Couples’ Dialogue Orientations,
2016
University of Maryland - College Park
Couples’ Dialogue Orientations, Dale Hample, Ioana A. Cionea
OSSA Conference Archive
Walton has distinguished among several sorts of argumentative dialogues (persuasion, negotiation, information seeking, deliberation, inquiry, and eristic). This paper continues the project of measuring individuals’ self-reported preferences for each dialogue type. In this study, long-term romantic couples were surveyed to examine if their dialogue preferences matched, and whether their preferences were, in turn, related to their relational satisfaction.
Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles,
2016
University of Amsterdam
Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles, Eugen Octav Popa
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover (or claimed to have discovered) fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 1984) view of normativity.
Inducing A Sympathetic (Empathic) Reception For Exhortation,
2016
Edgewood College, Communication Studies
Inducing A Sympathetic (Empathic) Reception For Exhortation, Fred J. Kauffeld, Beth Innocenti
OSSA Conference Archive
This essay explores ways arguers can afford potentially unsympathetic addressees good reason to empathetically entertain exhortative discourse. First, we illuminate the essential structure and underlying constitutive pragmatics of exhortation. Second, we show that the persuasive force of Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address derives from his use of exhortation. By doing so we add to recent scholarship that accounts for the persuasive force of civically significant speech acts.
Splitting A Difference Of Opinion,
2016
University of Groningen
Splitting A Difference Of Opinion, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe
OSSA Conference Archive
When unable to resolve a conflict of opinion about the objective worth of an action proposal, discussants may choose to negotiate for a compromise. Is it legitimate to abandon the search for a resolution, and instead enter into a negotiation that aims at settling the difference of opinion? What is the nature of a compromise, in contradistinction to a resolution? What kinds of argument do participants typically put to use in their negotiation dialogues?
The Strategic Formulation Of Abductive Arguments In Everyday Reasoning,
2016
Leiden University Centre for Linguistics
The Strategic Formulation Of Abductive Arguments In Everyday Reasoning, Henrike Jansen
OSSA Conference Archive
Since everyday abductive arguments convey the arguer’s individual interpretation of reality, they often exhibit a weak relationship between the premise and the conclusion. After all, what seems obvious to the arguer may appear far-fetched to an opponent. This paper examines some presentational devices that contribute to an arguer’s rhetorical goal of presenting the argument in such a way that the conclusion is suggested to be the result of a thorough investigative procedure.
Towards Computer Support For Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Analysis,
2016
University of Dundee
Towards Computer Support For Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Analysis, Jacky Visser
OSSA Conference Archive
Computer tools are increasingly used to support the analysis of argumentative texts. Generic support for argumentation analysis is helpful, but catering to the requirements of specific theoretical approaches has additional advantages. Although the pragma-dialectical method of analyzing argumentative texts is widely used, no dedicated computational support tools exist. An outline is presented for the development of such tools, that starts with the formal approximation of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion.
Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?,
2016
Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia
Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?, José Ángel Gascón
OSSA Conference Archive
While, in common usage, objectivity is usually regarded as a virtue, and failures to be objective as vices, this concept tends to be absent in argumentation theory. This paper will explore the possibility of taking objectivity as an argumentative virtue. Several problems immediately arise: could objectivity be understood in positive terms— not only as mere absence of bias? Is it an attainable ideal? Or perhaps objectivity could be explained as a combination of other virtues?
Explicating And Negotiating Bias In Interdisciplinary Argumentation Using Abductive Tools: Paper,
2016
Michigan State University
Explicating And Negotiating Bias In Interdisciplinary Argumentation Using Abductive Tools: Paper, Bethany K. Laursen
OSSA Conference Archive
Interdisciplinary inquiry hinges upon abductive arguments that integrate various kinds of information to identify explanations worthy of future study or use. Integrative abduction poses unique challenges, including different kinds of data, too many patterns, too many explanations, mistaken meanings across disciplinary lines, and cognitive, pragmatic, and social biases. Argumentation tools can help explicate and negotiate bias as interdisciplinary investigators sift and winnow candidate patterns and processes in search of the best explanation.
Acts Of Ostension,
2016
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Acts Of Ostension, Hubert Marraud
OSSA Conference Archive
I will analyze the role of ostension in argumentation. Ostension involves gestures, bearing, postures, facial expressions, etc.; thus it can be argued that ostension can introduce non-verbal modes of argument, giving rise to multimodal arguments (Groarke 2014). Acts of ostension can be considered as a kind of speech acts according to the account in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations §27. As such they can provide the premises of a certain sort of arguments (which I term arguments by ostension). We have to distinguish the proper act of ostension from both its content and the object of ostension. While the latter can …
Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?,
2016
University of Windsor
Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose
OSSA Conference Archive
The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no “meta-language” that crosses all modes, then all modes must be assessed using the felicity or veridiction conditions peculiar to …
Uses Of Arguments From Definition In Children’S Argumentation,
2016
Università della Svizzera Italiana
Uses Of Arguments From Definition In Children’S Argumentation, Rebecca G. Schär
OSSA Conference Archive
The literature on argumentation and education often conveys that children’s argumentation skills are not well developed; therefore, it would be difficult to find argumentation in small children, as well as in primary school classrooms (Kuhn 1991). However, studies focusing on argumentation in less formal contexts (for example the family, see Arcidiacono & Bova 2013) show that there is no need to depart from such a negative stance. If children are given room to pursue their lines of thought (Danish & Enyedy 2015), they often produce sophisticated spontaneous argumentation. In this paper I consider arguments from definition introduced by children as …
The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement,
2016
University of Auckland
The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare
OSSA Conference Archive
Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse .... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need …
Commentary On: Steve Oswald’S “Conspiracy And Bias: Argumentative Features And Persuasiveness Of Conspiracy Theories”,
2016
University of Windsor
Commentary On: Steve Oswald’S “Conspiracy And Bias: Argumentative Features And Persuasiveness Of Conspiracy Theories”, Scott Jacobs
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making,
2016
University of Santiago de Compostela
The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez
OSSA Conference Archive
Some decisions involve the use of a variety forms of arguments in order to balance different alternatives before getting a choice which is expected to be the better to solve the problem at issue. By doing this, there are some cases where people are able to or urge moving towards the choice that is most advantageous, probable or acceptable, and at other times towards a choice that is less negative or adverse than the others. Both alternatives depict different ways of searching for the stronger reason at stake. This means that the a fortiori argument is being used as a …
Commentary On E. Popa’S “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles”,
2016
Marygrove College
Commentary On E. Popa’S “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles”, S. W. Patterson
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On T. Herman’S “Revising Toulmin’S Model: Argumentative Cell And The Bias Of Objectivity”,
2016
Marygrove College
Commentary On T. Herman’S “Revising Toulmin’S Model: Argumentative Cell And The Bias Of Objectivity”, S. W. Patterson
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On Dima Mohammed’S “How To Argue (Well) About Evaluative Standpoints? Argumentation In Accountability Practice”,
2016
St. Cloud University
Commentary On Dima Mohammed’S “How To Argue (Well) About Evaluative Standpoints? Argumentation In Accountability Practice”, Susana Nuccetelli
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter,
2016
Lund University
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
OSSA Conference Archive
Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these …
Commentary On “Conspiracy And Bias: Argumentative Features And Persuasiveness Of Conspiracy Theories”,
2016
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Commentary On “Conspiracy And Bias: Argumentative Features And Persuasiveness Of Conspiracy Theories”, Scott Jacobs
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Reply To Commentary On “Patrick Bondy, Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”,
2016
Trent University
Reply To Commentary On “Patrick Bondy, Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”, Patrick Bondy
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
