Economic Theory Commons^™

Loose Notes And Papers, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. (2011, March 27). Notes on imperfect competition, the marginal principle, and entrepreneurship (Handwritten note).
• Graz Schumpeter Centre. (2011, March 27–29). Economic thinking in the classical tradition: symposium in honour of prof. heinz d. kurz on the occasion of his 65th birthday (Conference program). University of Graz (2, 3).
• Shaikh, A. (c. 2015). Notes on the measurement of essentials in economic production, engagement with mandel, and terms of trade in developing countries (Handwritten note) (6).
• Shaikh, A. (c. 2015). Notes on uneven development in the united states and the case and deaton study on deaths of …

Book Galleys With Corrections, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Capitalism: Competition, conflict, crises (Unpublished manuscript) by Anwar Shaikh.

Inequality Pyramid, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. (September). Wicksell effect (Unpublished manuscript).
• Shaikh, A. (September). Inequality pyramids (Unpublished manuscript).

Chamberlin Monopolistic Competition, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Chamberlin, E. H. (1951). Monopolistic competition revisited. Economica, New Series, Volume 18, Number 72. Blackwell Publishing.

Why Supply Chain Collaboration Fails: The Socio-Structural View Of Resistance To Collaboration Strategies, Stanley E. Fawcett, Matthew W. Mccarter, Amydee M. Fawcett, G. Scott Webb, Gregory Magnan

ESI Publications

Purpose

The relational view posits that supply chain integration can be a source of competitive advantage. Few firms, however, successfully co-create value to attain supernormal relational rents. We therefore elaborate theory regarding the reasons why collaboration strategies fail.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs a quasi-longitudinal, multi-case interview methodology to explore the reasons why collaboration strategies fail to deliver intended results. We interviewed managers at 49 companies in Period 1 and managers at 57 companies in Period 2. Fifteen companies participated in both rounds of interviews.

Findings

This paper builds and describes a taxonomy of relational resistors. We then explore how sociological …

The Effect Of Earned Vs. House Money On Price Bubble Formation In Experimental Asset Markets, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Praveen Kujal, David Porter

ESI Publications

Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak-Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter

ESI Publications

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival. This is particularly important in aggressor–defender contests. This paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor's action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender's win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions that is not being exploited by defenders; and …

The Role Of The Decision-Making Regime On Cooperation In A Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination Of Cyberloafing, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Matthew W. Mccarter

ESI Publications

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, …

Peer Pressure And Moral Hazard In Teams: Experimental Evidence, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

Team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in the lab and in the field despite the moral hazard in teams problem identified by Holmström (1982). In a newly developed virtual workplace, we show that, in line with Holmström, moral hazard in teams is indeed pervasive. Subsequently, we find strong evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem. Organizations equipped with a very weak form of peer monitoring (anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or face-to-face interactions) perform as well as those using individual incentives.

First Full Uncorrected Proofs Of Capitalism, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Capitalism: competition, conflict, crises, by Anwar Shaikh. Unpublished — first uncorrected proof, dated October 11, 2015.

Critique And Transformation: On The Hypothetical Nature Of Ecosystem Service Value And Its Neo-Marxist, Liberal And Pragmatist Criticisms, Andony P. Melathopoulos, Alex Stoner

Journal Articles

Ecosystem service valuation (ESV) attempts to transform the opposition of human economic necessity and ecological conservation by valuing the latter in terms of the services rendered by the former. However, despite a number of ESV-inspired sustainability initiatives since the 1990s, global ecological degradation continues to accelerate. This suggests that ESV has fallen far short of its goals of sustainable social transformation—a failure which has generated considerable criticism. This paper reviews three prominent lines of ESV criticism: 1) the neo-Marxist criticism, which emphasizes the “fictitious” character of ecosystem commodities; 2) the liberal criticism through Friedrich Hayek's concept “scientistic objectivism”; and 3) …

The New Dynamics Of El Paso's Post Industrial Development: An Analysis Of The El Paso Chihuahua's Ballpark Controversy, Alan Matthew Serna

Open Access Theses & Dissertations

This Thesis has sought to highlight a controversial event that occurred in El Paso, Texas when a wealthy group of local business interests, entered into a public/ private agreement with the City of El Paso to bring Triple-A baseball to the city. In doing so, the partnership drew large amounts opposition to their plan, when it was revealed that the city hall building would be demolished to make way for a new stadium, and that the issue would not be put to a vote. After analyzing all of the behaviors utilized by both opponents and proponents of the ballpark during …

The Choice Of Technology And Equilibrium Wage Rigidity, Haiwen Zhou

Economics Faculty Publications

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. …

Oup Book Backup, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

Backup of complete book.

Conduct In Narrativized Trust Games, Jan Osborn, Bart J. Wilson, Bradley R. Sherwood

English Faculty Articles and Research

We “narrativize” a basic extensive form trust game by placing participants in a story that contextualizes the interaction with an unforeseeable future. In our narrative experiment, participants consider each decision as a character, advancing the story with their choices for salient payoffs. Our interest is in understanding how participants apply Adam Smith's rules of beneficent and just conduct in our narrativized games with epistemic conditions of an unknown future, conditions which aren't possible in extensive form. We invite our readers to participate in the story of the results, making meaning as participants in a narrative that unfolds with their choices.

Are Subjects Making Financial Decisions In Lab Auctions Or Are They Just Gambling?, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Optimal bidding strategies in first-price and Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic but depend on bidder risk attitudes. However, laboratory experiments consistently find different behaviour between auction formats. This article explores whether the notion in psychology that financial and gambling risks are viewed differently can explain the discrepancy. Ultimately, the evidence does not support this hypothesis, but a bidder's propensity to gamble is associated with how much risk he takes in both auctions whereas his propensity to take financial risks is not. The results suggest that subjects may view themselves as gambling in laboratory auctions rather than making financial decisions.

Advancing The Understanding Of Behavior In Social-Ecological Systems: Results From Lab And Field Experiments, Marco A. Janssen, Therese Lindahl, James J. Murphy

ESI Publications

"Experiments have made important contributions to our understanding of human behavior, including behavior relevant for understanding social-ecological systems. When there is a conflict between individual and group interests in social-ecological systems, social dilemmas occur. From the many types of social-dilemma formulations that are used to study collective action, common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas are most relevant for social-ecological systems. Experimental studies of both common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas have shown that many predictions based on the conventional theory of collective action, which assumes rational, self-interested behavior, do not hold. More cooperation occurs than predicted (Ledyard 1995), “cheap talk” increases cooperation …

Performance Benefits Of Reward Choice: A Procedural Justice Perspective, Arran Caza, Matthew W. Mccarter, Gregory B. Northcraft

ESI Publications

Reward choice – employees' ability to exercise control over the formal rewards they receive from work – is an important part of many HRM strategies. Reward choice is expected to increase employee performance, but conflicting findings highlight the need to better understand how and when it will do so. Based on fairness heuristic theory, we predicted that procedural justice mediates reward choice's influence on performance, and that choice attractiveness moderates that influence. A field study and an experiment both had similar results, supporting our predictions. Reward choice can increase performance by as much as 40 per cent, but only when …

Sustaining Group Reputation, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin

ESI Publications

When individuals trade with strangers, there is a temptation to renege on agreements. If repeated interaction or exogenous enforcement is unavailable, societies often solve this problem via institutions that rely on group, rather than individual, reputation. Groups can employ two mechanisms to uphold reputation that are unavailable to individuals: information sharing and in-group punishment. We design a laboratory experiment to distinguish the roles of these mechanisms when individual reputations are unobservable. Subjects are split into groups and play a trust game with random re-matching, where only the group identity of one’s partner is known. Treatments differ by whether information about …

Disfluent Fonts Don’T Help People Solve Math Problems, Andrew Meyer, Shane Frederick, Terence C. Burnham, Juan D. Guevera Pinto, Ty W. Boyer, Linden J. Ball, Gordon Pennycook, Rakefet Ackerman, Valerie A. Thompson, Jonathon P. Schuldt

ESI Publications

Prior research suggests that reducing font clarity can cause people to consider printed information more carefully. The most famous demonstration showed that participants were more likely to solve counterintuitive math problems when they were printed in hard-to-read font. However, after pooling data from that experiment with 16 attempts to replicate it, we find no effect on solution rates. We examine potential moderating variables, including cognitive ability, presentation format, and experimental setting, but we find no evidence of a disfluent font benefit under any conditions. More generally, though disfluent fonts slightly increase response times, we find little evidence that they activate …