Economic Theory Commons^™

Emotional Calibration Of Self-Control, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter

ESI Publications

We study a dynamic model of self-control where previous decisions have influence on subsequent decision making. In our model effort and guilt are negative emotions produced by previous decisions to either resist or yield to temptation, respectively. These emotions calibrate an individual's self-control, in turn affecting future decisions. Our model explains non-stationary consumption paths characterized by compensatory indulgence and restraint, why under some circumstances the amplitude of this switching pattern increases with foresight, and how unavoidable options that might show up on one's menu influence choices, consequent emotions, consumption paths, and preferences for commitment. We discuss the implications of self-control …

Selecting An Alternative National Banking System Against Fractional Reserve Free Banking: The Greatest Modern Fraud?, Josiah J. Bardy

Senior Honors Theses

This paper serves as a compilation and analysis of different banking systems with an emphasis on fractional reserve free banking. Contemporary academic literature has debated fractional reserve banking with revisited scrutiny since the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The Austrian School, drawing conclusions from the Austrian business cycle theory, blames central banking for boom-bust economics. One proposed solution, fractional reserve free banking, eliminates the central bank’s control for a purer form of fractional reserve practice; however, this system may be inherently fraudulent and unethical. After completing an economic analysis of the western world’s banking system, this paper then explores an alternative solution.

Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus, Charles J. Thomas

ESI Working Papers

In a simple model I show consumer surplus can increase after competing sellers consummate a profitable merger that generates no cost savings. This finding contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom that horizontal mergers without efficiencies must enhance sellers’ market power to be profitable, thereby harming buyers. The model fits industries in which individual buyers conduct distinct procurement contests for which sellers incur costs to participate, say to assess their product’s fit with the buyer’s preferences. Mergers benefit buyers by inducing stronger contest-level entry, echoing common claims from merging parties that their merger is beneficial because it creates a stronger competitor.

Zero Textbook Cost Syllabus For Economics 201 (Macroeconomic Theory), Bettina E. Berch

Open Educational Resources

This is a zero textbook cost syllabus for teaching macroeconomic theory at the 200 level at a community college. It is designed for a one semester course, using a creative commons textbook and a variety of open source podcasts, newspaper articles, and other materials available to CUNY students.

The Ideological Roots Of Institutional Change, Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin

ESI Working Papers

Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions in response to changing economic conditions? And why do such conditions sometimes generate ideological backlashes and at other times lead to transformative sociopolitical movements? We propose an explanation that highlights the interplay--or lack thereof--between new technologies, ideologies, and institutions. When new technologies emerge, uncertainty results from a lack of understanding how the technology will fit with prevailing ideologies and institutions. This uncertainty discourages investment in institutions and the cultural capital necessary to take advantage of new technologies. Accordingly, increased uncertainty during times of rapid technological change may generate an ideological …

The Cultural Transmission Of Trust Norms: Evidence From A Lab In The Field On A Natural Experiment, Jared Rubin, Elira Karaja

ESI Working Papers

We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775-1919, these villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Habsburg and Ottoman/Russian border despite being located seven kilometers apart. Russian and Ottoman Öscal institutions were more rapacious than Habsburg institutions, which may have eroded trust of outsiders (relative to co-villagers). Our design permits us to rigorously test this conjecture, and more generally, whether historically institutionalized cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally. We Önd that participants on the Ottoman/Russian side are indeed less likely to trust outsiders but more likely to trust co-villagers.

Horticultural Activity Predicts Later Localized Limb Status In A Contemporary Pre-Industrial Population, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven

ESI Publications

Objectives—Modern humans may have gracile skeletons due to low physical activity levels and mechanical loading. Tests using prehistoric skeletons are limited by the inability to assess behaviour directly, while modern industrialized societies possess few socio-ecological features typical of human evolutionary history. Among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists, we test whether greater activity levels and, thus, increased loading earlier in life are associated with greater later-life bone status and diminished age-related bone loss.

Materials and Methods—We used quantitative ultrasonography to assess radial and tibial status among adults aged 20+ years (mean±SD age=49±15; 52% female). We conducted systematic behavioural observations to assess earlier-life …

Deception And Reception: The Behavior Of Information Providers And Users, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Working Papers

We investigate the behavior of information providers (underwriters) and users (investors) in a controlled laboratory experiment where underwriters have incentives to deceive and investors have incentives to avoid deception. Participants play simultaneously as underwriters and investors in one-shot information transmission games. The results of our experiment show a significant proportion of both deceptive and non-deceptive underwriters. Despite the presence of deceptive underwriters, investors are receptive to underwriters’ reports, gleaning information content, albeit overly optimistic. Within our sample, deception by underwriters and reception by investors are the most profitable strategies. Moreover, participants who send deceptive reports to investors, but at the …

Monitoring Institutions In Indefinitely Repeated Games, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.

Targeted Campaign Competition, Loyal Voters, And Supermajorities, Pierre C. Boyer, Kai A. Konrad, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters by engaging in persuasive efforts that are targetable. Each individual voter is persuaded by campaign effort and votes for the candidate who targets more persuasive effort to this voter. Each candidate chooses a level of total campaign effort and allocates their effort among the set of voters. We completely characterize equilibrium for the majoritarian objective game and compare that to the vote-share maximizing game. If the candidates are symmetric ex ante, both types of electoral competition dissipate the rents from once in expectation. However, the …

How To Describe Objects?, Liu Peng

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper addresses the problem of randomly allocating n indivisible objects to n agents where each object can be evaluated according to a set of characteristics. The planner chooses a subset of characteristics and a ranking of them. Then she describes each object as a list of values according to the ranking of those chosen characteristics. Being informed of such a description, each agent figures out her preference that is lexicographically separable according to the characteristics chosen and ranked by the planner. Hence a description of the objects induces a collection of admissible preferences. We call a description good if …

Reduced Forms And Weak Instrumentation, Peter C. B. Phillips

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper develops exact finite sample and asymptotic distributions for a class of reduced form estimators and predictors, allowing for the presence of unidentified or weakly identified structural equations. Weak instrument asymptotic theory is developed directly from finite sample results, unifying earlier findings and showing the usefulness of structural information in making predictions from reduced form systems in applications. Asymptotic results are reported for predictions from models with many weak instruments. Of particular interest is the finding that, in unidentified and weakly identified structural models, partially restricted reduced form predictors have considerably smaller forecast mean square errors than unrestricted reduced …

The Paradox Of Power: Principal-Agent Problems And Fiscal Capacity In Absolutist Regimes, Debin Ma, Jared Rubin

ESI Working Papers

Tax extraction in Qing China was low relative to Western Europe. It is not obvious why: China was much more absolutist and had stronger rights over property and people. Why did the Chinese not convert their absolute power into revenue? We propose a model, supported by historical evidence, which suggests that i) the center could not ask its tax collecting agents to levy high taxes because it would incentivize agents to overtax the peasantry; ii) the center could not pay agents high wages in return for high taxes because the center had no mechanism to commit to refrain from confiscating …

Coordination When There Are Restricted And Unrestricted Options, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona, Robert Sugden

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the number of options increases. Contrary to this expectation, we report an experiment which found more frequent coordination when the option set was unrestricted than when it was restricted. To try to explain this result, we develop a method for eliciting the general rules that subjects use to identify salient options in restricted and unrestricted sets. We find that each such rule, if used by all subjects, would generate greater coordination in restricted sets. However, subjects tend to apply different rules to restricted and unrestricted sets.

Human Grooming In Comparative Perspective: People In Six Small-Scale Societies Groom Less But Socialize Just As Much As Expected For A Typical Primate, Adrian V. Jaeggi, Karen Kramer, Raymond Hames, Evan J. Kiely, Cristina Gomes, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven

ESI Publications

Objectives—Grooming has important utilitarian and social functions in primates but little is known about grooming and its functional analogues in traditional human societies. We compare human grooming to typical primate patterns to test its hygienic and social functions.

Materials and Methods—Bayesian phylogenetic analyses were used to derive expected human grooming time given the potential associations between grooming, group size, body size, terrestriality, and several climatic variables across 69 primate species. This was compared against observed times dedicated to grooming, other hygienic behavior and conversation among the Maya, Pumé, Sanöma, Tsimane’, Yanomamö, and Ye’kwana (mean number of behavioral scans …

Deliberation Favours Social Efficiency By Making People Disregard Their Relative Shares: Evidence From Usa And India, Valerie Capraro, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hernán-González

ESI Publications

Groups make decisions on both the production and the distribution of resources. These decisions typically involve a tension between increasing the total level of group resources (i.e. social efficiency) and distributing these resources among group members (i.e. individuals’ relative shares). This is the case because the redistribution process may destroy part of the resources, thus resulting in socially inefficient allocations. Here we apply a dual-process approach to understand the cognitive underpinnings of this fundamental tension. We conducted a set of experiments to examine the extent to which different allocation decisions respond to intuition or deliberation. In a newly developed approach, …

Random Assignments On Preference Domains With A Tier Structure, Peng Liu, Huaxia Zeng

Research Collection School Of Economics

We address a standard random assignment problem (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) and search forsd-strategy-proof, sd-efficient and sd-envy-free or equal-treatment-of-equals rules.Our main result is that on a connected domain (Sato (2013)),if there exists a rule satisfying these axioms, this domain is endowed with a restricted tier structure.Furthermore, we show that, on such a domain, the Probabilistic Serial rule is the unique rulethat satisfies these axioms.As an extension, we introduce outside options to the model, and establish the same characterizations.

Housing Market Liquidity And The Effect On Unemployment In The United States: An Application To The U.S. Housing Market, Isolating Regional Housing Market Liquidity And The Associated Effect On Unemployment, Lindsey M. Piegza

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This study proposes a measure of price spread between the bid (or the offer price from the buyer) and the ask (or the list price of the seller) in order to isolate the effect of housing market liquidity on unemployment. Housing market liquidity is defined as its impact on labor market equilibrium and unemployment at the state and regional levels. This proxy for housing market liquidity offers a more thorough measure of housing liquidity or market clearing ability compared with the current literature, which has relied on price or price changes alone as the primary measure of activity in the …

Investing In The Presence Of Massive Flows, Terence C. Burnham, Harry Gakidis, Jeffrey Wurgler

ESI Working Papers

Approximately $10 trillion is benchmarked to Morgan Stanley Capital International’s Developed, Emerging, Frontier, and standalone market indexes. Reclassifications from one index to another require thousands of investors to decide how to react. We study a comprehensive sample of past reclassifications to guide this decision. Reclassified markets’ prices substantially overshoot between the announcement and effective dates—prices fall when a market moves from an index with more benchmarked ownership to one with less, such from Emerging to Frontier, and vice-versa—but revert within a year. We identify alpha-maximizing responses to reclassifications for both tightly benchmarked and more flexible investors.

Loose Math Notes, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Loose mathematical notes. Unpublished manuscript materials. Author: Anwar Shaikh, PhD.
• The analytical solution of the distribution of wages. Unpublished manuscript. Author: Anwar Shaikh, PhD. Date: February 6, 2017.
• Wealth of the world’s richest publicly traded companies per industry and per employee: Gamma, log-normal and Pareto power law as universal distributions? Soriano-Hernández, P. G., del Castillo-Mussot, M., Campirán-Chavez, I., & Montemayor-Aldrete, J. A. (2017). Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 476, 143–157.
• Handwritten mathematical calculations and derivations. Manuscript notes. Author: Anwar Shaikh, PhD.
• Mathematical derivations related to probability distributions, wage distributions, and wealth …