Working To Recover The Essence Of Education For The Sake Of Teaching And Teacher Education: Towards A Phenomenological Understanding Of The Forgotten, Ontological Aspects Of Learning,
2011
College of DuPage
Working To Recover The Essence Of Education For The Sake Of Teaching And Teacher Education: Towards A Phenomenological Understanding Of The Forgotten, Ontological Aspects Of Learning, James Magrini
James M Magrini
The current definition of a good teacher is grounded in sets of pre-determined competencies established and imposed upon schools by bureaucratic organizations that are, proximally and for the most part, removed from the foundational elements of education, namely, the existential, embodied conscious experience of teaching and learning as it unfolds in the lived world of schools and universities. As Pinar (2004) observes, contemporary American education is deterministic, and "in its press for efficiency and standardization,' has the effect of reducing "teachers to automata" (p. 28). Thus, the subject-hood, or authentic identity, of both teachers and students is not of their …
Questioning The Epistemic Virtue Of Strategy: The Emperor Has No Clothes!,
2011
Southern Cross University
Questioning The Epistemic Virtue Of Strategy: The Emperor Has No Clothes!, Steven French, Alexander Kouzmin, Stephen Kelly
Adjunct Professor Stephen J Kelly
No abstract provided.
The Birth Of Philosophy Of Mathematics: Out Of The Spirit Of (Neo-)Kantianism,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
The Birth Of Philosophy Of Mathematics: Out Of The Spirit Of (Neo-)Kantianism, Bernd Buldt
Bernd Buldt
No abstract provided.
Logic,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
Towards A New Epistemology Of Mathematics,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
Towards A New Epistemology Of Mathematics, Bernd Buldt, Benedikt Löwe, Thomas Müller
Bernd Buldt
No abstract provided.
Mathematical Practice And Platonism: A Phenomenological Perspective,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
Mathematical Practice And Platonism: A Phenomenological Perspective, Bernd Buldt
Bernd Buldt
No abstract provided.
What Does Time Tell In (Intuitionistic) Mathematics?,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
What Does Time Tell In (Intuitionistic) Mathematics?, Bernd Buldt
Bernd Buldt
No abstract provided.
Loss Of Vision: How Mathematics Turned Blind While It Learned To See More Clearly,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
Loss Of Vision: How Mathematics Turned Blind While It Learned To See More Clearly, Bernd Buldt, Dirk Schlimm
Bernd Buldt
To discuss the developments of mathematics that have to do with the introduction of new objects, we distinguish between ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘non-Aristotelian’ accounts of abstraction and mathematical ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. The development of mathematics from the 19th to the 20th century is then characterized as a move from a ‘bottom-up’ to a ‘top-down’ approach. Since the latter also leads to more abstract objects for which the Aristotelian account of abstraction is not well-suited, this development has also lead to a decrease of visualizations in mathematical practice.
On Rc 102-43-14,
2011
Carnegie Mellon University
Why Mathematical Concepts Are Special (According To Husserl),
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
Why Mathematical Concepts Are Special (According To Husserl), Bernd Buldt
Bernd Buldt
No abstract provided.
Rudolf Carnap,
2011
Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation,
2011
Butler University
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.
Mechanisms, Causes, And The Layered Model Of The World,
2011
Butler University
Mechanisms, Causes, And The Layered Model Of The World, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties – Kim’s functional model of reduction – and contrasting it …
Ephemeral Mechanisms And Historical Explanation,
2011
Butler University
Ephemeral Mechanisms And Historical Explanation, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
While much of the recent literature on mechanisms has emphasized the superiority of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation over laws and nomological explanation, paradigmatic mechanisms—e.g., clocks or synapses – actually exhibit a great deal of stability in their behavior. And while mechanisms of this kind are certainly of great importance, there are many events that do not occur as a consequence of the operation of stable mechanisms. Events of natural and human history are often the consequence of causal processes that are ephemeral and capricious. In this paper I shall argue that, notwithstanding their ephemeral nature, these processes deserve to be …
Mechanisms And The Nature Of Causation,
2011
Butler University
Mechanisms And The Nature Of Causation, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
In this paper I offer an analysis of causation based upon a theory of mechanisms – complex systems whose "internal" parts interact to produce a system's "external" behavior. I argue that all but the fundamental laws of physics can be explained by reference to mechanisms. Mechanisms provide an epistemologically unproblematic way to explain the necessity which is often taken to distinguish laws from other generalizations. This account of necessity leads to a theory of causation according to which events are causally related when there is a mechanism that connects them. I present reasons why the lack of an account of …
Singular And General Causal Relations: A Mechanist Perspective,
2011
Butler University
Singular And General Causal Relations: A Mechanist Perspective, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
My aim in this paper is to make a case for the singularist view from the perspective of a mechanical theory of causation (Glennan 1996, 1997, 2010, forthcoming), and to explain what, from this perspective, causal generalizations mean, and what role they play within the mechanical theory.
From Hiroshima To Baghdad: Military Hegemony Versus Just Military Preparedness,
2011
Butler University
From Hiroshima To Baghdad: Military Hegemony Versus Just Military Preparedness, Harry Van Der Linden
Harry van der Linden
In this paper I question the morality of U.S. military supremacy or hegemony in terms of what constitute the legitimate use of military force and the proper preparation for using such force. I first discuss in a somewhat synoptic fashion how American hegemonic military force (from its very beginning with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima) has been justified in dishonest ways and wrongly executed. Next, I show that Just War Theory (JWT) needs to be revised in order to come to a convincing assessment of U.S. military hegemony and its use of military force. This leads me …
Tinkering With Tenure,
2011
Utah Valley University
Tinkering With Tenure,
2011
Utah Valley University
Mechanisms And The Nature Of Causation,
2011
Butler University
Mechanisms And The Nature Of Causation, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
In this paper I offer an analysis of causation based upon a theory of mechanisms – complex systems whose "internal" parts interact to produce a system's "external" behavior. I argue that all but the fundamental laws of physics can be explained by reference to mechanisms. Mechanisms provide an epistemologically unproblematic way to explain the necessity which is often taken to distinguish laws from other generalizations. This account of necessity leads to a theory of causation according to which events are causally related when there is a mechanism that connects them. I present reasons why the lack of an account of …
