Apf,
2012
Bard College
Apf, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Production function notes.docx by Anwar Shaikh, PhD
- Parable and realism in capital theory: The surrogate production function by Paul A. Samuelson
- Capital theory up to date by Joan Robinson
- Beyond the surrogate prod function by Anwar Shaikh, PhD
- Notes on John McCombie, Stefano Zambelli, and Arrigo Opocher by Anwar Shaikh, PhD
- Notes on Steven Kinsella and Antoine Godin by Anwar Shaikh, PhD
- Patnaik two good world: Machines, corn by Anwar Shaikh, PhD
- On the dismal state of a dismal science? by Heinz D. Kurz
- Economics: Principles and policy by William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder
- Empirical …
Referee Report & Trento Notes,
2012
Bard College
Referee Report & Trento Notes, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Anonymous. (2012). Referee's report on "Production, circuits of capital, and flows and stocks in national accounts" by Anwar Shaikh (Unpublished manuscript) (23-12_Refe... p. 2).
- Shaikh, A. (2012, May 24). Trento I: develop & underdevelop (Handwritten note) (23-12_Refe... p. 3).
- Shaikh, A. (2012, May 24). Trento I: develop & underdevelop, page 3 (Handwritten note) (23-12_Refe... p. 4).
- Shaikh, A. (2012, May 24). Notes on Sraffa and thought processes (Handwritten note) (23-12_Refe... p. 5).
- Institute for New Economic Thinking. (2012, April 5). Grant change form for Anwar Shaikh, grant ID: 3232 (Institutional document) (23-12_Refe... p. 7).
- Shaikh, A. (2012, …
Talks,
2012
Bard College
Talks, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Department of Economics, University of Trento. (2012, May 23). A symposium in honour of anwar shaikh: surrogates, humbugs and other pseudo-production functions on the 50th anniversary of 'the surrogate production function' (Conference program) (23-4_Talks... p. 2). University of Trento.
- Velupillai, K. V. (2012, May 23). Welcome address (Conference presentation) (23-4_Talks... p. 2). University of Trento.
- Shaikh, A. (1964). Laws of production and laws of algebra: the humbug production function. Review of Economics and Statistics, 56(1) (23-4_Talks... p. 2). MIT Press.
- Swan, T. (1956). Economic record, vol. 32, 1956, pp. 334-361. Economic Record, 32, …
Internal Communication In Ireland Before And During The Economic Recession From The Perspective Of Communication Practice, Technology, And Ethics,
2012
Technological University Dublin
Internal Communication In Ireland Before And During The Economic Recession From The Perspective Of Communication Practice, Technology, And Ethics, Laoise O'Murchú
Doctoral
Internal communication in Ireland from the ‘celtic tiger’ era through to the economic
recession from the perspective of: communication practice, technology and ethics.
This thesis examines the practice of internal communication in Irish public and
private sector organisations during 2007/8 and 2010. This period spans the end of
Ireland’s ‘celtic tiger’ economy and the development of a major recession. All the
case study organisations have been affected by the credit crunch and are experiencing
economic, financial and ethical challenges.
The practices of internal communication in Ireland has evaded in depth academic
examination in communications literature. Therefore, the contribution to knowledge …
Loose Notes On Marx, Interest Rates,
2012
Bard College
Loose Notes On Marx, Interest Rates, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Shaikh, A. (n.d.). Notes on natural deposit rate and travel itinerary to Thessaloniki (Handwritten notes) (22-32_Loos... p. 2).
- Shaikh, A. (n.d.). Notes on gold lending, bank markups, and interest rate theories (Handwritten notes) (22-32_Loos... p. 3).
- Lutz, F. A. (1968). The theory of interest. D. Reidel Publishing Company (22-32_Loos... p. 3).
- Shaikh, A. (2012). Notes on interest rates (Unpublished manuscript) (22-32_Loos... p. 14)
Trade,
2012
Bard College
Trade, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Trade, compiled by Anwar Shaikh, containing working papers, lecture notes, correspondence, and handwritten research notes on international trade, exchange rates, comparative and absolute advantage, purchasing power parity, and trade balances. The materials date from 2005 through 2012 and are associated with Anwar Shaikh’s research and teaching at the New School for Social Research in New York.
- Trade classical equations, Anwar Shaikh, 2012-05-07. Unpublished manuscript.
- Classical trade theory, Anwar Shaikh, 2001-10-24, revised 2008-10-07. Unpublished manuscript.
- Competition, exchange rates, and trade balances, Anwar Shaikh, undated. Unpublished manuscript.
- Automatic trade balance is a “doctrinaire delusion”, …
Single Peakedness And Giffen Demand,
2012
Singapore Management University
Single Peakedness And Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi
Research Collection School Of Economics
I provide a simple example of a single peaked utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is smooth, non piecewise defined, strictly concave but not globally increasing. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided. In addition the properties of the demand function are studied: I find that the inferior commodity with a Giffen demand must be cheaper relatively to a substitute and that Giffen demand arises at relatively low levels of income. However it is not required that the share of income spent on that commodity be large.
Subreption And Institutional Inquiry: Theoretical Philosophy And Evolutionary Thinking,
2012
Portland State University
Subreption And Institutional Inquiry: Theoretical Philosophy And Evolutionary Thinking, John B. Hall, Alexander Dunlap
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations
With this inquiry we respond to William Dugger‘s assertion that ―[s]ubreption is one of the least studied social phenomena of the twentieth century.‖ Our research seeks to fill a gap in the literature by clarifying subreption, and its origins in Philosophy to its importance in social science, and, especially, Institutional Inquiry. We conjecture that Thorstein Veblen borrows form Immanuel Kant‘s understanding of Erschleichung. In this respect, Veblen‘s understanding and use of subreption serves as conduit between its use in Roman law, through Kant‘s understanding, and on to what Veblen later introduces as an approach creatively relied upon by three other, …
Veblen’S Predator And The Great Crisis,
2012
Portland State University
Veblen’S Predator And The Great Crisis, John B. Hall, Iciar Dominguez-Lacasa, Jutta Günther
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations
With this inquiry we attribute cause for the current and “Great Crisis” to Veblen’s predator. After summarizing origins and manifestations of this crisis we juxtapose Veblen’s emphasis upon the predator to other potential causes for crisis and crises. Noted to have emerged when our stock of human knowledge provided for the creation of surplus, Veblen’s predator is presented as capable of metamorphosis and also driving evolution of our capitalistic system: whether this means emerging as the businessman in the “era of the machine,” or the investment banker promoting a financial metaphysics in the current “era of finance.”
Complexity, Innovation, And The Regulation Of Modern Financial Markets,
2012
Cornell Law School
Complexity, Innovation, And The Regulation Of Modern Financial Markets, Dan Awrey
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The intellectual origins of the global financial crisis (GFC) can be traced back to blind spots emanating from within conventional financial theory. These blind spots are distorted reflections of the perfect market assumptions underpinning the canonical theories of financial economics: modern portfolio theory, the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevancy principle, the capital asset pricing model and, perhaps most importantly, the efficient market hypothesis. In the decades leading up to the GFC, these assumptions were transformed from empirically (con)testable propositions into the central articles of faith of the ideology of modern finance: the foundations of a widely held belief in …
Do International Corruption Metrics Matter? Assessing The Impact Of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index,
2012
Old Dominion University
Do International Corruption Metrics Matter? Assessing The Impact Of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, Omar Elemere Hawthorne
Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations
This dissertation examines the impact of Transparency International's (TI), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and whether or not the CPI and hence TI matter. It examines the impact of TI's CPI on policymakers. It explores three areas: world's political and economic responses and Jamaica's policy responses to the CPI. Jamaica is selected for a case study due to TI's high corruption perceptions index rating for the country: a country that legally has strong anti-corruption laws but, nonetheless, sees its CPI ranking worsen almost yearly.
This study comprises mixed methodologies, using both qualitative and quantitative measures to assess the impact of the …
Finance Capital And Profits,
2012
Bard College
Finance Capital And Profits, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Theories of profit and capital by Anwar Shaikh (Unpublished manuscript, March 5, 2012)
- Finance capital and profits by Anwar Shaikh (Unpublished manuscript, January 31, 2012)
- Shaikh, A. (2012). Ape II (Unpublished handwritten notes). Anwar Shaikh, PhD
- Age-related pension incentives and retirement behavior (Unpublished manuscript fragment, unknown year)
- Lapavitsas, C., & Levina, I. (2011). Financial profit: Profit from production and profit upon alienation. Research on Money and Finance Discussion Paper Series (No. 24). Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- Skarstein, R. (2011). Overaccumulation of productive capital or of finance capital? A view …
Choice Of Technology,
2012
Bard College
Choice Of Technology, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Park, C.-S. (2005). Testing Okishio's criterion of technical choice. Research in Political Economy, Volume 22. Elsevier Ltd.
- Duménil, G., & Lévy, D. (2005). Testing for the Marxian-Classical criterion of technical choice. Research in Political Economy, Volume 22. Elsevier Ltd.
- Shaikh, A. Handwritten notes on the geometric limits of technical choice (Unpublished manuscript).
- Marx, K. Typescript text on capital evaluation and machine production (Unpublished manuscript).
- Shaikh, A. Book draft excerpt on individual price-value deviations (Unpublished manuscript).
- Shaikh, A. Handwritten notes on perfect competition viability and technical change criteria (Unpublished manuscript).
- Duménil, G., & Lévy, D. Testing …
Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach,
2012
Chapman University
Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
ESI Working Papers
We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-o between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium, based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions.
Building And Rebuilding Trust With Promises And Apologies,
2012
Chapman University
Building And Rebuilding Trust With Promises And Apologies, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Daniel Sznycer
ESI Working Papers
Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and …
Too Many Cooks Spoil The Broth: How The Tragedy Of The Anticommons Emerges In Organizations,
2012
Chapman University
Too Many Cooks Spoil The Broth: How The Tragedy Of The Anticommons Emerges In Organizations, Matthew W. Mccarter, Shirli Kopelman, Thomas A. Turk, Candace Ybarra
ESI Working Papers
In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the (psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes to these …
Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions,
2012
Chapman University
Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size …
Experimental Evidence On The Properties Of The California’S Cap And Trade Price Containment Reserve,
2012
Chapman University
Experimental Evidence On The Properties Of The California’S Cap And Trade Price Containment Reserve, Rachel Bodsky, Domenic Donato, Kevin James, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
We report on a series of experiments to examine the properties of California’s Reserve Sale allocation mechanism to be implemented as part of the forthcoming cap and trade program and compare it with an alternative reserve sale mechanism. The proposed reserve sale mechanism allows covered entities to purchase allowances after the primary auction sale at fixed prices. If demand for units is greater the amount supplied in the reserve sale, a Proportional Rationing rule is used to distribute allowances based on submitted request for units. This rule is contrasted with to an alternative rule, Equal Rationing in which allowances are …
Do Liars Believe? Beliefs And Other-Regarding Preferences In Sender-Receiver Games,
2012
Chapman University
Do Liars Believe? Beliefs And Other-Regarding Preferences In Sender-Receiver Games, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
We examine subjects‟ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects‟ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject‟s own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state of the nature is unfavorable. Nevertheless, 67 percent of receivers invest conditional …
Are You A Good Employee Or Simply A Good Guy? Influence Costs And Contract Design,
2012
Chapman University
Are You A Good Employee Or Simply A Good Guy? Influence Costs And Contract Design, Brice Corgnet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
ESI Working Papers
We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation …
