If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?,
2016
University of Bristol
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties,
2016
Dalhousie University
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness,
2016
East Tennessee State University
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals,
2016
WellBeing International
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Animal Sentience
Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.
To Bee Or Not To Bee?,
2016
Cornell University
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects,
2016
Bielefeld University
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.
Institutional Animal Care And Use Committees: A Flawed Paradigm Or Work In Progress?,
2016
University of New Mexico
Institutional Animal Care And Use Committees: A Flawed Paradigm Or Work In Progress?, John P. Gluck, F. Barbara Orlans
John P. Gluck, PhD
In his challenging article, Steneck (1997) criticized the creation of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) system established by the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act. He saw the IACUC review and approval of biomedical and behavioral research with animals as an unnecessary "reassignment" of duties from existing animal care programs to IACUC committees. He argued that the committees are unable to do the work expected of them for basically three reasons: (a) the membership lacks the expertise in matters relevant to animal research and care, (b) there exists an inherent and disabling conflict of interest, and …
Ethical Issues In The Use Of Animals In Biomedical And Psychopharmocological Research,
2016
University of New Mexico
Ethical Issues In The Use Of Animals In Biomedical And Psychopharmocological Research, John P. Gluck, Jordan Bell
John P. Gluck, PhD
Rationale: The ethical debate concerning the use of animals in biomedical and pharmacological research continues to be replete with misunderstandings about whether animals have moral standing. Objectives: This article briefly reviews the central ethical positions and their relationship to the basic parameters of research regulation from an international perspective. The issues associated with the validation of animal models will then be discussed. Finally, suggestions for empirical ethics research will be presented. Methods: Recent literature reviews were accessed and analyzed. Results: This review summarizes the pertinent ethical and research literature. Conclusions: In summary, regardless of the ethical perspective one favors, there …
Harry F. Harlow And Animal Research: Reflection On The Ethical Paradox,
2016
University of New Mexico
Harry F. Harlow And Animal Research: Reflection On The Ethical Paradox, John P. Gluck
John P. Gluck, PhD
With respect to the ethical debate about the treatment of animals in biomedical and behavioral research, Harry F. Harlow represents a paradox. On the one hand, his work on monkey cognition and social development fostered a view of the animals as having rich subjective lives filled with intention and emotion. On the other, he has been criticized for the conduct of research that seemed to ignore the ethical implications of his own discoveries. The basis of this contradiction is discussed and propositions for current research practice are presented.
Animals In Biomedical Research: The Undermining Effect Of The Rhetoric Of The Besieged,
2016
University of New Mexico
Animals In Biomedical Research: The Undermining Effect Of The Rhetoric Of The Besieged, John P. Gluck, Steven R. Kubacki
John P. Gluck, PhD
It is correctly asserted that the intensity of the current debate over the use of animals in biomedical research is unprecedented. The extent of expressed animosity and distrust has stunned many researchers. In response, researchers have tended to take a strategic defensive posture, which involves the assertation of several abstract positions that serve to obstruct resolution of the debate. Those abstractions include the notions that the animal protection movement is trivial and purely anti-intellectual in scope, that all science is good (and some especially so), and the belief that an ethical consensus can never really be reached between the parties.
The Moral Dimension Of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness,
2016
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, and Messerli Research Institute, Vienna
The Moral Dimension Of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness, Susana Monsó
Animal Sentience
Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human,
2016
San Francisco State University
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
Animal Sentience
Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis,
2016
Washington State University
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.
Feel Or Perspective?,
2016
University of Miami
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.
How To Become A Post-Dog. Animals In Transhumanism,
2016
University of Exeter
How To Become A Post-Dog. Animals In Transhumanism, Michael Hauskeller
Between the Species
This paper analyses and deconstructs the transhumanist commitment to animal rights and the well-being of all sentient beings. Some transhumanists have argued that such a commitment entails a moral imperative to help non-human animals overcome their biological limitations by enhancing their cognitive abilities and generally “uplifting” them to a more human-like existence. I argue that the transhumanist approach to animal welfare ultimately aims at the destruction of the animal as an animal. By seeking to make animals more like us the freedom to live their life as the kind of creature they are is being denied to them. It is …
Canada’S Commercial Seal Hunt: It’S More Than A Question Of Humane Killing,
2016
International Fund for Animal Welfare
Canada’S Commercial Seal Hunt: It’S More Than A Question Of Humane Killing, David M. Lavigne, William S. Lynn
William S. Lynn, PhD
No abstract provided.
Animals, Ethics And Geography,
2016
Clark University
Animals, Ethics And Geography, William S. Lynn
William S. Lynn, PhD
No abstract provided.
Contested Moralities: Animals And Moral Value In The Dear/Symanski Debate,
2016
Green Mountain College
Contested Moralities: Animals And Moral Value In The Dear/Symanski Debate, William S. Lynn
William S. Lynn, PhD
Geography is experiencing a ‘moral turn’ in its research interests and practices. There is also a flourishing interest in animal geographies that intersects this turn, and is concurrent with wider scholarly efforts to reincorporate animals and nature into our ethical and social theories. This article intervenes in a dispute between Michael Dear and Richard Symanski. The dispute is over the culling of wild horses in Australia, and I intervene to explore how geography deepens our moral understanding of the animal/human dialectic. I begin by situating the inquiry into ethics and animals in geography. Next, I provide a synopsis of Dear …
Thou And It: Personhood Actualized Through Water Rights,
2016
Oglethorpe University
Thou And It: Personhood Actualized Through Water Rights, Kierra M. Powell
Oglethorpe Journal of Undergraduate Research
While issues of racial and gendered discrimination are more visible and widely discussed, poverty and water based discrimination is often a silent fact of life for the many. As one of the most critical elemental resources required for the sustainability of human life, safe water has been designated a human right, but the current global distribution of water does not mirror this sentiment. The divide in quality water distribution provokes the question: whose life is intrinsically valued? This study seeks to determine the status of personhood as displayed by the movement of water in relation to the underprivileged. I first …
Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise,
2016
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zürich & Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow, and Landscape Research, Birmensdorf
Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.
