre-industrial lifestyle and low prevalence of coronary artery disease risk factors, we examined the Tsimane, a Bolivian population living a subsistence lifestyle of hunting, gathering, fishing, and farming with few cardiovascular risk factors, but high infectious inflammatory burden.

Methods—We did a cross-sectional cohort study including all individuals who self-identified as Tsimane and who were aged 40 years or older. Coronary atherosclerosis was assessed by coronary artery calcium (CAC) scoring done with …

Smile, Dictator, You’Re On Camera, Joy A. Buchanan, Matthew K. Mcmahon, Matthew Simpson, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

We investigate the degree to which people in a shopping mall express other-regarding behavior in the dictator game. Whereas many studies have attempted to increase the social distance between the dictator and experimenter and between the dictator and dictatee, we attempt to minimize that social distance between random strangers by video recording the decisions with the permission of the dictators to display their image on the Internet. Offers made by dictators are high relative to other experiments and a nontrivial number give the entire experimental windfall away, however a nontrivial number of people keep everything as well.

The Tsimane Health And Life History Project: Integrating Anthropology And Biomedicine, Michael Gurven, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Aaron D. Blackwell, Bret Beheim, Helen Davis, Hillard Kaplan, Paul L. Hooper

ESI Publications

The Tsimane Health and Life History Project, an integrated bio-behavioral study of the human life course, is designed to test competing hypotheses of human life-history evolution. One aim is to understand the bidirectional connections between life history and social behavior in a highfertility, kin-based context lacking amenities of modern urban life (e.g. sanitation, banks, electricity). Another aim is to understand how a high pathogen burden influences health and well-being during development and adulthood. A third aim addresses how modernization shapes human life histories and sociality. Here we outline the project’s goals, history, and main findings since its inception in 2002. …

A Study Of The Triggers Of Conflict And Emotional Reactions, Michael Caldera, Michael T. Mcbride, Matthew W. Mccarter, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Publications

We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about an opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions …

Does The Effect Of Driving Distance On Pga/Lpga Tour Earnings Differ Across Genders?, Conner R. Albright

Georgia College Student Research Events

Since the early 21st century, the game of golf has seen a shift in importance of touch and finesse towards power and distance. Though many studies have observed the effects of individual golf statistics on earnings, none have examined if these effects fluctuate between genders. The purpose of my study is to show male and female professional golfers the effects of hitting the ball far and if their practice time might be better off spent practicing other areas of the game. By using player statistics from the 2015 PGA and LPGA cross sectional data set, this paper will examine if …

Emotional Calibration Of Self-Control, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter

ESI Publications

We study a dynamic model of self-control where previous decisions have influence on subsequent decision making. In our model effort and guilt are negative emotions produced by previous decisions to either resist or yield to temptation, respectively. These emotions calibrate an individual's self-control, in turn affecting future decisions. Our model explains non-stationary consumption paths characterized by compensatory indulgence and restraint, why under some circumstances the amplitude of this switching pattern increases with foresight, and how unavoidable options that might show up on one's menu influence choices, consequent emotions, consumption paths, and preferences for commitment. We discuss the implications of self-control …

Selecting An Alternative National Banking System Against Fractional Reserve Free Banking: The Greatest Modern Fraud?, Josiah J. Bardy

Senior Honors Theses

This paper serves as a compilation and analysis of different banking systems with an emphasis on fractional reserve free banking. Contemporary academic literature has debated fractional reserve banking with revisited scrutiny since the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The Austrian School, drawing conclusions from the Austrian business cycle theory, blames central banking for boom-bust economics. One proposed solution, fractional reserve free banking, eliminates the central bank’s control for a purer form of fractional reserve practice; however, this system may be inherently fraudulent and unethical. After completing an economic analysis of the western world’s banking system, this paper then explores an alternative solution.

Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus, Charles J. Thomas

ESI Working Papers

In a simple model I show consumer surplus can increase after competing sellers consummate a profitable merger that generates no cost savings. This finding contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom that horizontal mergers without efficiencies must enhance sellers’ market power to be profitable, thereby harming buyers. The model fits industries in which individual buyers conduct distinct procurement contests for which sellers incur costs to participate, say to assess their product’s fit with the buyer’s preferences. Mergers benefit buyers by inducing stronger contest-level entry, echoing common claims from merging parties that their merger is beneficial because it creates a stronger competitor.

Zero Textbook Cost Syllabus For Economics 201 (Macroeconomic Theory), Bettina E. Berch

Open Educational Resources

This is a zero textbook cost syllabus for teaching macroeconomic theory at the 200 level at a community college. It is designed for a one semester course, using a creative commons textbook and a variety of open source podcasts, newspaper articles, and other materials available to CUNY students.

The Ideological Roots Of Institutional Change, Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin

ESI Working Papers

Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions in response to changing economic conditions? And why do such conditions sometimes generate ideological backlashes and at other times lead to transformative sociopolitical movements? We propose an explanation that highlights the interplay--or lack thereof--between new technologies, ideologies, and institutions. When new technologies emerge, uncertainty results from a lack of understanding how the technology will fit with prevailing ideologies and institutions. This uncertainty discourages investment in institutions and the cultural capital necessary to take advantage of new technologies. Accordingly, increased uncertainty during times of rapid technological change may generate an ideological …

The Cultural Transmission Of Trust Norms: Evidence From A Lab In The Field On A Natural Experiment, Jared Rubin, Elira Karaja

ESI Working Papers

We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775-1919, these villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Habsburg and Ottoman/Russian border despite being located seven kilometers apart. Russian and Ottoman Öscal institutions were more rapacious than Habsburg institutions, which may have eroded trust of outsiders (relative to co-villagers). Our design permits us to rigorously test this conjecture, and more generally, whether historically institutionalized cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally. We Önd that participants on the Ottoman/Russian side are indeed less likely to trust outsiders but more likely to trust co-villagers.

Horticultural Activity Predicts Later Localized Limb Status In A Contemporary Pre-Industrial Population, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven

ESI Publications

Objectives—Modern humans may have gracile skeletons due to low physical activity levels and mechanical loading. Tests using prehistoric skeletons are limited by the inability to assess behaviour directly, while modern industrialized societies possess few socio-ecological features typical of human evolutionary history. Among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists, we test whether greater activity levels and, thus, increased loading earlier in life are associated with greater later-life bone status and diminished age-related bone loss.

Materials and Methods—We used quantitative ultrasonography to assess radial and tibial status among adults aged 20+ years (mean±SD age=49±15; 52% female). We conducted systematic behavioural observations to assess earlier-life …

Deception And Reception: The Behavior Of Information Providers And Users, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Working Papers

We investigate the behavior of information providers (underwriters) and users (investors) in a controlled laboratory experiment where underwriters have incentives to deceive and investors have incentives to avoid deception. Participants play simultaneously as underwriters and investors in one-shot information transmission games. The results of our experiment show a significant proportion of both deceptive and non-deceptive underwriters. Despite the presence of deceptive underwriters, investors are receptive to underwriters’ reports, gleaning information content, albeit overly optimistic. Within our sample, deception by underwriters and reception by investors are the most profitable strategies. Moreover, participants who send deceptive reports to investors, but at the …

Monitoring Institutions In Indefinitely Repeated Games, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.

Targeted Campaign Competition, Loyal Voters, And Supermajorities, Pierre C. Boyer, Kai A. Konrad, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters by engaging in persuasive efforts that are targetable. Each individual voter is persuaded by campaign effort and votes for the candidate who targets more persuasive effort to this voter. Each candidate chooses a level of total campaign effort and allocates their effort among the set of voters. We completely characterize equilibrium for the majoritarian objective game and compare that to the vote-share maximizing game. If the candidates are symmetric ex ante, both types of electoral competition dissipate the rents from once in expectation. However, the …

Reduced Forms And Weak Instrumentation, Peter C. B. Phillips

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper develops exact finite sample and asymptotic distributions for a class of reduced form estimators and predictors, allowing for the presence of unidentified or weakly identified structural equations. Weak instrument asymptotic theory is developed directly from finite sample results, unifying earlier findings and showing the usefulness of structural information in making predictions from reduced form systems in applications. Asymptotic results are reported for predictions from models with many weak instruments. Of particular interest is the finding that, in unidentified and weakly identified structural models, partially restricted reduced form predictors have considerably smaller forecast mean square errors than unrestricted reduced …