Taylor Rules + Central Bank Policies,
2012
Bard College
Taylor Rules + Central Bank Policies, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
4:25 PM
Claude responded: This collection includes:
This collection includes:
- Shaikh, A. (n.d.). [Handwritten folder label identifying contents as "Taylor rules and central bank policies, 9/12"; folder tab notation: "Taylor rules and CB policy 9/12"]. Unpublished manuscript note. New School for Social Research.
- Taylor, J. B. (1999). A historical analysis of monetary policy rules [Chapter 7, with handwritten annotations by Shaikh, A., including derivation of Taylor rule: i = α + βΠ + (Δu_k/u_{k-1}); long-run interest rate formula; and marginal notes distinguishing descriptive vs. prescriptive uses of the rule, and noting that i relates to π in a …
Replacement Investment,
2012
Bard College
Replacement Investment, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Shaikh, A. September 10, 1973. Gross stock and net stock project (Handwritten research notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research.
- Shaikh, A. September 28, 1979. Deriving current dollar stock from BLS data (Handwritten correspondence notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research.
- Shaikh, A. May 10, 1980. BLS data on Jack Faucett adjustments (Handwritten folder notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research.
- Shaikh, A. December 1, 1982. Note on retirements vs. business failure (Handwritten manuscript notes). Unpublished work. New York, NY: New School for Social Research. …
International Organization And Poverty Alleviation,
2012
Eckerd College
International Organization And Poverty Alleviation, William F. Felice, Diana Fuguitt
Human Rights & Human Welfare
A review of:
The World Trade Organization and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Edited by Sarah Joseph, David Kinley & Jeff Waincymer. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 2009.
and
Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights. By Desmond McNeill & Asunción St. Clair. New York, NY: Routledge. 2009.
and
Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform. By Catherine Weaver. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2008.
The Structural Injustice Of Forced Migration And The Failings Of Normative Theory,
2012
Loyola University Chicago
The Structural Injustice Of Forced Migration And The Failings Of Normative Theory, David Ingram
Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works
I propose to criticize two strands of argument - contractarian and utilitarian – that liberals have put forth in defense of economic coercion, based on the notion of justifiable paternalism. To illustrate my argument, I appeal to the example of forced labor migration, driven by the exigencies of market forces. In particular, I argue that the forced migration of a special subset of unemployed workers lacking other means of subsistence (economic refugees) cannot be redeemed paternalistically as freedom or welfare enhancing in the long run. I further argue that contractarian and utilitarian approaches are normatively incapable of appreciating this fact …
Instrumen Stimulus Fiskal: Pilihan Kebijakan Dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Perekonomian,
2012
Direktorat Jenderal Anggaran, Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia
Instrumen Stimulus Fiskal: Pilihan Kebijakan Dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Perekonomian, Wisynu Wardhana, Djoni Hartono
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Pembangunan Indonesia
This study aims to identify the impact of the fiscal stimulus instrument choices on the economy, and to formulate policy options appropriate with the fiscal stimulus in boosting the economy, especially on economic growth, employment, and household income. The analysis tools is Applied General Equilibrium Model for Fiscal Policy Analysis (AGEFIS) using the Social Accounting Matrix database (SAM) of Indonesia in 2005. The simulation results show that (i) fiscal stimulus provide a boost to economic growth, employment, and household income, but on the other hand have a potential to cause an increase in price, (ii) government spending and cutting taxes …
Change We Can't Believe In ... Or Afford: Why The Timing Is Wrong To Reduce The Estate Tax On The Wealthiest Americans,
2012
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Change We Can't Believe In ... Or Afford: Why The Timing Is Wrong To Reduce The Estate Tax On The Wealthiest Americans, Phyllis C. Taite
Faculty Articles
At the end of the year 2008 the United States was in the midst of an economic storm. The country started going through its worst financial state since the Great Depression. Historically, transfer taxes were instated specifically to raise revenue during the country’s financial time of need. The temporary repeal during the 2010 tax year occurred during a time when the country was experiencing an economic storm, a time when the country could least afford to forego the additional revenue. Consequently, the timing of the temporary repeal was in direct contradiction to the original purpose of the estate tax. While …
What Are Analysts Really Good At?,
2012
Singapore Management University
What Are Analysts Really Good At?, Ohad Kadan, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, Tzachi. Zach
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their stock recommendations. Forexample, a ‘buy’ for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its peers in the same sector(“industry benchmarkers”), while for other brokers it means the stock is expected to outperform themarket (“market benchmarkers”), or just some absolute return (“total benchmarkers”). We use thesebenchmarks to analyze the role of stock picking, industry picking and market timing in contributing to theperformance of stock recommendations. We are able to do so given that different benchmarks suggest theuse of different sets of abilities. Analysis of the relation between analysts’ recommendations and theirlong-term …
Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach,
2012
Chapman University
Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
ESI Working Papers
We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-o between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium, based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions.
Trade,
2012
Bard College
Trade, Anwar Shaikh Phd
Archives of Anwar Shaikh
This collection includes:
- Trade, compiled by Anwar Shaikh, containing working papers, lecture notes, correspondence, and handwritten research notes on international trade, exchange rates, comparative and absolute advantage, purchasing power parity, and trade balances. The materials date from 2005 through 2012 and are associated with Anwar Shaikh’s research and teaching at the New School for Social Research in New York.
- Trade classical equations, Anwar Shaikh, 2012-05-07. Unpublished manuscript.
- Classical trade theory, Anwar Shaikh, 2001-10-24, revised 2008-10-07. Unpublished manuscript.
- Competition, exchange rates, and trade balances, Anwar Shaikh, undated. Unpublished manuscript.
- Automatic trade balance is a “doctrinaire delusion”, …
The Herodotus Paradox,
2012
Indiana University
The Herodotus Paradox, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the 'Herodotus paradox.'
The Lifeboat Problem,
2012
Max Planck Institute of Tax Law & Public Finance
The Lifeboat Problem, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat”). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (“a seat”). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. The partitioning of prizes can lead to coordination failure when players employ nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria some rents are sheltered and rent dissipation is …
Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games With Application To The Economics Of Alliances,
2012
Chapman University
Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games With Application To The Economics Of Alliances, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
In Borel’s (1921) Colonel Blotto game two players simultaneously allocate their respective endowments of a resource across n battlefields, the higher allocation wins each battlefield, and players maximize the number of battlefields won. Here we examine two players who may form an alliance before separately competing in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games against a common adversary. Despite a lack of common interests, unilateral transfers — in a direction consistent with the exploitation hypothesis — arise for a range of parameter configurations. Such transfers alter the adversary’s strategy and the combination of the direct and strategic effects benefits both allies.
Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?,
2012
Penn State University
Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?, Hernan D. Bejarano, Lance Clifner, Carl Johnston, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.
دور التقارير المالية المنشورة للشركات المساهمة في تلبية احتياجات المستخدمين من المعلومات دراسة استطلاعية على عينة من الوسطاء والمستثمرين في سوق العراق للأوراق المالية,
2012
Al-Muthanna University
دور التقارير المالية المنشورة للشركات المساهمة في تلبية احتياجات المستخدمين من المعلومات دراسة استطلاعية على عينة من الوسطاء والمستثمرين في سوق العراق للأوراق المالية, فالح عبد الحسن داود
Muthanna Journal of Administrative and Economics Sciences
هدفت هذه الدراسة إلى بيان الدور الذي يمكن أن تلعبه معلومات التقارير المالية للشركات المدرجة في سوق العراق للأوراق المالية في قرارات المستخدمين المتعلقة ببيع وشراء أسهم هذه الشركات ، وباعتماد أسلوب الاستبيان الذي تم توزيعه على عينة مكونة من ( 42 ) فردا من الوسطاء الماليين والمستثمرين المتعاملين في هذه السوق ، فقد كانت من أهم نتائج الدراسة ما يلي :-إن هؤلاء المستخدمين لا يحصلون على التقارير المالية للشركات بسهولة ويسر وإنها لا تتوفر لهم في الوقت المناسب وحاجتهم إليها .-يعتمد هؤلاء المستخدمين على هذه التقارير في قراراتهم الاستثمارية حيث يفهمون المعلومات المحاسبية ويستخدمونها بالشكل الملائم والصحيح .-لا يكتفي …
Coastal Empire Economic Monitor, 1st Quarter, 2012,
2012
Georgia Southern University
Coastal Empire Economic Monitor, 1st Quarter, 2012, Armstrong Atlantic State University Center For Regional Analysis
Coastal Empire Economic Monitor
The Coastal Empire Economic Indicators are designed to provide continuously updating quarterly snapshots of the Savannah Metropolitan Statistical Area economy. The coincident index measures the current economic heartbeat of the region. The leading index provides a short term forecast of the region’s economic activity in six to nine months.
Coastal Empire Economic Monitor, 2nd Quarter, 2012,
2012
Georgia Southern University
Coastal Empire Economic Monitor, 2nd Quarter, 2012, Armstrong Atlantic State University Center For Regional Analysis
Coastal Empire Economic Monitor
The Coastal Empire Economic Indicators are designed to provide continuously updating quarterly snapshots of the Savannah Metropolitan Statistical Area economy. The coincident index measures the current economic heartbeat of the region. The leading index provides a short term forecast of the region’s economic activity in six to nine months.
A Household-Level Decomposition Of The White-Black Homeownership Gap,
2012
Singapore Management University
A Household-Level Decomposition Of The White-Black Homeownership Gap, Eric Fesselmeyer, Kien T. Le, Kiat Ying Seah
Research Collection College of Integrative Studies
This paper uses a semiparametric homeownership model to estimate and to decompose the household-level white-black homeownership gap into an endowment component and a residual component across the distribution of homeownership rates. We find that the racial gap differs across homeownership rates and that studies that examine the gap only at the mean may be misleading. We also find that although household characteristics explain the homeownership gap for most households, there is a substantial portion of the gap that remains unexplained for households with a very low propensity to own homes. A comparison of the estimates from the semiparametric model and …
Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?,
2012
Singapore Management University
Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Research Collection School Of Economics
In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other's efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency, multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency elimites the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players' efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.
Supply Elasticity Of Housing,
2012
Sogang University
Supply Elasticity Of Housing, Kyunghwan Kim, Sock-Yong Phang, Susan Wachter
Research Collection School Of Economics
The supply elasticity of housing determines how quickly house prices respond to economic shocks and this has many real economic consequences. Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) describes its importance in housing market analysis: „most housing models, and most policy analysis hinge on explicit or implicit estimates of the price elasticity of supply of housing: does the market respond to demand side shocks with more supply or higher prices‟. However, as pointed out by Quigley (1979), there exist real analytical difficulties in modeling the supply of housing. Attempting to measure the flow of housing services provided by the stock of housing is …
Optimal International Agreement And Treatment Of Domestic Subsidy,
2012
Singapore Management University
Optimal International Agreement And Treatment Of Domestic Subsidy, Gea M. Lee
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an international agreement, when a government, having incentive to use its domestic subsidy as a means of import protection, can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a market imperfection. We show that any optimal agreement, as opposed to the conventional message of the targeting principle, restricts the home government’s freedom to select its domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters. Our finding suggests that a proper restriction on domestic subsidy is somewhere between GATT and WTO rules.
