Economic Theory Commons^™

Retirements - Scrapping, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. July 11, 2010. Notes on retirements and scrapping. Unpublished work. Title and author only.

• Shaikh, A. March 8, 1979. Notes on fixed capital. Unpublished work. Title and author only.

• Shaikh, A. August 6, 1988. Perlo vs. BEA - kstock. Unpublished work. Title and author only.

• Goldsmith, R. W., Brady, D. S., & Mendershausen, H. 1956. A study of saving in the United States, volume III. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Gupta, S. May 2, 1991. Alternative estimates of capital stock. Unpublished work. Title and author only.

Microfoundations, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Microfoundations: subject outline and reading list. Anwar Shaikh, PhD. Unpublished archival folder cover sheet.
• Golland, L., & Sigmund, K. 2007. Exact thought in a demented time: Karl Menger and his Viennese mathematical colloquium. The Mathematical Intelligencer, volume 29, issue 1. Springer Science and Business Media, New York.
• Rizvi, S. A. T. 2005. Deception and game theory. In C. Gerschlager, Ed., Deception in markets: an economic analysis. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
• Philp, B., & Young, D. 2002. Preferences, reductionism and the microfoundations of analytical Marxism. Cambridge Journal of Economics, volume 26, issue 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, on …

Visibility Of Contributions And Cost Of Information: An Experiment On Public Goods, Anya Savikhin, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of information about contributors on contributions in the public goods game. We systematically consider several treatments that are similar to a wide range of situations in practice. First, we vary the cost of viewing identifiable information about contributors. Second, we vary recognizing all, top or bottom contributors. We find that recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the top contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing contributors, but recognizing only the bottom contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. When viewing information about contributors is costly, …

Fight Or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks In The Game Of Siege, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in …

Affecting Policy By Manipulating Prediction Markets: Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Shengle Lin, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Documented results indicate prediction markets effectively aggregate information and form accurate predictions. This has led to a proliferation of markets predicting everything from the results of elections to a company’s sales to movie box office receipts. Recent research suggests prediction markets are robust to manipulation attacks and resulting market outcomes improve forecast accuracy. However, we present evidence from the lab indicating that single‐minded, well‐funded manipulators can in fact destroy a prediction market’s ability to aggregate informative prices and mislead those who are making forecasts based upon market predictions. However, we find that manipulators primarily influence market trades meaning outstanding bids …

Personality And The Consistency Of Risk Taking Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes

ESI Working Papers

Researchers have found that an individual’s risk attitude is not stable across elicitation methods. Results reported by Deck et al. (2009) suggest that personality may help explain the apparent inconsistency, offering support to Borghans et al.’s (2008) argument that economists should consider a multi‐domain approach to measuring risk attitudes. This paper uses laboratory methods to compare risk attitudes as measured by the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure under two different frames. We find that, as in Deck et al. (2009), one’s willingness to take financial risks (as measured by Weber et al. 2002) significantly affects behavior; however the effect is …

Perfect And Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring In A Minimum-Effort Game, Cary Deck, Nikos Nikiforakis

ESI Working Papers

This paper presents the results from a minimum-effort game in which individuals can observe the choices of others in real time. We find that under perfect monitoring almost all groups coordinate at the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, when individuals can only observe the actions of their immediate neighbors in a circle network, monitoring improves neither coordination nor efficiency relative to a baseline treatment without real-time monitoring. We argue that the inefficiency of imperfect monitoring is due to information uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the interpretation of the information available regarding the actions of others.

Can Markets Save Lives? An Experimental Investigation Of A Market For Organ Donations, Cary Deck, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Working Papers

Many people die while waiting for organ transplants even though the number of usable organs is far larger than the number needed for transplant. Governments have devised many policies aimed at increasing available transplant organs with variable success. However, with few exceptions, policy makers are reluctant to establish markets for organs despite the potential for mutually beneficial exchanges. We ask whether organ markets could save lives. Controlled laboratory methods are ideal for this inquiry because human lives would be involved when implementing field trials. Our results suggest that markets can increase the supply of organs available for transplant, but that …

Price Increasing Competition? Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jingping Gu

ESI Working Papers

Economic intuition suggests that increased competition generates lower prices. However, recent theoretical work shows that a monopolist may charge a lower price than a firm facing a competitor selling a differentiated product. The direction of the price change when competition is introduced is dependent upon the joint distribution of buyer values for the two products. We explore this relationship using controlled laboratory experiments. Our results indicate that the distribution of buyer values does affect prices in a manner consistent with the theoretical predictions, although price increasing competition is rare due in part to overly intense competition regardless of the distribution …

Marx On Money, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A., PhD. (n.d.). New SR model [Handwritten notes].

• Shaikh, A., PhD. (n.d.). Hand out monies [Handwritten notes].

• Shaikh, A. (2010, May 17). Exchange, money and price (pp. 12–18) [Draft manuscript]. Includes plates of ancient monies.

• Shaikh, A., PhD. (1999, December 8). Value, price, money [Handwritten notes].

• Shaikh, A., PhD. (1999, December 1). Eco 104 notes on value, form of value, price, and the capital circuit [Handwritten notes].

• Shaikh, A. (2001, November 5). Lectures on value [Printed course document with handwritten annotations]. Economic 104: Historical foundations I.

• Shaikh, A., …

Theory Of P, K, R (Chapter 6), Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Ch 6: profit and capital (Unpublished manuscript) by Anwar Shaikh.
• Appendix 6.1: algebra of profit and surplus labor (Unpublished manuscript) by Anwar Shaikh.
• Appendix 6.1 formal algebra profit & surplus labor (Unpublished manuscript notes) by Anwar Shaikh.
• Two sources of profits (Unpublished presentation slides) by Anwar Shaikh.
• The puzzle of profits (Unpublished manuscript) by Anwar Shaikh.

Discussion & Notes On Quality Adjustments Bias Of K Stock, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Fixed reproducible tangible wealth in the United States, 1925–89, written by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, in the year 1993.
• Discussion & note on quality adj bias of k stock, an unpublished set of handwritten research notes and analytical commentary prepared by Anwar Shaikh, PhD, on September 17, 2010.
• Kstock bias in quality adj. prices, a manuscript file folder label inscribed with the identification code NA-23-65, prepared by Anwar Shaikh, PhD, on June 5, 2026.
• Alternate measures of current-cost output/capital indexes: 1947 = 100, an unpublished …

Chapter Five, Money - Earlier Drafts, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Exchange, money and price — Shaikh, Anwar, PhD. Draft dated May 17, 2010, with an earlier date of March 22, 2009 also recorded on the document. Unpublished manuscript.
• Exchange, money and price — Shaikh, Anwar, PhD. Outline dated May 14, 2010, with an earlier date of March 22, 2009 also recorded on the document. Unpublished outline.
• Long waves: Theories and chronologies — Shaikh, Anwar, PhD. Undated. Unpublished handwritten notes and chronological table.
• Notes on long waves and great depressions — Shaikh, Anwar, PhD. Undated. Unpublished research notes.
• General points on Marx's theory of money — Shaikh, Anwar, …

Team Formation And Self‐Serving Biases, Brice Corgnet

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

There is extensive evidence which indicates that people learn positively about themselves. We build on this finding to develop a model of team formation. We show that under complete information learning positively about oneself prevents efficient team formation. Agents becoming overconfident tend to ask for an excessive share of the group outcome. Positive learning generates divergence in workers' beliefs and hampers efficient team formation. Interestingly, in a context of incomplete information regarding the partner's ability, extensive learning biases may reduce the divergence in agents' beliefs and facilitate efficient team formation as a result. We apply our model to coauthorship and …

Did I Do That? Group Positioning And Asymmetry In Attributional Bias, Brian Gunia, Brice Corgnet

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A laboratory experiment examined whether one structural feature of groups—members’ physical positioning—may produce asymmetry in their perceived contribution to a task. In particular, we investigated asymmetry in group members’ (often excessive) claims of credit for collective tasks ("the self-serving attributional bias"). Consistent with the availability account of this bias, group members located in the middle of a group, with easy visual access to their partners’ contributions, demonstrated less bias than outside members (who demonstrated bias consistent with prior research)—but no less satisfaction. Further analyses suggested that these results reflected bias reduction among middle members and did stem from visual availability. …

The Attack And Defense Of Weakest-Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker‟s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender‟s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of …

Durability, Re-Trading And Market Performance, John Dickhaut, Shengle Lin, David Porter, Vernon Smith

ESI Working Papers

Key differential structural characteristics of environments studied in previous market experiments have documented large divergences in their observed performance, particularly discrepancies in their convergence to expected equilibrium outcomes. We investigate why this should be so.