Religious Identity And The Provision Of Public Goods: Evidence From The Indian Princely States,
2013
Chapman University
Religious Identity And The Provision Of Public Goods: Evidence From The Indian Princely States, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
Religious identity affects preferences and can consequently affect policy. We propose two mechanisms through which a ruler's religious identity can affect public good provision: i) greater provision of goods in regions where more subjects are the ruler's co-religionists, and ii) lower provision of goods where private markets provide a substitute to the ruler's co-religionists. Empirically, identifying the causal effect of religious identity on policy is often impossible, since the religious identity of rulers rarely changes over time and place. We address this problem by exploiting the variation in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States in the early …
Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak‐Link Contest?,
2013
Chapman University
Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak‐Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one might want to predict the move of a strategic participant. This is particularly important in aggressor‐defender contests. This paper reports a set of such experiments where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor’s action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender’s win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions, namely excess bid information, that …
Recalibrational Emotions And The Regulation Of Trust-Based Behaviors,
2013
Chapman University
Recalibrational Emotions And The Regulation Of Trust-Based Behaviors, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Though individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to trust or act trustworthy, we theorize that trust-based behaviors are universally determined by the calibration of conflicting short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs, and that these programs are calibrated by emotions experienced personally and interpersonally. In this chapter we review both the main-stream and evolutionary theories of emotions that philosophers, psychologists, and behavioral economists have based their work on and which can inform our understanding of trust-based behavior regulation. The standard paradigm for understanding emotions is based on mapping their positive and negative affect valence. While Valence Models …
Commitment Problems In Conflict Resolution,
2013
Chapman University
Commitment Problems In Conflict Resolution, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to opt-in.
Prediction Markets In The Laboratory,
2013
Chapman University
Prediction Markets In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
"The idea that there is wisdom from the collective has been forcefully described in “The Wisdom of the Crowds” by James Surowiecki, who argues that the aggregation of information in groups results in better decisions than those that are afforded by any single member of the group. Markets, like opinion polls, are one mechanism for aggregating disparate pieces of information. The aggregation properties of prices were first noted by Hayek (1945) and were formally examined by Muth (1961). In particular, Hayek argues that market prices serve the purpose of sharing and coordinating local and personal knowledge, while Muth shows that …
The Impact Of Competition On Prices With Numerous Firms,
2013
Chapman University
The Impact Of Competition On Prices With Numerous Firms, Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Deyuan Li, Hongyi Li
ESI Working Papers
We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals detail-independent equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of rms is large, markups are proportional to 1= (nF' [F^-1 (1- 1/n)], where F is the random utility noise distribution and n is the number of rms. This implies prices are pinned down by the tail properties of the noise distribution and that prices are independent of many other institutional details. The elasticity of the markup with respect to …
What's Left Of Micro,
2013
Bard College
What's Left Of Micro, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes.
• Shaikh, A. (2013, November 10). Comments [Unpublished handwritten manuscript].
• Shaikh, A. (n.d.). Disagreements [Unpublished handwritten manuscript].
• Shaikh, A. (n.d.). Rethinking micro [Unpublished handwritten manuscript].
• Shaikh, A. (2013, November 10). Ceylon bicycle repair shop: Rethinking micro (UMass/NSSR student conference) [Unpublished handwritten manuscript].
• Shaikh, A. (2009, December 3). What’s left of microeconomics: Lecture outline [Unpublished manuscript].
• Guerrien, B. (2002, March 15). Is there anything worth keeping in standard microeconomics? Post-Autistic Economics Review, (12), Article 1. Post-Autistic Economics Network.
• Harcourt, G. C. (2002, May 2). Comment on Bernard Guerrien’s essay. Post-Autistic Economics …
How Universal Is The Big Five? Testing The Five-Factor Model Of Personality Variation Among Forager-Farmers In The Bolivian Amazon,
2013
University of California, Santa Barbara
How Universal Is The Big Five? Testing The Five-Factor Model Of Personality Variation Among Forager-Farmers In The Bolivian Amazon, Michael Gurven, Christopher Von Rueden, Maxim Massenkoff, Hillard Kaplan, Marino Lero Vie
ESI Publications
The five-factor model (FFM) of personality variation has been replicated across a range of human societies, suggesting the FFM is a human universal. However, most studies of the FFM have been restricted to literate, urban populations, which are uncharacteristic of the majority of human evolutionary history. We present the first test of the FFM in a largely illiterate, indigenous society. Tsimane forager–horticulturalist men and women of Bolivia (n = 632) completed a translation of the 44-item Big Five Inventory (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998), a widely used metric of the FFM. We failed to find robust support for the FFM, based …
Faith, Science And Religion,
2013
Chapman University
Cognitive Systems For Revenge And Forgiveness,
2013
University of Miami
Cognitive Systems For Revenge And Forgiveness, Michael E. Mccullough, Robert Kurzban, Benjamin A. Tabak
ESI Publications
Minimizing the costs that others impose upon oneself and upon those in whom one has a fitness stake, such as kin and allies, is a key adaptive problem for many organisms. Our ancestors regularly faced such adaptive problems (including homicide, bodily harm, theft, mate poaching, cuckoldry, reputational damage, sexual aggression, and the infliction of these costs on one's offspring, mates, coalition partners, or friends). One solution to this problem is to impose retaliatory costs on an aggressor so that the aggressor and other observers will lower their estimates of the net benefits to be gained from exploiting the retaliator in …
Women's Mobilization In Latin America: A Case Study Of Venezuela,
2012
The University of San Francisco
Women's Mobilization In Latin America: A Case Study Of Venezuela, Brianna Russell
Master's Theses
Abstract
I examine the following elements in regards to women’s mobilization in Latin America and Venezuela from the late 1950s to the present: (a) the influence of the state and economy on times when women mobilized (b) class division within the movement (c) women’s demands during different time periods (d) the ways in which women were successful in working towards gender equality. This thesis reviews the literature on women’s mobilization in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century. I find that women mobilized across class lines with the masses to end dictatorships. Women demobilized during transitions to …
Modernization, Sexual Risk-Taking, And Gynecological Morbidity Among Bolivian Forager-Horticulturalists,
2012
University of New Mexico
Modernization, Sexual Risk-Taking, And Gynecological Morbidity Among Bolivian Forager-Horticulturalists, Jonathan Stieglitz, Aaron D. Blackwell, Raúl Quispe Gutierrez, Edhitt Cortez Linares, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan
ESI Publications
Sexual risk-taking and reproductive morbidity are common among rapidly modernizing populations with little material wealth, limited schooling, minimal access to modern contraception and healthcare, and gendered inequalities in resource access that limit female autonomy in cohabiting relationships. Few studies have examined how modernization influences sexual risk-taking and reproductive health early in demographic transition. Tsimane are a natural fertility population of Bolivian forager-farmers; they are not urbanized, reside in small-scale villages, and lack public health infrastructure. We test whether modernization is associated with greater sexual risk-taking, report prevalence of gynecological morbidity (GM), and test whether modernization, sexual risk-taking and parity are …
The Structure Of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions Over Product Domains And Lexicographically Separable Preferences,
2012
Singapore Management University
The Structure Of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions Over Product Domains And Lexicographically Separable Preferences, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice functions (which we call generalized random dictatorships) are induced by probability distributions on voter sequences of length equal to the number of components. They induce a fixed probability distribution on the product set of voter peaks. The marginal probability distribution over every component is a random dictatorship. Our results generalize the classic random dictatorship result in Gibbard (1977) and the decomposability results for …
Contracting Over Prices,
2012
Singapore Management University
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Research Collection School Of Economics
We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging inefficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.
A Household Model Of Careers And Education Investment,
2012
University of Birmingham
A Household Model Of Careers And Education Investment, Jessica F. Young
Undergraduate Economic Review
This paper develops a two-stage non-cooperative household game, in which parents make career decisions and an investment into their child’s human capital. The model is solved for Nash equilibrium outcomes and extended for a cooperative solution. In non-cooperative pure strategies, both parents choosing to work is a Nash equilibrium, though there are alternative outcomes when the conditions underlying the career decision are varied. The investment behaviour of agents is analysed. We find that choices are critically affected by the magnitude of the cost (and reflected quality) of a high education investment relative to a low investment, and the intrinsic value …
Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,
2012
Singapore Management University
Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations, Takashi Kunimoto, Drew Fudenberg, Takashi Kunimoto, Oliver Tercieux
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-Maskin monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small information perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium also exists. Finally, …
Interpretation And Construction In Altering Rules,
2012
Georgetown University Law Center
Interpretation And Construction In Altering Rules, Gregory Klass
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This essay is a response to Ian Ayres's, "Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules," 121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012). Ayres identifies an important question: How does the law decide when parties have opted-out of a contractual default? Unfortunately, his article tells only half of the story about such altering rules. Ayres cares about rules designed to instruct parties on how to get the terms that they want. By focusing on such rules he ignores altering rules designed instead to interpret the nonlegal meaning of the parties' acts or agreement. This limited vision is characteristic of economic approaches to …
Blood, Organs And Other Tissues For Sale: Diamela Eltit's Impuesto A La Carne And The Afterwards Of The Neoliberal Development In Latin America.,
2012
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Blood, Organs And Other Tissues For Sale: Diamela Eltit's Impuesto A La Carne And The Afterwards Of The Neoliberal Development In Latin America., Wanda I. Ocasio- Rivera
Hispanic Studies Publications
Abstract
Blood, organs and other tissues for sale: Diamela Eltit's Impuesto a la carne and the afterwards of the neoliberal development in Latin America.
As Marx elaborated in Capital: Volume I at the moment human labour is sold, the subject participates in an ominous plot where she/he becomes a commodity. In a capitalist mode of production, the subject’s alienation from his/her humanity occurs because the individuals can only express labor through a privately-owned system of production in which he/she is an instrument, an object. This dehumanization process submits the subject under the exchange transactions of the market, where labor value …
[Sabbatical Report],
2012
Western Kentucky University
[Sabbatical Report], Youn Kim
Sabbatical Reports
I commenced the research as proposed in my application in collaboration with Keith McLaren of Monash University, Australia and Gary Wong of the University of Macau, China. I had worked with them on a related project which will be published in a journal this year. The new project is titled "Consumer Demand, Consumption, and Asset Pricing: An Integrated Analysis."
A Generalized Representation Theorem For Harsanyi's ('Impartial') Observer,
2012
Rice University
A Generalized Representation Theorem For Harsanyi's ('Impartial') Observer, Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, Zvi Safra
Research Collection School Of Economics
We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare function in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may assume independent of the social alternative.
