Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding,
2016
University of Groningen
Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding, J. H. Van Hateren
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) argue that insects have sentience because of functional similarities between the insect brain and vertebrate midbrain. Based on a recent theory of agency and consciousness, I argue that the functional similarities merely point to an advanced form of agency. Insects presumably lack the capacity for social bonding that may be required for subjective experiencing.
Reflexivity: A First Demonstration,
2016
Purdue University
Reflexivity: A First Demonstration, Melissa Jane Swisher
Open Access Dissertations
Currently, the emergent relation of reflexivity after training a set of baseline relations has not been demonstrated with any animal—human or nonhuman. True reflexivity can only be demonstrated if no identity (i.e., physically matching stimulus) relations are trained. In six experiments, the emergence of reflexivity and its opposite, anti-reflexivity, were explored. Pigeons received concurrent successive matching training on two or three arbitrary tasks: AB hue-form and BC form-hue (and AC hue-hue) matching. Once they had acquired these tasks, they were tested for BB (form-form) reflexivity or BB’ (form-form) anti-reflexivity matching. Most (10 of 13) pigeons that received three arbitrary tasks …
Analysis Of The Intricacies Of Substrate Recognition Of High Mobility Group Proteins And Aminoacyl-Trna Synthetases Using Non-Cognate Substrates,
2016
University of Southern Mississippi
Analysis Of The Intricacies Of Substrate Recognition Of High Mobility Group Proteins And Aminoacyl-Trna Synthetases Using Non-Cognate Substrates, Douglas Van Iverson Ii
Dissertations
The studies presented in section 1 (Chapters I-IV) focus on the design and development of nucleic acid four-way junctions (4WJs) to target a member of the high mobility group (HMG) proteins, the proinflammatory cytokine high mobility group box 1 protein (HMGB1). In the present study, hybrid PNA-DNA 4WJs based on a model DNA 4WJ were constructed to improve the thermal stability of 4WJs while maintaining strong binding affinity toward HMGB1. An electrophoretic mobility shift assay (EMSA) was used to examine the binding affinity of an isolated DNA binding domain of HMGB1, the HMGB1 b-box (HMGB1b), toward a set of PNA-DNA …
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness,
2016
Psychology, University of Lethbridge
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Animal Sentience
Insects might have been the first invertebrates to evolve sentience, but cephalopods were the first invertebrates to gain scientific recognition for it.
Caterpillars, Consciousness And The Origins Of Mind,
2016
University of British Columbia
Caterpillars, Consciousness And The Origins Of Mind, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as "mind" and "consciousness," are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual and empirical virtues, among them: (a) it (re)solves the problem of how minds are created by brains ─ also known as the "Hard Problem" (Chalmers 1995) ─ by revealing that the apparent difficulty results from a category error, (b) it …
Graemeloweus, A New Scorpion Genus From Northern California, Usa (Scorpiones: Vaejovidae),
2016
Marshall University
Graemeloweus, A New Scorpion Genus From Northern California, Usa (Scorpiones: Vaejovidae), Michael E. Soleglad, Victor Fet, Matthew R. Graham, Richard F. Ayrey
Euscorpius
Genus Graemeloweus, gen. nov. (Scorpiones: Vaejovidae) is described from northern California, USA. The genus is composed of three species formerly placed in Pseudouroctonus: Graemeloweus iviei (Gertsch et Soleglad, 1972), comb. nov. (type species), G. glimmei (Hjelle, 1972), comb. nov., and G. maidu (Savary et Bryson, 2016), comb. nov. Major diagnostic characters of Graemeloweus include a non-bifurcated primary lamellar hook, the presence of a secondary lamellar hook, a complex mating plug with a two part base and an asymmetric crescent-shape barb, and the presence of a well-developed ventromedian (V2) carina on the pedipalp chela. Evidence is presented suggesting that …
Animals Are Agents,
2016
University of Michigan
Animals Are Agents, Linda A.W. Brakel
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands’s (2016) target article invites us to consider individuals in a broad subset of the non-human animal world as genuine persons. His account features animals reacting to salient environmental stimuli as Gibsonian affordances, which is indicative of “pre-reflective self-awareness.” He holds that such pre-reflective self-awareness is both “immune to error through misidentification” (Shoemaker, 1968) and a necessary precursor to reflective consciousness and personhood. I agree. In this commentary I hope to extend Rowlands’s work with a view in which agency is an even more fundamental precursor and one can (and should) consider individuals throughout the entire animal kingdom as …
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vi. Compsobuthus Vachon, 1949 (Buthidae), With A Description Of C. Eritreaensis Sp. N.,
2016
Charles University
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vi. Compsobuthus Vachon, 1949 (Buthidae), With A Description Of C. Eritreaensis Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, Jana Plíšková, František Šťáhlavský
Euscorpius
All four Compsobuthus species of the Horn of Africa were newly collected, C. werneri firstly collected in Eritrea and C. eritreaensis sp. n. discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016. Information is provided about their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as their habitat. The hemispermatophore of C. eritreaensis sp. n. is illustrated and described. In addition to morphological analysis, we also describe the karyotype of C. eritreaensis sp. n. (2n=22).
A New Species Of Diplocentrus (Scorpionidae: Diplocentrinae) From Western Izabal, Guatemala,
2016
Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala
A New Species Of Diplocentrus (Scorpionidae: Diplocentrinae) From Western Izabal, Guatemala, Luis F. De Armas, Rony E. Trujillo
Euscorpius
Diplocentrus izabal sp. n. is herein described on basis to one male (holotype) and two females from El Estor municipality, Izabal department, eastern Guatemala. It seems to be a close relative of Diplocentrus lachua Armas, Trujillo & Agreda, 2012, from which it differs by having carapace almost smooth, with anteromedian notch V-shaped; pectines with 11 teeth in both sexes, and carapace clearly longer than pedipalp manus and metasomal segment V (D. lachua has carapace minutely granulate, with anteromedian notch U-shaped; pectines with 13 teeth in the males (female unknown), and carapace as long as both pedipalp manus and metasomal …
Implicit Mental Processes Are An Improbable Basis For Personhood,
2016
East Tennessee State University
Implicit Mental Processes Are An Improbable Basis For Personhood, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to create the unity of conscious thought required for personhood. For him pre-reflective awareness does not include intentionality and is probably an unconscious process. I suggest that his sense of implicit leads to significant difficulties for his argument and that including intentionality in the definition of a first-person perspective provides a stronger base for viewing animals as persons.
Are Animals Persons?,
2016
University of Miami
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person” is restricted to self-aware creatures: humans (above a certain age) and possibly some of the great apes and cetaceans. I argue that this orthodoxy should be rejected, because it rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. Replacing this with a sense of self-awareness that is relevant requires us to accept that personhood is much more widely distributed through the animal kingdom.
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience,
2016
Macquarie University, Australia
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
To what degree are non-human animals conscious? We propose that the most meaningful way to approach this question is from the perspective of functional neurobiology. Here we focus on subjective experience, which is a basic awareness of the world without further reflection on that awareness. This is considered the most basic form of consciousness. Tellingly, this capacity is supported by the integrated midbrain and basal ganglia structures, which are among the oldest and most highly conserved brain systems in vertebrates. A reasonable inference is that the capacity for subjective experience is both widespread and evolutionarily old within the vertebrate lineage. …
Utilitarianism Generalized To Include Animals,
2016
Nanyang Technological University
Utilitarianism Generalized To Include Animals, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
In response to the seventeen commentaries to date on my target article on reducing animal suffering, I propose that the term “welfarism” (when used pejoratively by animal advocates) should be qualified as “anthropocentric welfarism” so as to leave “welfarism” simpliciter to be used in its generic sense of efforts to improve conditions for those who need it. Welfarism in this benign sense — even in its specific utilitarian form (maximizing the sum total of net welfare) with long-term future effects and effects on others (including animals) appropriately taken into account — should be unobjectionable (even if not considered sufficient by …
Molecular Response Of Spartina Alterniflora To The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
2016
University of South Florida
Molecular Response Of Spartina Alterniflora To The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Mariano Alvarez
USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations
Although the “genome as a blueprint” metaphor has been pervasive in biology, recent advances in molecular biology have revealed a complex network of regulatory machinery that dynamically regulated molecular processes in response to environmental conditions. However, these patterns, as well as the evolutionary processes that underlie them, remain understudied in natural conditions. In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill released an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, making landfall on salt marsh habitat dominated by the foundation species Spartina alterniflora. Despite the severe impacts to phenotype and fitness, S. alterniflora proved remarkably resilient in …
Cross-Species Mind-Reading,
2016
Université du Québec à Montréal & University of Southampton
Cross-Species Mind-Reading, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
We can never be sure anyone else is sentient. But we can be sure enough in the case of other people, nonhuman primates, mammals, birds, fish, lower vertebrates and invertebrates as to make scepticism academic and otiose (not to mention monumentally cruel). The only genuinely uncertain kinds of cases are jellyfish, microbes and plants. The rest is not about whether but what they are feeling.
My Orgasms Cannot Be Traded Off Against Others’ Agony,
2016
Université du Québec à Montréal & University of Southampton
My Orgasms Cannot Be Traded Off Against Others’ Agony, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
Only I can calculate my own welfare as net pleasure minus pain. No one else can do that calculation for me – nor for a population, and especially not averaging across some individuals’ pleasure and other individuals’ pain. Pain and pleasure are incommensurable and only pain matters morally. To maximize welfare is to minimize pain.
In Praise Of Fishes: Précis Of What A Fish Knows (Balcombe 2016),
2016
Humane Society Institute for Science and Policy
In Praise Of Fishes: Précis Of What A Fish Knows (Balcombe 2016), Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
Our relationship to fishes in the modern era is deeply problematic. We kill and consume more of them than any other group of vertebrates. At the same time, advances in our knowledge of fishes and their capabilities are gaining speed. Fish species diversity exceeds that of all other vertebrates combined, with a wide range of sensory adaptations, some of them (e.g., geomagnetism, water pressure and movement detection, and communication via electricity) alien to our own sensory experience. The evidence for pain in fishes (despite persistent detractors) is strongly supported by anatomical, physiological and behavioral studies. It is likely that fishes …
Sentience As Moral Consideration And Disvalue In Nature,
2016
Animal Ethics
Sentience As Moral Consideration And Disvalue In Nature, Daniel Dorado
Animal Sentience
In recent work Ng assumes that it is good to engage in activities aimed at promoting ecosystem conservation. The only way Ng can derive this from the axiology he assumes (the view that wellbeing is the only intrinsically valuable or disvaluable thing) would be to assume that ecosystem conservation would benefit the individuals involved. This can be so as long as value prevails over disvalue in the target environments. Ng seems to assume this is indeed the case, but he does not explain why, and it is a claim that goes against the conclusions he has argued for previously (Ng …
Inalienable Rights And Pluralism In Animal Advocacy,
2016
Istanbul Technical University
Inalienable Rights And Pluralism In Animal Advocacy, Beril Sözmen
Animal Sentience
I comment on two of Ng’s suggestions. There is a lack of support for his suggestion that some experiments on individual animals will be useful for future success, so they should be permitted. I also question his recommendation that animal advocacy should focus on farmed animals first and wild animals later. The lack of solid support for why this would be a more effective strategy leads me to suggest a more pluralistic support of a variety of types of advocacy.
Changing Attitudes Towards Animals In The Wild And Speciesism,
2016
University of Santiago de Compostela
Changing Attitudes Towards Animals In The Wild And Speciesism, Oscar Horta
Animal Sentience
I argue that despite Ng’s claim that we should postpone the defense of those animals that live in the wild, we do have reasons to start spreading concern for them now. We can do it by (i) changing public attitude by heightening awareness of speciesism, by which we will also challenge animal exploitation; and (ii) by disseminating information about the situation of animals in the wild.
