Economic Theory Commons^™

Revisiting The Foundations Of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms, Yi-Chun Chen, Jiangtao Li

Research Collection School Of Economics

An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical foundation for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms in general social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We propose a condition called the uniform shortest-path tree that, under regularity, ensures the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This exposes the underlying logic of the existence of such foundations in the single-unit auction setting, and extends the argument to cases where it was hitherto unknown. To prove this result, we adopt the linear programming approach to mechanism design. In …

Agglomeration And The Extent Of The Market: An Experimental Investigation Into Spatially Coordinated Exchange, Jordan Adamson

ESI Working Papers

How and why do agglomerations emerge? While economic historians emphasize trade and economic geographers emphasize variety, we still don’t understand the role of coordination. I fill this gap by extending the model of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) to formalize Smith’s (1776) theory of agglomeration. I then test the model in a laboratory experiment and find individuals tend to coalesce purely to coordinate exchange, with more agglomeration when there is a larger variety of goods in the economy. I also find that tying individuals to the land reduces agglomeration, but magnifies the effect of variety.

Coordination And Evolutionary Dynamics: When Are Evolutionary Models Reliable?, Daniel Graydon Stephenson

ESI Publications

This study reports a continuous-time experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker–defender games. It implements three experimental treatment conditions: one with strong coordination incentives, one with weak coordination incentives, and one with zero coordination incentives. Each treatment exhibits identical equilibrium predictions but distinct evolutionary predictions. Observed behavior was tightly clustered around equilibrium under both the zero coordination treatment and the weak coordination treatment but widely dispersed from equilibrium under the strong coordination treatment. This result was anticipated by explicitly dynamic models but not by conventional stability criteria. In contrast to the widely maintained assumption of sign-preservation, subjects frequently switched …

Variation Among Populations In The Immune Protein Composition Of Mother's Milk Reflects Subsistence Pattern, Laura D. Klein, Jincui Huang, Elizabeth A. Quinn, Melanie A. Martin, Alicia A. Breakey, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Claudia Valeggia, Grazyna Jasienska, Brooke Scelza, Carlito B. Lebrilla, Katie Hinde

ESI Publications

Lay Summary: Adaptive immune proteins in mothers’ milk are more variable than innate immune proteins across populations and subsistence strategies. These results suggest that the immune defenses in milk are shaped by a mother’s environment throughout her life.

Background and objectives: Mother’s milk contains immune proteins that play critical roles in protecting the infant from infection and priming the infant’s developing immune system during early life. The composition of these molecules in milk, particularly the acquired immune proteins, is thought to reflect a mother’s immunological exposures throughout her life. In this study, we examine the composition of innate …

Do Negative Random Shocks Affect Trust And Trustworthiness?, Hernán Bejarano, Joris Gillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Publications

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are …

Do Negative Random Shocks Affect Trust And Trustworthiness?, Hernán Bejarano, Joris Gillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Publications

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are …

The Supply Side Determinants Of Territory And Conflict, Jordan Adamson, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Working Papers

What determines the geographic extent of territory? We microfound and extend Boulding’s “Loss of Strength Gradient” to predict the extensive and intensive margins of conflict across space. We show how economies of scale in the production of violence and varying costs of projecting violence at a distance combine to affect the geographic distribution of conflict and territory. We test and probe the boundaries of this model in an experiment varying the fixed costs of conflict entry. As predicted, higher fixed costs increase the probability of exclusive territories; median behavior closely tracks equilibrium predictions in all treatments.

Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review …

Black Gold In A Changing World: An Examination Of Saudi Arabia’S Dependence On Oil And The Possibility Of A Solar Energy Transition, Sofia Mouritsen

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

This paper examines Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil, considering the profound effects that the resource has on the domestic, socioeconomic, and international affairs of the Kingdom. It is determined, after examining the economic and environmental factors that make it necessary, that Saudi Arabia must reduce its dependence on oil and diversify its economy, ideally by pursing solar energy. This conclusion is reached by considering Saudi Arabia’s domestic challenges, which include unemployment and rising domestic energy demand, as well as factors such as the price volatility of oil and changing global energy trends. A Saudi transition to solar power is determined …

The Distribution Of Information And The Price Efficiency Of Markets, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’ private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss the implications of our findings …

Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Working Papers

"In this paper I want to begin with the neoclassical supply and demand model of markets (SDM), whose static equilibrium consequences predicted outcomes far more accurately than were anticipated in laboratory experimental tests of the theory actuated by Jevons (1862, 1871; Smith, 1962). The observed predictive accuracy of SDM was not anticipated because complete information on supply and demand was widely believed, thought and taught to be a necessary condition for finding equilibrium. 1 Jevons’ model required him to have complete information in any particular market, as he only articulated a model of market optimal outcomes, and no model of …

Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.

The Onset, Spread, And Prevention Of Mass Atrocities: Perspectives From Network Models, Charles H. Anderton, Jurgen Brauer

Economics Department Working Papers

No abstract provided.

Big Data In Economics, Matthew Harding, Jonathan Hersh

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Big Data refers to data sets of much larger size, higher frequency, and often more personalized information. Examples include data collected by smart sensors in homes or aggregation of tweets on Twitter. In small data sets, traditional econometric methods tend to outperform more complex techniques. In large data sets, however, machine learning methods shine. New analytic approaches are needed to make the most of Big Data in economics. Researchers and policymakers should thus pay close attention to recent developments in machine learning techniques if they want to fully take advantage of these new sources of Big Data.

Essays In New Keynesian Monetary Policy, Tzu-Hao Huang

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

The dissertation consists of three Chapters. I consider New Keynesian models which involve tradeoffs between output gap and inflation variances. Such policy strategy is often referred to as flexible inflation targeting rules (e.g., Lars Svensson 2011, pp.1238-95). Taylor rules, in general, have the symbolic expression ��_t=��_x��_t+��_����_t+��_g��_t, where ��_t is the nominal interest rate at period t, ��_t is the target variable output gap at period t, ��_t is the target variable inflation rate at period t, ��_t is realized shock …

Random Assignment Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Peng Liu

Research Collection School Of Economics

We study the random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The key difference between the setting with bundles and the setting with objects (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is one of feasibility. The implications of this difference are significant. First, the characterization of sd-efficient random assignments is fundamentally different. Second, a possibility result in the setting with objects fails in the setting with bundles. However, in the setting with bundles, we are able to identify a preference restriction, called essential monotonicity, under which the random serial dictatorship rule (extended to the setting with bundles) is equivalent to the probabilistic …

Sharing Sequential Values In A Network, Ruben Juarez, Yu Ko Chiu, Jingyi Xue

Research Collection School Of Economics

Consider a sequential process where agents have individual values at every possible step. A planner is in charge of selecting steps and distributing the accumulated aggregate values among a number of agents. We model this process by a directed network, whereby each edge is associated with a vector of individual values. This model applies to several new and existing problems, e.g. developing a connected public facility and distributing total values received by surrounding districts, selecting a long-term production project and sharing final profits among partners of a firm, or choosing a machine schedule to serve different tasks and distributing total …

Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power, Tom Campbell, Nathaniel T. Wilcox

ESI Working Papers

From 1960 to 2015, Federal District Court opinions involving challenges to Executive Branch authority show that U.S. Federal District Court judges (trial judges) support such authority less as they age, with a sharp decline beginning near age 57. We argue that District judges know that elevation to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to ‘cooperate’ with the Executive, with advancing age. Political variables (and other variables) introduced as extra regressors do not reverse our main results. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their Circuit courts, District judges in the eleven State Circuits …

Traveling With Joel, Peter Mclaren

Education Faculty Articles and Research

"Kovel’s contributions to a critique of psychiatry, of political theory and of the ruination of the biosphere have been pathfinding, highly revered, and reviewed and debated in highly prestigious journals and publications such as The New York Times. His work with revolutionaries around the globe (including sojourns in Nicaragua during the Sandinista revolution as just one of many examples), and his achievements alongside some of the leading political activists worldwide have secured for Kovel a premier place in the history of the left. But notoriety is not what drives Kovel’s work. What drives Kovel’s work is a relentless struggle for …

Partners Or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, And The Choice Of Scale Of Interaction, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a monetary system, participants were reluctant to interact on a large scale; and when they did, efficiency plummeted compared to partnerships because cooperation collapsed. This failure was reversed only when a stable monetary system endogenously emerged: the institution of money mitigated strategic uncertainty problems.