Economic Theory Commons^™

Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-o between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium, based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions.

Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size …

Do Liars Believe? Beliefs And Other-Regarding Preferences In Sender-Receiver Games, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Working Papers

We examine subjects‟ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects‟ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject‟s own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state of the nature is unfavorable. Nevertheless, 67 percent of receivers invest conditional …

Are You A Good Employee Or Simply A Good Guy? Influence Costs And Contract Design, Brice Corgnet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Working Papers

We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation …

Experimental Evidence On The Properties Of The California’S Cap And Trade Price Containment Reserve, Rachel Bodsky, Domenic Donato, Kevin James, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We report on a series of experiments to examine the properties of California’s Reserve Sale allocation mechanism to be implemented as part of the forthcoming cap and trade program and compare it with an alternative reserve sale mechanism. The proposed reserve sale mechanism allows covered entities to purchase allowances after the primary auction sale at fixed prices. If demand for units is greater the amount supplied in the reserve sale, a Proportional Rationing rule is used to distribute allowances based on submitted request for units. This rule is contrasted with to an alternative rule, Equal Rationing in which allowances are …

Are All R&D Dollars Created Equal?: A Look At The Effect Of Federal Investment On Patent Success, Casey J. O'Neil

Pepperdine Policy Review

No abstract provided.

Estimating The Impact Of Cell Phone Laws On Car Accident Fatalities, Odinakachi Anyanwu

Pepperdine Policy Review

No abstract provided.

Text Ch 6 Profit Capital, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. (2012, February 6). Theories of profit and capital (Unpublished manuscript).
• Keynes, J. M. (1976). A treatise on money. Macmillan.
• Braham, J. (2001). Sales without profits are meaningless. Business Week.
• Marx, K. (1977). Capital: A critique of political economy (Vol. 1). Vintage Books.
• Ishikura, H. (2004). Marx's circuit of capital and Keynes's monetary theory of production. Journal of Economic Studies.
• Varian, H. L. (1993). Intermediate microeconomics: A modern approach. W. W. Norton & Company.
• Shane, S. (2008). The illusions of entrepreneurship: The costly myths that entrepreneurs, investors, and policy makers live by …

Chapter 10 Price Value Revisions, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Ch. 10: Price/value revisions. NA-24-13.

• Add survey from Jefferis (attached).

• Add survey from Jeffries (attached).

• Email from Lefteris to Anwar Shaikh regarding chapter revisions and additional empirical studies. In this message, Lefteris notes that the attachment contains a summary of empirical studies from a 2010 paper with Paitaridis and that more recent papers with Theodore are already included in the references.

• Extract from Tsoulfidis and Paitaridis, “On the labor theory of value: Statistical artefacts or regularities?” This excerpt reviews empirical studies of price-value deviations and related debates.

• References for the chapter excerpt. …

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Competition (Misc.), Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Duménil, G., Glick, M., & Lévy, D. (1997). The history of competition policy as economic history. The Antitrust Bulletin, 42(2), 373–416. Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
• Shaikh, A. (2011, November 22). ECO 104: Competition [Handwritten lecture notes, 2 pages, on lined notepaper, dated November 22, 2011; covering competition between industries, summary of phenomena, and empirical findings on profit rates]. Anwar Shaikh, Ph.D., Department of Economics, New School for Social Research. [Unpublished teaching notes.]
• Treen, M. (2010, August 16). FW: [New post] Andrew Kliman and the "Neo-Ricardian" attack on Marxism, Pt 1 [Email forwarded to Anwar Shaikh from …

Replacement Investment, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. September 10, 1973. Gross stock and net stock project (Handwritten research notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research.
• Shaikh, A. September 28, 1979. Deriving current dollar stock from BLS data (Handwritten correspondence notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research.
• Shaikh, A. May 10, 1980. BLS data on Jack Faucett adjustments (Handwritten folder notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research.
• Shaikh, A. December 1, 1982. Note on retirements vs. business failure (Handwritten manuscript notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research. …

Trade, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Trade, compiled by Anwar Shaikh, containing working papers, lecture notes, correspondence, and handwritten research notes on international trade, exchange rates, comparative and absolute advantage, purchasing power parity, and trade balances. The materials date from 2005 through 2012 and are associated with Anwar Shaikh’s research and teaching at the New School for Social Research in New York.
• Trade classical equations, Anwar Shaikh, 2012-05-07. Unpublished manuscript.
• Classical trade theory, Anwar Shaikh, 2001-10-24, revised 2008-10-07. Unpublished manuscript.
• Competition, exchange rates, and trade balances, Anwar Shaikh, undated. Unpublished manuscript.
• Automatic trade balance is a “doctrinaire delusion”, …

The Herodotus Paradox, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the 'Herodotus paradox.'

The Lifeboat Problem, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat”). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (“a seat”). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. The partitioning of prizes can lead to coordination failure when players employ nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria some rents are sheltered and rent dissipation is …

Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?, Hernan D. Bejarano, Lance Clifner, Carl Johnston, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.

Do International Corruption Metrics Matter? Assessing The Impact Of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, Omar Elemere Hawthorne

Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations

This dissertation examines the impact of Transparency International's (TI), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and whether or not the CPI and hence TI matter. It examines the impact of TI's CPI on policymakers. It explores three areas: world's political and economic responses and Jamaica's policy responses to the CPI. Jamaica is selected for a case study due to TI's high corruption perceptions index rating for the country: a country that legally has strong anti-corruption laws but, nonetheless, sees its CPI ranking worsen almost yearly.

This study comprises mixed methodologies, using both qualitative and quantitative measures to assess the impact of the …

Single Peakedness And Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi

Research Collection School Of Economics

I provide a simple example of a single peaked utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is smooth, non piecewise defined, strictly concave but not globally increasing. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided. In addition the properties of the demand function are studied: I find that the inferior commodity with a Giffen demand must be cheaper relatively to a substitute and that Giffen demand arises at relatively low levels of income. However it is not required that the share of income spent on that commodity be large.

Nonlinear Dynamics And Stability In A Multigroup Asset Flow Model, Mark Desantis, David Swigon, Gunduz Caginalp

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The multigroup asset flow model for asset price dynamics incorporates distinct motivations, e. g., trend and fundamentals (value) and assessments of value by different groups of investors. The stability and bifurcation properties are established for the curve of equilibria. We prove that if all trader groups focus on fundamentals, then all equilibria are stable. For systems in which there is one fundamental and one momentum (trend) group, we establish conditions for stability. In particular, an equilibrium that is stable becomes unstable as the time scale on which momentum investors focus diminishes. The computations examine the excursions, which we define as …

Political Legitimacy And Technology Adoption, Metin M. Coşgel, Thomas J. Miceli, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A fundamental question of economic and technological history is why some civilizations adopted new and important technologies and others did not. In this paper, we analyze the effect that new technologies have on agents that legitimize rulers. We construct a simple political economy model which suggests that rulers may not accept a productivity-enhancing technology when it negatively affects an agent’s ability to provide the ruler legitimacy. However, when other sources of legitimacy emerge, the ruler will accept the technology as long as the new legitimizing source is not negatively affected. We use this insight to help explain the initial blocking …

An Economic Perspective On Preemption, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay has two goals. The first is to present an economic theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes. The optimal regime choice model is used to generate specific implications for the court decisions on preemption of products liability claims. The second objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice model to consider its implications for broader controversies about preemption.