Economic Theory Commons^™

Loose Notes And Papers, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. (2011, March 27). Notes on imperfect competition, the marginal principle, and entrepreneurship (Handwritten note).
• Graz Schumpeter Centre. (2011, March 27–29). Economic thinking in the classical tradition: symposium in honour of prof. heinz d. kurz on the occasion of his 65th birthday (Conference program). University of Graz (2, 3).
• Shaikh, A. (c. 2015). Notes on the measurement of essentials in economic production, engagement with mandel, and terms of trade in developing countries (Handwritten note) (6).
• Shaikh, A. (c. 2015). Notes on uneven development in the united states and the case and deaton study on deaths of …

Book Galleys With Corrections, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Capitalism: Competition, conflict, crises (Unpublished manuscript) by Anwar Shaikh.

Inequality Pyramid, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. (September). Wicksell effect (Unpublished manuscript).
• Shaikh, A. (September). Inequality pyramids (Unpublished manuscript).

Chamberlin Monopolistic Competition, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Chamberlin, E. H. (1951). Monopolistic competition revisited. Economica, New Series, Volume 18, Number 72. Blackwell Publishing.

Why Supply Chain Collaboration Fails: The Socio-Structural View Of Resistance To Collaboration Strategies, Stanley E. Fawcett, Matthew W. Mccarter, Amydee M. Fawcett, G. Scott Webb, Gregory Magnan

ESI Publications

Purpose

The relational view posits that supply chain integration can be a source of competitive advantage. Few firms, however, successfully co-create value to attain supernormal relational rents. We therefore elaborate theory regarding the reasons why collaboration strategies fail.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs a quasi-longitudinal, multi-case interview methodology to explore the reasons why collaboration strategies fail to deliver intended results. We interviewed managers at 49 companies in Period 1 and managers at 57 companies in Period 2. Fifteen companies participated in both rounds of interviews.

Findings

This paper builds and describes a taxonomy of relational resistors. We then explore how sociological …

The Effect Of Earned Vs. House Money On Price Bubble Formation In Experimental Asset Markets, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Praveen Kujal, David Porter

ESI Publications

Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

Risky Business: An Analysis Of Teacher Risk Preferences, Daniel H. Bowen, Stuart Buck, Cary Deck, Jonathan N. Mills, James V. Shuls

ESI Publications

A range of proposals aim to reform teacher compensation, recruitment, and retention. Teachers have generally not embraced these policies. One potential explanation for their objections is that teachers are relatively risk averse. We examine this hypothesis using a risk-elicitation task common to experimental economics. By comparing preferences of new teachers with those entering other professions, we find that individuals choosing to teach are significantly more risk averse. This suggests that the teaching profession may attract individuals who are less amenable to certain reforms. Policy-makers should take into account teacher risk characteristics when considering reforms that may clash with preferences.

Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak-Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter

ESI Publications

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival. This is particularly important in aggressor–defender contests. This paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor's action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender's win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions that is not being exploited by defenders; and …

The Role Of The Decision-Making Regime On Cooperation In A Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination Of Cyberloafing, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Matthew W. Mccarter

ESI Publications

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, …

Experimental Evolution And Economics, Terence C. Burnham, Aimee Dunlap, David W. Stephens

ESI Publications

This is a theory paper that advocates experimental evolution as a novel approach to study economic preferences. Economics could benefit because preferences are exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious. Experimental evolution allows the empirical study of preferences by placing organisms in designed environments and studying their genotype and phenotype over multiple generations. We describe a number of empirical studies on different aspects of preferences. We argue that experimental evolution has the potential to improve economics.

Peer Pressure And Moral Hazard In Teams: Experimental Evidence, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

Team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in the lab and in the field despite the moral hazard in teams problem identified by Holmström (1982). In a newly developed virtual workplace, we show that, in line with Holmström, moral hazard in teams is indeed pervasive. Subsequently, we find strong evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem. Organizations equipped with a very weak form of peer monitoring (anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or face-to-face interactions) perform as well as those using individual incentives.

First Full Uncorrected Proofs Of Capitalism, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Capitalism: competition, conflict, crises, by Anwar Shaikh. Unpublished — first uncorrected proof, dated October 11, 2015.

Comment: Entering The "Great School Of Self-Command": The Moralizing Influence Of Markets, Language, And Imagination, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Economists for centuries have struggled to understand the self-other relationship and its implications for economic life. For economists in the classical tradition of Adam Smith, this was a central question regarding the wealth and flourishing of nations. Later, as this volume demonstrates, the relationship of the self to others was forgotten as economics became associated almost exclusively with the pursuit of what Peter Boettke and Daniel Smith describe as "ruthless efficiency."

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and a growing body of experimental and empirical evidence showing the predictive shortcomings of narrow self-interest models, a more capacious economics …

On "Strongly Fortified Minds": Self-Restraint And Cooperation In The Discussion Tradition, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Accordingly, this essay explores some unappreciated benefits of discussion. While educators frequently favor discussion as a means to encouraging engaged learning, they nonetheless rarely attempt to explain how or why these benefits arise. More than this, the role of economists from Adam Smith through Frank Knight and his student, James Buchanan, in explaining the benefits associated with discussion has been neglected both within economics and throughout the academy. In this tradition one accepts the inevitability of an individual "point of view" and the good society is one that can govern itself by means of an emergent consensus among points of …

The Cognitive Basis Of Social Behavior: Cognitive Reflection Overrides Antisocial But Not Always Prosocial Motives, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those who rely more heavily …

Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy

ESI Working Papers

In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk …

Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …

Dynamic Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

The directed search model (Peters, 1984) is static; its dynamic extensions typically restrict strategies, often assuming price or match commitments. We lift such restrictions to study equilibrium when search can be directed over time, without constraints and at no cost. In equilibrium trade frictions arise endogenously, and price commitments, if they do exist, are self-enforcing. In contrast to the typical model, there exists a continuum of equilibria that exhibit trade frictions. These equilibria support any price above the static price, including monopoly pricing in arbitrarily large markets. Dispersion in posted prices can naturally arise as temporary or permanent phenomenon despite …

The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray

ESI Working Papers

Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found were not influenced by social information.

Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with …