Economic Theory Commons^™

Firing Threats And Tenure In Virtual Organizations: Incentives Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job …

Cyber-Shilling In Automobile Auctions: Evidence From A Field Experiment, David Grether, David Porter, Matthew Shum

ESI Publications

We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the "price grid," or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers suggesting that they are "cyber-shills" working on behalf of sellers. These patterns do not appear in the New York auctions.

Risky Business: An Analysis Of Teacher Risk Preferences, Daniel H. Bowen, Stuart Buck, Cary Deck, Jonathan N. Mills, James V. Shuls

ESI Publications

A range of proposals aim to reform teacher compensation, recruitment, and retention. Teachers have generally not embraced these policies. One potential explanation for their objections is that teachers are relatively risk averse. We examine this hypothesis using a risk-elicitation task common to experimental economics. By comparing preferences of new teachers with those entering other professions, we find that individuals choosing to teach are significantly more risk averse. This suggests that the teaching profession may attract individuals who are less amenable to certain reforms. Policy-makers should take into account teacher risk characteristics when considering reforms that may clash with preferences.

Experimental Evolution And Economics, Terence C. Burnham, Aimee Dunlap, David W. Stephens

ESI Publications

This is a theory paper that advocates experimental evolution as a novel approach to study economic preferences. Economics could benefit because preferences are exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious. Experimental evolution allows the empirical study of preferences by placing organisms in designed environments and studying their genotype and phenotype over multiple generations. We describe a number of empirical studies on different aspects of preferences. We argue that experimental evolution has the potential to improve economics.

Humankind In Civilization’S Extended Order: A Tragedy, The First Part, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

This article is a short, scientific story of the labyrinthian human career, of humankind’s place in the natural order of the world, and of the evolution of moral rules and rule following that make the extended order of civilization possible. Drawing upon work in anthropology, biology, and linguistics, I weave a science-based narrative of how Homo sapiens came to be the only primate to convert enemy aliens into trading friends. It is a Goethean story of the human condition that postulates the common origins of and modern tension between Pleistocene and Anthropocene morality. It is also a Hayekian story of …

Further Towards A Theory Of The Emergence Of Property, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

This article explores the emergence of property as a moral convention. To understand this process I make use of several laboratory experiments on property in its nascence. These experiments illustrate how a rule of property arises from our knowledge of what is morally right, and not vice versa. I also argue that while the ultimate end of property is our interest in using things, the proximate end of property is not losing them, i.e., the end of a rule of property is to secure from morally unfounded harm.

Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-Based Interaction, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Publications

We observed reports of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotions activated after interactions in the Trust game. Our analyses reveal that activation of 20 emotional states following trust-based interaction is better explained by predictions derived from a multi-dimensional Recalibrational perspective than by predictions derived from two-dimensional Valence and Arousal perspectives. The Recalibrational perspective proposes that emotions are activated according to their functional features – for example, emotions help people achieve short or long-sighted goals by up or down-regulating behavioral propensities, whereas Valence and Arousal perspectives consider simpler hedonic dimensions lacking functional specificity. The Recalibrational perspective is also distinguished from the …

Dynamic Optimization And Conformity In Health Behavior And Life Enjoyment Over The Life Cycle, Hernán D. Bejarano, Hillard Kaplan, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

This article examines individual and social influences on investments in health and enjoyment from immediate consumption. Our lab experiment mimics the problem of health investment over a lifetime (Grossman, 1972a,b). Incentives to find the appropriate expenditures on life enjoyment and health are given by making in each period come period a function of previous health investments. In order to model social effects in the experiment, we randomly assigned individuals to chat/observation groups. Groups were permitted to freely chat between repeated lifetimes. Two treatments were employed: In the Independent-rewards treatment, an individual's rewards from investments in life enjoyment depend only on …

A Class Of Symmetric And Quadratic Utility Functions Generating Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi

Research Collection School Of Economics

I provide a simple example of a quadratic utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is symmetric, increasing and concave. Interestingly, the Giffen effect arises in the subspace where the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided.

Comment: Entering The "Great School Of Self-Command": The Moralizing Influence Of Markets, Language, And Imagination, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Economists for centuries have struggled to understand the self-other relationship and its implications for economic life. For economists in the classical tradition of Adam Smith, this was a central question regarding the wealth and flourishing of nations. Later, as this volume demonstrates, the relationship of the self to others was forgotten as economics became associated almost exclusively with the pursuit of what Peter Boettke and Daniel Smith describe as "ruthless efficiency."

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and a growing body of experimental and empirical evidence showing the predictive shortcomings of narrow self-interest models, a more capacious economics …

On "Strongly Fortified Minds": Self-Restraint And Cooperation In The Discussion Tradition, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Accordingly, this essay explores some unappreciated benefits of discussion. While educators frequently favor discussion as a means to encouraging engaged learning, they nonetheless rarely attempt to explain how or why these benefits arise. More than this, the role of economists from Adam Smith through Frank Knight and his student, James Buchanan, in explaining the benefits associated with discussion has been neglected both within economics and throughout the academy. In this tradition one accepts the inevitability of an individual "point of view" and the good society is one that can govern itself by means of an emergent consensus among points of …

Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy

ESI Working Papers

In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk …

Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …

The Cognitive Basis Of Social Behavior: Cognitive Reflection Overrides Antisocial But Not Always Prosocial Motives, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those who rely more heavily …

Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with …

On The Merit Of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact With Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan

ESI Working Papers

Influence costs models predict that organizations should limit managerial discretion to deter organizational members from engaging in wasteful politicking activities. We test this conjecture in a controlled, yet realistic, work environment in which we allow employees to influence managers’ decisions about rewards. We find that influence activities are pervasive and significantly lower organizational performance. Organizational performance suffers because principals offer weaker incentives when influence activities are allowed than when they are not. Importantly, we show that equal pay incentive schemes perform better when influence activities are available than when they are not. Our results thus support the idea that prevalent …

The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray

ESI Working Papers

Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found were not influenced by social information.

When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler

ESI Working Papers

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, but when uninformed, Americans give less than Spanish. Culture and information not only affect individual giving, but also the determinants of giving and the beliefs about how income inequality arises. Beliefs partially moderate cross-cultural differences in giving.

An Experiment On Retail Payments Systems, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Stefania Bortolotti

ESI Working Papers

We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers’ economic incentives played a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain their adoption …

Revisiting Information Aggregation In Asset Markets: Reflective Learning & Market Efficiency, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

The ability of markets to aggregate disperse information leading to prices that reflect the fundamental value of an asset is key to assessing the often-debated efficiency of markets. We study information aggregation in the experimental environment originally created by Plott and Sunder (1988). Contrary to the current belief, we find that markets do not aggregate information. The model that best describes our data, as well as data on information aggregation subsequent to Plott and Sunder (1988), is prior information (Lintner, 1969). That is, traders use their private information but fail to use market prices to infer other traders’ information. We …