Economic Theory Commons^™

Information (Non)Aggregation In Markets With Costly Signal Acquisition, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders’ acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset’s value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy …

Essays On Inequality And Macroeconomic Stability, Thomas Hauner

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation consists of three chapters. . .

Chapter 1: Aggregate Wealth and Its Distribution as Determinants of Financial Crises: Panel Evidence This essay investigates the relationship between wealth inequality and financial crises across a panel of nine advanced economies over the past 100 years. While substantiation of a role for income inequality is ambiguous in the literature, evidence is presented suggesting a unique capacity for the accumulation of assets to increase the likelihood of a future financial crisis episode. Testing long-run panel data with a reduced form, two-way fixed effects model, estimates suggest that increasing wealth inequality, in an …

Nebraska Monthly Economic Indicators: September 20, 2017, Eric Thompson

Leading Economic Indicator Reports

The Leading Economic Indicator – Nebraska (LEI-N) 1 fell by 0.38% during August of 2017. The decline in the LEI-N, which is designed to predict economic activity six months into the future, suggests that the Nebraska economy will grow slowly during the first few months of 2018. The drop in the indicator was primarily due to a decline in manufacturing hours-worked during August. Building permits for single-family homes and airline passenger enplanements also dropped slightly. There were two positive components of the LEI-N. Businesses responding to the August Survey of Nebraska Business reported plans to increase sales and employment over …

The Welfare Effects Of Civil Forfeiture, Michael Preciado, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

Using a laboratory experiment we explore competing claims on the welfare effects of civil forfeiture. Experiment participants are tasked with making trade-offs in allocating resources “to fight crime” with and without the ability to seize and forfeit assets. It is an open question whether the societal impact of reducing crime is greater in a world with or without civil forfeiture. Proponents of civil forfeiture argue that the ill-gotten gains of criminals can be used by law enforcement to further fight crime. Opponents claim that the confiscation of assets by law enforcement distorts the prioritization of cases by focusing attention, not …

No Mere Tautology: The Division Of Labor Is Limited By The Division Of Labor, Andrew Smyth, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

We explore the intersection of growth theory and the theory of the firm with an experiment. Economic growth is possible in our experiment when agents specialize to exploit increasing returns. We find that low opportunity costs are sufficient for Marshallian internal economies, but that Marshallian external economies are slow to emerge in four probing treatment conditions. Transaction costs do not hamper external economies as we anticipated prior to collecting data. When external economies falter, it is because new ideas about the cost and value of more extensive specialization fail to emerge. Ideas are what make further divisions of the …

Fair Division With Uncertain Needs, Jingyi Xue

Research Collection School Of Economics

Imagine that agents have uncertain needs and a resource must be divided before uncertainty resolves. In this situation, waste typically occurs when the assignment to an agent turns out to exceed his realized need. How should the resource be divided in the face of possible waste? This is a question out of the scope of the existing rationing literature. Our main axiom to address the issue is no domination. It requires that no agent receive more of the resource than another while producing a larger expected waste, unless the other agent has been fully compensated. Together with conditional strict endowment …

Preferences With Changing Ambiguity Aversion, Jingyi Xue

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper provides two equivalent representations for thegeneral class of uncertainty averse preferences studied by Cerreia-Vioglio,Maccheroni, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2011). The two representations employrespectively two important extensions of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maxmindecision rule. The first is a weighted maxmin representation with anon-constant weight used in mixing the minimum and maximum expected utilities.The second is a variant constraint representation which evaluates a prospect bythe worst expected utility over a neighborhood of approximating priors wherethe size of the neighborhood depends on the prospect. The equivalent representationshave advantage in several respects. In the second part of this paper, we studythe wealth effect …

The Attack And Defense Of Weakest Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled — specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla-warfare” strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most one target with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in …

Loss Aversion And The Quantity-Quality Tradeoff, Jared Rubin, Anya Samek, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from …

A Reexamination Of “The Hidden Return To Incentives”, Jing Davis, Steven Schwartz, Richard Young

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.

The Effect Of Paid Sick Leave On Physician Office-Based Visits, Korvin Vicente

Theses and Dissertations

This paper uses a balanced sample of workers from cross-sections of the National Health Interview Survey to estimate the causal effects of paid sick leave on the medical care seeking behavior of individuals, as measured by physician office-based visits.

Human And Monkey Responses In A Symmetric Game Of Conflict With Asymmetric Equilibria, Sarah F. Brosnan, Sara A. Price, Kelly Leverett, Laurent Prétôt, Michael Beran, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

To better understand the evolutionary history of human decision-making, we compare human behavior to that of two monkey species in a symmetric game of conflict with two asymmetric equilibria. While all of these species routinely make decisions in the context of social cooperation and competition, they have different socio-ecologies, which leads to different predictions about how they will respond. Our prediction was that anti-matching would be more difficult than matching in a symmetric coordination with simultaneous moves. To our surprise, not only do rhesus macaques frequently play one asymmetric Nash equilibrium, but so do capuchin monkeys, whose play in the …

Historical Cost And Conservatism Are Joint Adaptations That Help Identify Opportunity Cost, Sudipta Basu, Gregory B. Waymire

ESI Publications

Braun (The ecological rationality of historical costs and conservatism. Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, this issue) argues that the traditional accounting principles underlying the revenue-expense approach such as Historical Cost and Conservatism are ecologically rational in that they help organizations survive better in uncertain economic environments. More importantly, Braun argues that the revenue-expense approach generates new private information, which informs markets and makes them more effective (Hayek, 1945, The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530), as opposed to merely reflecting back market data under the asset-liability approach (e.g. Sunder, 2011, IFRS monopoly: …

Exchange In The Absence Of Legal Enforcement: Reputation And Multilateral Punishment Under Uncertainty, Aidin Hajikhameneh, Jared Rubin

ESI Working Papers

Prinicpal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution to mitigate this problem is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is uncertainty regarding whether an agent actually cheated or was just the victim of bad luck? And how might such uncertainty be mitigated—or exacerbated—by nonobservable, pro-social behavioral characteristics? We address these questions by designing a simple modified trust game with uncertainty and the capacity for principals to employ multilateral punishment. We find that a modest amount of uncertainty …

Experimenting With Contests For Experimentation, Cary Deck, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Publications

We report an experimental test of alternative rules in innovation contests when success may not be feasible and contestants may learn from each other. Following Halac, Kartik, and Liu (in press), the contest designer can vary the prize allocation rule from Winner‐Take‐All (WTA) in which the first successful innovator receives the entire prize to Shared in which all successful innovators during the contest duration share in the prize. The designer can also vary the information disclosure policy from Public in which at each period, all information about contestants' past successes and failures is publicly available, to Private, in which contestants …

How Product Innovation Can Affect Price Collusion, Andrew Smyth

ESI Working Papers

Price conspiracies appear endemic in many markets. This paper conjectures that low expected returns from product innovation can affect price collusion in certain markets. This conjecture is tested—and supported—by both archival and experimental data. In particular, average market prices in low innovation experiments are significantly greater than those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments, because price collusion is more successful in the low innovation experiments.

Favorite-Longshot Bias In Pari-Mutuel Betting: An Evolutionary Explanation, Atsushi Kajii, Takahiro Watanabe

Research Collection School Of Economics

Favorite-longshot bias (FLB) refers to an observed tendency whereby “longshots” are overvalued and favorites are undervalued. We offer an evolutionary explanation for FLB in pari-mutuel betting using a simple market model. A bettor is forced to quit with some probability if his total net gain in one day is negative. Because of a positive track take, the expected returns of any strategy are negative, and so every agent must eventually lose and disappear in the long run. Those who favor longshots have a better chance of getting ahead with rare but large gains, enabling them to survive for longer than …

The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The defender’s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. Although there are multiple equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the allocations of forces across targets that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy in which a single random network is attacked.

Equilibrium Play In Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

One robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play the game. Motivated by Adam Smith’s proposition that beneficence—like that of non‐ equilibrium play in the ultimatum game—cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe high rates of equilibrium play with highly unequal splits when responders choose to play such ultimatum games with both fixed and variable sums.

War And Conflict In Economics: Theories, Applications, And Recent Trends, Erik O. Kimbrough, Kevin Laughren, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges.