Economic Theory Commons^™

Slow-Fast Analysis Of A Multi-Group Asset Flow Model With Implications For The Dynamics Of Wealth, Mark Desantis, David Swigon

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The multi-group asset flow model is a nonlinear dynamical system originally developed as a tool for understanding the behavioral foundations of market phenomena such as flash crashes and price bubbles. In this paper we use a modification of this model to analyze the dynamics of a single-asset market in situations when the trading rates of investors (i.e., their desire to exchange stock for cash) are prescribed ahead of time and independent of the state of the market. Under the assumption of fast trading compared to the time-rate of change in the prescribed trading rates we decompose the dynamics of the …

On Booms That Never Bust: Ambiguity In Experimental Asset Markets With Bubbles, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We study the effect of ambiguity on the formation of bubbles and on the occurrence of crashes in experimental asset markets à la Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988). We extend their framework to an environment where the fundamental value of the asset is ambiguous. We show that, when the fundamental value is ambiguous, asset prices tend to be lower than when it is risky although bubbles form in both the ambiguous and the risky environments. Additionally, bubbles do not crash in the ambiguous case whereas they do so in the risky one. These findings regarding depressed prices and the absence …

Spending Too Little In Hard Times, Alessandro Del Ponte, Peter Descioli

Political Science Faculty Articles and Research

People’s decisions to consume and save resources are critical to their wellbeing. Previous experiments find that people typically spend too much because of how they discount the future. We propose that people’s motive to preserve their savings can instead cause them to spend too little in hard times. We design an economic game in which participants can store resources for the future to survive in a harsh environment. A player’s income is uncertain and consumption yields diminishing returns within each day, creating tradeoffs between spending and saving. We compare participants’ decisions to a heuristic that performed best in simulations. We …

Conditional Independence In A Binary Choice Experiment, Nathaniel Wilcox

ESI Working Papers

Experimental and behavioral economists, as well as psychologists, commonly assume conditional independence of choices when constructing likelihood functions for structural estimation. I test this assumption using data from a new experiment designed for this purpose. Within the limits of the experiment’s identifying restriction and designed power to detect deviations from conditional independence, conditional independence is not rejected. In naturally occurring data, concerns about violations of conditional independence are certainly proper and well-taken (for well-known reasons). However, when an experimenter employs contemporary state-of-the-art experimental mechanisms and designs, the current evidence suggests that conditional independence is an acceptable assumption for analyzing data …

Selection In The Lab: A Network Approach, Aleksandr Alekseev, Mikhail Freer

ESI Working Papers

We study the selection problem in economic experiments by focusing on its dynamic and network aspects. We develop a dynamic network model of student participation in a subject pool, which assumes that students' participation is driven by the two channels: the direct channel of recruitment and the indirect channel of student interaction. Using rich recruitment data from a large public university, we find that the patterns of participation and biases are consistent with the model. We also find evidence of both short- and long-run selection biases between males and females, as well as between cohorts of students. Males tend to …

On Strategy-Proofness And The Salience Of Single-Peakedness, Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Masso

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible …

Revisiting The Foundations Of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms, Yi-Chun Chen, Jiangtao Li

Research Collection School Of Economics

An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical foundation for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms in general social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We propose a condition called the uniform shortest-path tree that, under regularity, ensures the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This exposes the underlying logic of the existence of such foundations in the single-unit auction setting, and extends the argument to cases where it was hitherto unknown. To prove this result, we adopt the linear programming approach to mechanism design. In …

On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms, Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types. Although the standard model and more generally a continuum type space are widely used in the literature, it is nonetheless an abstraction of reality. Given that the public good provision problem has occupied a central application in the theory of mechanism design, we propose a "stress test" for the results in the standard model …

Entrepreneurship, College, And Credit: The Golden Triangle, Roberto M. Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun

Research Collection School Of Economics

We develop a model to evaluate the aggregate impact of college finance in an environment with entrepreneurship. The calibrated model captures the stylized fact that entrepreneurs with college are more common and more profitable in the United States. The calibration indicates this is mainly because higher labor earnings allow college‐educated agents to ameliorate credit constraints if and when they eventually become entrepreneurs. Changes in financing constraints on entrepreneurs can thus affect college attendance, and changes in financing constraints on college can affect entrepreneurship rates as well.

Agglomeration And The Extent Of The Market: An Experimental Investigation Into Spatially Coordinated Exchange, Jordan Adamson

ESI Working Papers

How and why do agglomerations emerge? While economic historians emphasize trade and economic geographers emphasize variety, we still don’t understand the role of coordination. I fill this gap by extending the model of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) to formalize Smith’s (1776) theory of agglomeration. I then test the model in a laboratory experiment and find individuals tend to coalesce purely to coordinate exchange, with more agglomeration when there is a larger variety of goods in the economy. I also find that tying individuals to the land reduces agglomeration, but magnifies the effect of variety.

Coordination And Evolutionary Dynamics: When Are Evolutionary Models Reliable?, Daniel Graydon Stephenson

ESI Publications

This study reports a continuous-time experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker–defender games. It implements three experimental treatment conditions: one with strong coordination incentives, one with weak coordination incentives, and one with zero coordination incentives. Each treatment exhibits identical equilibrium predictions but distinct evolutionary predictions. Observed behavior was tightly clustered around equilibrium under both the zero coordination treatment and the weak coordination treatment but widely dispersed from equilibrium under the strong coordination treatment. This result was anticipated by explicitly dynamic models but not by conventional stability criteria. In contrast to the widely maintained assumption of sign-preservation, subjects frequently switched …

Variation Among Populations In The Immune Protein Composition Of Mother's Milk Reflects Subsistence Pattern, Laura D. Klein, Jincui Huang, Elizabeth A. Quinn, Melanie A. Martin, Alicia A. Breakey, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Claudia Valeggia, Grazyna Jasienska, Brooke Scelza, Carlito B. Lebrilla, Katie Hinde

ESI Publications

Lay Summary: Adaptive immune proteins in mothers’ milk are more variable than innate immune proteins across populations and subsistence strategies. These results suggest that the immune defenses in milk are shaped by a mother’s environment throughout her life.

Background and objectives: Mother’s milk contains immune proteins that play critical roles in protecting the infant from infection and priming the infant’s developing immune system during early life. The composition of these molecules in milk, particularly the acquired immune proteins, is thought to reflect a mother’s immunological exposures throughout her life. In this study, we examine the composition of innate …

Do Negative Random Shocks Affect Trust And Trustworthiness?, Hernán Bejarano, Joris Gillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Publications

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are …

Do Negative Random Shocks Affect Trust And Trustworthiness?, Hernán Bejarano, Joris Gillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Publications

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are …

The Supply Side Determinants Of Territory And Conflict, Jordan Adamson, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Working Papers

What determines the geographic extent of territory? We microfound and extend Boulding’s “Loss of Strength Gradient” to predict the extensive and intensive margins of conflict across space. We show how economies of scale in the production of violence and varying costs of projecting violence at a distance combine to affect the geographic distribution of conflict and territory. We test and probe the boundaries of this model in an experiment varying the fixed costs of conflict entry. As predicted, higher fixed costs increase the probability of exclusive territories; median behavior closely tracks equilibrium predictions in all treatments.

Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review …

Black Gold In A Changing World: An Examination Of Saudi Arabia’S Dependence On Oil And The Possibility Of A Solar Energy Transition, Sofia Mouritsen

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

This paper examines Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil, considering the profound effects that the resource has on the domestic, socioeconomic, and international affairs of the Kingdom. It is determined, after examining the economic and environmental factors that make it necessary, that Saudi Arabia must reduce its dependence on oil and diversify its economy, ideally by pursing solar energy. This conclusion is reached by considering Saudi Arabia’s domestic challenges, which include unemployment and rising domestic energy demand, as well as factors such as the price volatility of oil and changing global energy trends. A Saudi transition to solar power is determined …

The Distribution Of Information And The Price Efficiency Of Markets, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’ private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss the implications of our findings …

Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Working Papers

"In this paper I want to begin with the neoclassical supply and demand model of markets (SDM), whose static equilibrium consequences predicted outcomes far more accurately than were anticipated in laboratory experimental tests of the theory actuated by Jevons (1862, 1871; Smith, 1962). The observed predictive accuracy of SDM was not anticipated because complete information on supply and demand was widely believed, thought and taught to be a necessary condition for finding equilibrium. 1 Jevons’ model required him to have complete information in any particular market, as he only articulated a model of market optimal outcomes, and no model of …

Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.