Economic Theory Commons^™

Poking Holes And Adding Points In Dictator Games, James C. Cox, Cary Deck, Laura Razzolini, Vjollca Sadiraj

ESI Working Papers

Deviations from choices predicted by self-regarding preferences have regularly been observed in standard dictator games. Such behavior is not inconsistent with conventional preference theory or revealed preference theory, which accommodate other-regarding preferences. By contrast, experiments in which giving nothing is not the least generous feasible act produce data that is inconsistent with conventional preference theory including social preference models and suggest the possible relevance of reference point models. Two such models are the reference-dependent theory of riskless choice with loss aversion and choice monotonicity in moral reference points. Our experiment includes novel treatments designed to challenge both theoretical models of …

Competition Through Entry Fees Between Auctions For Differentiated Objects, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci, Domenico Colucci

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper considers two competing auctions with objects differentiated according to the random utility framework introduced in Perloff and Salop (1985): bidders privately observe their values for the two objects, and values are ex ante i.i.d. across objects and across bidders. For the case of uniform distribution of values, we show that competition under entry fees is less intense than competition under reserve prices in the sense that sellers are better off, and bidders are worse off when competition takes place with entry fees rather than under reserve prices. The key difference between the two settings is that undercutting under …

How Fair Workweek Laws Affect Labor Markets: A New York City Case Study, Joseph Pickens, Aaron Sojourner

Employment Research Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence, Yongjoon Kim, Afia Promi, Jiatong Xue, Cary Deck

ESI Working Papers

As disputants increasingly rely upon arbitration it is critical to understand outcomes that are likely to arise from mechanisms like final offer arbitration. While a sizable experimental literature investigating strategic behavior in final offer arbitration exists, that work has overwhelmingly focused on situations where the arbitrator’s beliefs about the appropriate resolution are symmetric and uninfluenced by the disputants’ cases. This paper considers a setting where the arbitrator’s beliefs depend on the strength of each disputant’s case. We find disputant responses to changes in the relative strength of their case generally follow comparative statics predictions. Further, we find that final offers …

Object Play In Tsimane Children: Implications For Sex-Specific Division Of Labour, Ava Moser, Michael D. Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Benjamin C. Trumble, Jonathan Stieglitz, Paul Hooper, Daniel Cummings, Adrian Jaeggi, Kathelijne Koops

ESI Publications

Sex-specific division of labour and the associated use of different subsistence techniques by males (e.g. hunting) and females (e.g. gathering) has played an important role in shaping human societies. Skills needed in adulthood are practiced in play during childhood and object play has been proposed to foster tool-use skills necessary for adult subsistence techniques. Here, we investigated sex differences in the ontogeny of object play in Tsimane children in Bolivia to understand its potential role in shaping gender-specific adult roles. We used observational data (>80,000 scan samples) from nine Tsimane communities collected between 2002 and 2007. We analysed age …

How Fair Workweek Laws Affect Labor Markets: A New York City Case Study, Joseph Pickens, Aaron Sojourner

Upjohn Institute Policy and Research Briefs

No abstract provided.

Learning About Stability Of Risk Preferences, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Classical theories posit that risk preferences are stable across decision contexts. Two branches of empirical literature assess this claim. Structural approaches examine within-person consistency of model-based estimates of risk aversion, while “model-free” approaches examine within-person correlations of risky choices. We elucidate the latent structure underlying the model-free approach. Using this structure, we develop a new approach to assessing preference stability that has stronger testable implications, and we partially identify features of stability and heterogeneity of risk preferences. Our study illustrates a general principle: partial identification through minimal assumptions grounded in economic theory robustly bridges fully structural and model-free methods.

Coordination In Time, Lars Boerner, Erik O. Kimbrough, Mouli Modak

ESI Working Papers

We study how well people are able to solve pure coordination problems in continuous time. Subjects decide whether and when to pay a cost to go to market with their goods and earn money only if another person shows up at the same time. We show that coordination failure is common in a baseline, and we introduce treatments that feature public coordination devices (meant to mimic clocks) and assess the extent to which coordination improves when such devices are provided via different institutions. A publicly provided device outperforms a variety of privately provided alternatives. Our evidence suggests this is because …

Robust Contracting Under Distributional Uncertainty, Jiangtao Li, Kexin Wang

Research Collection School of Economics

We study contract design when the principal has limited information about the output distributions induced by the agent's actions. In a baseline model where only the means are known, we show that increasing affine contracts are robustly optimal. The mean restrictions accommodate a wide range of output distributions, including extreme cases that help establish this optimality. We then extend the analysis to environments with additional constraints on the distributions. Our main result shows that the robust optimality of increasing affine contracts persists even when the principal knows more—for example, that each action induces a distribution with full support.

Minimum Resale Price Maintenance In The Absence Of Point-Of-Sale Service, Agency Or Free-Rider Problems, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper De Vries

ESI Working Papers

We show that MRPM can increase manufacturer profits and total output even in the ab- sence of traditional justifications based on point-of-sale services, retailer effort, or free-riding. The key insight is that MRPM mitigates channel conflict by altering how retailers balance extracting surplus from loyal customers and competing for price-sensitive shoppers. When a manufacturer optimally chooses a wholesale price and MRPM policy, this can intensify com- petition and create systematic distributional effects: prices fall for loyal consumers but rise for shoppers, and the profits of smaller, shopper-dependent retailers decline. We characterize the conditions under which MRPM raises output, benefits a …

Building Reputation: State-Sponsored Rebellions And Transnational Identities, Marion Mercier, Arthur Silve, Benjamin Tremblay-Auger

ESI Working Papers

States sometimes back rebellions abroad to signal resolve. We study this reputation-building logic in international relations, focusing on co-ethnic links between countries as an objective source of variation in a state’s incentives to demonstrate resolve. We formally derive two interconnected predictions from the mechanism: (a) a state is more likely to endorse the uprising of a foreign group when facing a larger audience, resulting in (b) greater political inclusion for the group. We build a comprehensive panel dataset of co-ethnic rebellion sponsorship, and find evidence consistent with both predictions.

Tokenization And Interconnectedness: A Numerical Exploration, Alessandro Gioffré, Gabriele Camera

ESI Working Papers

Tokenization of assets has multiple implications for the operation of financial markets, among which are mitigating trade frictions and improving the interconnectedness of financial firms. This feature—if not properly managed—can propagate shocks more widely as compared to a traditional system. We study this double-edged aspect of tokenization using a matching model that makes explicit how firms are exposed to counterparty risk. We propose a way to manage this increased risk, through Financial Transactions Limiters, which exploit the technical advantages of tokenization in monitoring financial transactions of individual firms. We numerically analyze the possible social welfare consequences of tokenization, in …

What Kind Of Economists Do We Want? From A One-Track To A Two-Track Mind, Magnus Henrekson, Lars Jonung, Mats Lundahl

Economic and Business Review

We explore the challenges facing the current academic training of economists in small European countries such as Sweden. The monolithic focus on publishing in the top-five journals, which prioritizes methodological rigor over problem-driven research, is often a threat to social relevance and policy applicability. This limits pluralism, excludes many talented economists, and fails to prepare graduates for nonacademic positions. We propose a two-track model for PhD training and academic evaluation, emphasizing both traditional research and applied economic policy, tailored to the diverse needs of academia, public administration, and business. We also argue for broader evaluation criteria, enhanced interdisciplinary collaboration, and …

Multidimensional Arbitration, Cary Deck, Paul Pecorino, Brian R. Powers

ESI Working Papers

Most analyses of arbitration consider disputes over a single dimensional issue; however, in many situations more than one issue can be in dispute. In a labor context, the parties may disagree on the hourly wage, number of paid holidays, and fringe benefits as well as other conditions of employment. In addition to conventional arbitration (CA), two variants of multidimensional final-offer arbitration (FOA) are employed in practice. Under one version of FOA, the arbitrator must pick the entire package submitted by one of the disputants. Under the other version of FOA, the arbitrator can select elements from each disputant’s final offer …

Analisis Dampak Kebijakan Insentif Fiskal Terhadap Tingkat Komponen Dalam Negeri (Tkdn) Industri Manufaktur Di Indonesia, Muhammad Muhammad, Riyanto Riyanto

Jurnal Kebijakan Ekonomi

Over the last decade, the manufacturing sector's contribution to Indonesia's economy has declined. In 2010, it was 29.10% of GDP, but by 2022, it had dropped to 19.14%. Employment in the sector also fell, from 14.91% of the workforce in 2010 to 13.80% in 2022. To reverse this trend, the government introduced a policy to boost the Domestic Component Level (DCL) in manufacturing. By offering fiscal incentives to industries meeting certain DCL targets, the government aims to drive economic growth and job creation. A study using BPS data from 2008-2019 shows that this policy raised DCL by 23.5%.

Dampak Jumlah Kredit Yang Dimiliki Rumah Tangga Terhadap Kekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga (Kdrt) Pada Anak Di Indonesia, Anjar Maulitfiani, Dwini Handayani

Jurnal Kebijakan Ekonomi

This study examines the impact of intensity of household debt on domestic violence (DV) towards children in Indonesia. There is a positive relationship between the amount of household debt and the likelihood of domestic violence towards children based on literature review. This research uses a quantitative method with multinomial logistic regression analysis. The results of this study indicate that households with more than one household debt are correlated with an increased likelihood of both psychological and physical domestic violence towards children compared to the likelihood of no domestic violence, both before and after controlling variables added.

Revisiting Kin And Ethnic Favoritism In The Bribery Experiment, Mahsa Akbari, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Erik O. Kimbrough

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We report a conceptual replication of Akbari et al. (2020), who study the impact of co-ethnicity and kinship on behavior in an experimental “bribery game”. In the game, player A can offer a bribe to B, who can help A by inefficiently transferring resources from passive third-party C. We replicate the finding that by varying the relatedness of A, B and C, we can substantially modulate the willingness of A to offer the bribe and the willingness of B to reciprocate the bribe by harming C. The findings are consistent with theories of kin altruism and ethnic favoritism.

The Discouraging Effect Of Overconfidence, Cary Deck, Klajdi Bregu

ESI Publications

Overconfidence is often viewed as encouraging entrepreneurs and CEOs to follow risky strategies such as entering new markets, engaging in innovation, or pursuing mergers and acquisitions. While such undertakings can generate excess returns and profits, overconfidence is frequently offered as an explanation for why so many business ventures fail. However, we show that in a setting where the decision maker does not know whether success is possible, theoretically, overconfidence can also have a discouraging effect, causing one to give up too soon. This counterintuitive result is driven by effectively misattributing one's own failure to an elevated assessment of the chance …

Ectopic Adipose Tissue In Subsistence Populations With Minimal Coronary Disease, Large Left Atria, And Very Low Rates Of Atrial Fibrillation, Randall C. Thompson, Benjamin C. Trumble, Daniel K. Cummings, Angela D. Neunuebel, Paul L. Hooper, Samuel Wann, Adel H. Allam, Frances Neunuebel, Benjamin D. Gans, Samantha I. King, Edmond Seabright, Caleb E. Finch, Margaret Gatz, Kenneth Buetow, Michael I. Miyamoto, Guido P. Lombardi, M. Linda Sutherland, James D. Sutherland, Christopher J. Ward, Madeleine J. Lee, Ashna Mahadev, Daniel Eid Rodriguez, David E. Michalik, Chris J. Rowan, Tianyu Cao, Jonathan Stieglitz, Cameron M. Quick, Gregory S. Thomas, Jagat Narula, Damini Dey, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan

ESI Publications

Background

Methods

My Performance Over Yours: Earned Entitlement, Performance, Luck, And Deservingness In Giving, Andrej Angelovski, Praveen Kujal, Jose M. Ortiz

ESI Working Papers

We study how three widely discussed cues—source of income (merit vs luck), own performance, and information about others’ work status and performance—shape redistribution. Prior to the dictator game, all 306 dictators and most of the 306 recipients complete the same real-effort matrix task in an online experiment that would yield either $4 or $1 for the dictators. In the Performance treatment the dictator’s payoff is based on their performance; in Luck, it is assigned by a 50-50 draw. We find that: (i) Earned entitlement is prevalent for high-performing dictators: they keep more for themselves; (ii) Earned entitlement is conditional …