Lessons Learned: Philip Lane,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Lessons Learned: Philip Lane, Mary Anne Chute Lynch, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Philip Lane served as governor of the Central Bank of Ireland from 2015 to 2019. He introduced countercyclical capital and systemic buffer tools and initiated research into the role and risks of cross-border inflows across Ireland. As a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) since 2015, Lane has advocated for the European Union to adopt macroprudential policies and tools. He hailed the work of the European Systemic Risk Board and similar institutions established after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis to share data, information concerning risks, and concerns over financial …
Lessons Learned: J. Christopher Flowers,
2025
Yale University
Lessons Learned: J. Christopher Flowers, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
J. Christopher Flowers has been managing director, CEO, and chairman of the private investment firm J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC for many years. During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009, Flowers was involved with investing in some of the largest banks and financial institutions in the world and advising and consulting with them on possible acquisitions, mergers, and sales as several of these firms began to collapse. In the fall of 2008, Flowers worked closely with the Bank of America (BofA) on proposals to acquire Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, and he developed a plan for private investors to …
Lessons Learned: Giorgio Gobbi,
2025
Yale University
Lessons Learned: Giorgio Gobbi, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Giorgio Gobbi joined the Economic Research Department of the Bank of Italy in 1990 and was assigned to carry out analysis and research on the banking industry. From 1998 to 2004, he headed the department’s Financial Intermediaries Office and represented the bank at the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of International Settlements, and the European Central Bank. Starting in 2007, Gobbi headed the Financial Structure and Intermediaries Division within the bank’s Structural Economic Analysis Department. He was appointed deputy head of the Financial Stability Unit in 2013 and became head of the Financial Stability Directorate in 2014.
Eliminating Discount Window Stigma: What Can We Learn From Abroad?,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Eliminating Discount Window Stigma: What Can We Learn From Abroad?, Susan Mclaughlin
Journal of Financial Crises
This article picks up from an earlier Journal of Financial Crisis policy note on discount window design to see how the experiences of other central banks can inform work to redesign the discount window to reduce stigma. As explained in that article, banks’ reluctance to use the discount window is problematic for financial stability as it constrains the Fed’s ability to use its liquidity provision tools to stem runs and mitigate contagion in times of stress. The stigma associated with discount window borrowing in the United States is well documented and is a multifaceted phenomenon.
Lessons Learned: Jesper Berg,
2025
Yale University
Lessons Learned: Jesper Berg, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
The career of Jesper Berg, a Danish economist, has spanned multiple financial crises. He held positions with the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, from 2004 to 2010, first as head of market operations and later as head of financial stability. He had served as head of the capital markets and financial structure division at the European Central Bank from 2000 to 2004, and earlier he was an economist at the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange and Trade Relations Department. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Berg in December 2022, when he was director general of the Danish …
Liquidity Facilities Provided To Banks During The Dominican Republic Financial Crisis Of 2003,
2025
Financial Stability Subdirectorate, CBDR
Liquidity Facilities Provided To Banks During The Dominican Republic Financial Crisis Of 2003, Marco Porfirio Martínez
Journal of Financial Crises
As part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (CBDR) released a comprehensive document providing an overview of the origins and handling of the 2003 financial crisis. This Archive Note builds on the highlights of that document by discussing primary factors that led to problems within Banco Intercontinental (Baninter), the bank that triggered the crisis; detailing measures the CBDR implemented to mitigate the situation; and addressing the consequences for two other major banks, Banco Mercantil and Bancrédito.
United States: Lehman Brothers Broker-Dealer Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008,
2025
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy
United States: Lehman Brothers Broker-Dealer Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Steven Kelly
Journal of Financial Crises
On Sunday, September 14, 2008, a deal to sell the United States investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) to United Kingdom–based Barclays fell apart. US authorities informed LBHI that, given the lack of rescue funds, it would need to file for bankruptcy before Monday morning to avoid additional chaos for the firm and markets. However, authorities understood Barclays was still interested in buying Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI). Federal Reserve and Treasury officials were concerned about the impact that the sudden failure of LBI could have on financial markets. LBI had $87 billion in secured overnight repurchase …
United States: First Republic Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United States: First Republic Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Salil Gupta, Jack French, Steven Kelly
Journal of Financial Crises
First Republic Bank, a California-based institution with $212.6 billion in assets, lost $25 billion in deposits on Friday, March 10, 2023, following the closing of Silicon Valley Bank that morning. On Sunday, March 12, First Republic announced that it had access to $70 billion in unused liquidity owing to its borrowing capacity at the Federal Reserve, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and JPMorgan Chase (JPMC). But First Republic’s depositors withdrew a further $40 billion of deposits on Monday, March 13. First Republic’s borrowings from the Federal Reserve rose as high as $109 billion between Friday, March 10, and Wednesday, …
United States: Citigroup Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United States: Citigroup Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
By November 21, 2008, against the backdrop of heavy losses during the Global Financial Crisis, Citigroup counterparties were substantially pulling back from the firm. On November 23, the US Department of the Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve announced a support package for Citi composed of a capital injection and a loss-sharing arrangement on $300.8 billion of assets. Under the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), Citi would absorb the first $39.5 billion in losses on a mutually agreed upon pool of risky assets; the Treasury and FDIC provided $15 billion in loss protection after that, combined with Citi’s …
United States: Bear Stearns Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2008,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United States: Bear Stearns Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2008, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
On Thursday, March 13, 2008, the US investment bank Bear Stearns Companies approached the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), saying it expected many of its repurchase agreement (repo) counterparties would not “roll,” or renew, their repo agreements the next day. As a result, the firm would be obligated to repay many of its repo liabilities. Without an emergency loan, Bear would be forced to file for bankruptcy on Friday morning, March 14. Before the market opened on Friday, the FRBNY made an overnight loan for $12.9 billion through JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC) on a nonrecourse basis, which on-lent …
United States: Bank Of America Emergency Liquidity Program, 2009,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United States: Bank Of America Emergency Liquidity Program, 2009, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
On December 31, 2008, Bank of America (BofA) finalized its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, absorbing losses of $15.5 billion as a result. Regulators were concerned about BofA’s short-term liquidity position and ability to post more collateral if its credit rating was downgraded. On January 16, 2009, the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Department of the Treasury announced an interagency support package to BofA, which included an asset guarantee wherein all three agencies shared losses with BofA on a “ring-fenced” $118 billion pool of assets. Under the ring-fencing arrangement, known as the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), BofA would …
United Kingdom: Northern Rock Emergency Liquidity Program, 2007,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United Kingdom: Northern Rock Emergency Liquidity Program, 2007, Bailey Decker, Jack French, Eming Shyu
Journal of Financial Crises
Northern Rock plc was a bank in the United Kingdom (UK) that experienced rapid growth from 1998 to 2007. The bank was a large issuer of UK residential mortgage-backed securities. Its funding was primarily wholesale as its retail deposit growth had not kept up with its asset growth. By August 2007, Northern Rock’s credit default swap spreads were widening and its share price falling as conditions deteriorated in the markets on which it relied for short-term funding. To meet the bank’s substantial liquidity needs, the Bank of England (BoE) announced on September 14, 2007, that it would extend an emergency …
United Kingdom: Hbos And Rbs Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United Kingdom: Hbos And Rbs Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker, Jack French
Journal of Financial Crises
Two United Kingdom–based banks, Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), faced substantial liquidity needs during fall of 2008. To provide funding until recapitalization, the Bank of England (BoE) extended ad hoc emergency liquidity facilities to HBOS on October 1 and to RBS on October 7, 2008, comprising US dollars (USD) and British pounds sterling (GBP). As collateral for the 2008 assistance, HBOS and RBS posted pools of loans that were ineligible for the BoE’s market-wide operations. Aggregate usage of the two ad hoc facilities peaked at GBP 61.5 billion (USD 106.0 billion) on October …
Switzerland: Credit Suisse Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Switzerland: Credit Suisse Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Jack French, Owen Heaphy, Steven Kelly
Journal of Financial Crises
Credit Suisse (CS) faced multiple challenges leading up to March 2023 including a significant outflow of client funds in the fourth quarter of 2022 and reputational loss resulting from a number of scandals in the preceding years. On Wednesday, March 15, 2023, shortly after two high-profile bank failures in the United States, a high-ranking official of the Saudi National Bank, a major shareholder, publicly said it would not provide any more capital for the company. Despite a joint statement from the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) that CS was in compliance with capital …
Sweden: Carnegie Investment Bank Ab Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Sweden: Carnegie Investment Bank Ab Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Jack French
Journal of Financial Crises
In October 2008, Carnegie Investment Bank AB (Carnegie) had trouble obtaining financing amid concerns about its financial health. However, Sweden’s central bank, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) still viewed Carnegie as solvent. Between October 27 and 28, the Riksbank lent Carnegie 2.4 billion Swedish kronor (SEK). As collateral for the loan, Carnegie and its holding company, D. Carnegie & Co. AB (D. Carnegie), provided all shares and subsidiaries in Carnegie as well as all shares in a sister subsidiary under D. Carnegie, Max Matthiessen Holding AB (Max Matthiessen). On November 10, 2008, the FSA …
Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Journal of Financial Crises
Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding between 2000 and 2008, Caja de Ahorros de Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009. Normally, a Eurosystem bank in CCM’s position would turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to obtain liquidity through its standing financing facilities, but CCM lacked eligible collateral to tap them. Consequently, in February 2009, the Bank of Spain (BoS) provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of EUR 900 million to CCM, secured against CCM assets, to help meet its liquidity needs. In March, …
Russia: Otkritie Emergency Liquidity Program, 2017,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Russia: Otkritie Emergency Liquidity Program, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner
Journal of Financial Crises
In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced deposit runs related to concerns over Otkritie’s recent acquisitions, including a large, troubled bank and insurance company. The runs prompted Otkritie to heavily rely on the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR’s) standing fixed-rate repurchase agreement (repo) facility to meet the outflow. By July, Otkritie had RUB 338.1 billion in outstanding repo loans from the CBR. As depositors continued to withdraw funds in August, the CBR provided Otkritie with an unsecured emergency loan of RUB 330 billion while Otkritie continued to borrow from the repo facility. On August …
Moldova: Consortium Of Banks Emergency Liquidity Program, 2014,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Moldova: Consortium Of Banks Emergency Liquidity Program, 2014, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
In the fall of 2014, a bank fraud involving illegal loans and transfers resulted in USD 1 billion being stolen from the government of Moldova, which amounted to more than an eighth of Moldova’s GDP. In September 2014, it became clear to the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) that the banks involved in the fraud—Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala, and Unibank—were deeply insolvent and had been hiding that fact from regulators. In late November, the NBM issued 9.4 billion Moldovan lei (MDL; USD 640 million) in emergency credit to the banks at an interest rate of 10 basis points against …
Latvia: Parex Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Latvia: Parex Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker
Journal of Financial Crises
Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall owing to massive credit and market losses in addition to liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (LVL; USD 428.6 million). Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million). Latvian authorities said they doubted that Parex would be able to pay back, extend, or replace these loans. Authorities intervened at the …
Italy: Banco Ambrosiano Emergency Liquidity Program, 1982,
2025
Pfizer Portfolio & Decision Analysis
Italy: Banco Ambrosiano Emergency Liquidity Program, 1982, Kopal Ardimento
Journal of Financial Crises
On June 14, 1982, prompted by the disappearance of Banco Ambrosiano (BA) CEO Roberto Calvi, the Bank of Italy opened an investigation into BA, which revealed to the market BA’s 1.9 trillion–2.2 trillion Italian lire (ITL; USD 1.4 billion–USD 1.6 billion) in questionable foreign loans. The Treasury Ministry deemed intervention necessary because BA’s collapse would compromise the credibility of the Italian banking system abroad. Attempts to appeal to the Vatican Bank to honor guarantees it had made against these foreign loans failed. The Bank of Italy worried that runs on deposits would further impair BA while authorities explored alternatives to …
