Another New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From The Taurus Mountains In Antalya Province, Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae),
2016
Celal Bayar University
Another New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From The Taurus Mountains In Antalya Province, Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur, Aristeidis Parmakelis, Kadir Boğaç Kunt
Euscorpius
A new scorpion species, Euscorpius alanyaensis sp. n., is described based on specimens collected from the Taurus Mountains in Antalya Province (Alanya District) in southern Turkey. It is a sibling species of the recently described E. gocmeni Tropea et al., 2014, and similarly, the new species is also characterized by a high trichobothrial count (Pv = 9–11, et = 7, em = 4, and eb = 4), a high pectinal teeth count (Dp = 9–11 in males, 8 in females), medium-small size, and light to medium brown-reddish colour. In addition, for the first time a phylogenetic …
How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?,
2016
Goldsmiths, University of London
How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans
Animal Sentience
The sudden appearance of consciousness that Reber posits in creatures with flexible cell walls and motility rather than non-flexible cells walls and no motility involves an evolutionary discontinuity. This kind of “miracle” is required by all “discontinuity” theories of consciousness. To avoid miraculous emergence, one may need to consider continuity theories, which accept that different forms of consciousness and material functioning co-evolve but assume the existence of consciousness to be primal in the way that matter and energy are assumed to be primal in physics.
“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong,
2016
The University of Queensland
“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Reber (2016) attempts to resuscitate an obscure and outdated hypothesis referred to as the “cellular basis of consciousness” that was originally formulated by the author nearly twenty years ago. This hypothesis proposes that any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds, and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness. Reber seeks to reduce consciousness to a fundamental property inherent to individual cells rather than to centralised nervous systems. This commentary shows how this hypothesis is based on supposition, false premises and a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. The cellular basis of consciousness …
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness,
2016
Volda University College
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological phenomenon of consciousness.
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca,
2016
WellBeing International
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the …
Might Insects Experience Pain?,
2016
Queen's University - Belfast
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.
Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error,
2016
University of Michigan
Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel
Animal Sentience
Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains both hard and problematic.
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward,
2016
The University of Queensland
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory …
From Thinking Selves To Social Selves,
2016
Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna
From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
Animal Sentience
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals as Social Selves. It does so because it departs from the orthodox conception of self-awareness, which is both egocentric and logocentric. Instead, its focus is on the relation between consciousness and a person’s lived body, her actions and goals. Characterizing persons as pre-reflectively self-aware beings in Rowlands’s sense offers a much more useful conceptual tool to interpret social behaviour in animals.
What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?,
2016
Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna
What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
Animal Sentience
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of animal personhood bears a moral dimension (Monsó, 2016). His definition of pre-reflective self-awareness has a focus on sentience and on the lived body of a person as well as on her implicit awareness of her own goals. Interestingly, these also play a key role in animal welfare science, as well as in animal rights theories that value the interests of animals. Thus, Rowlands’s concept shows connectivity with both major fields of animal ethics. His metaphysical arguments might indeed contain a strong answer to the question of …
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?,
2016
University of Bristol
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties,
2016
Dalhousie University
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness,
2016
East Tennessee State University
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals,
2016
WellBeing International
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Animal Sentience
Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.
Butheoloides Grosseri Sp. N. (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Uganda,
2016
Marshall University
Butheoloides Grosseri Sp. N. (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Uganda, František Kovařík
Euscorpius
A new species Butheoloides grosseri sp. n. is described and fully complemented with color photos of female holotype, as well as its habitat. This is the first species assigned to this genus from Uganda and represents southern limits of genus Butheoloides distribution.
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Viii. Pandinops Birula, 1913 (Scorpionidae), With Description Of Two New Species,
2016
Marshall University
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Viii. Pandinops Birula, 1913 (Scorpionidae), With Description Of Two New Species, František Kovařík
Euscorpius
Complete Pandinops trichobothrial pattern and spiniform formula of tarsomeres of legs are published for the first time. P. friedrichi sp. n. from Somalia and P. turieli sp. n. from Ethiopia and Kenya are described. Information is provided about all Pandinops species, their taxonomy, and distribution, and P. turieli sp. n. discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016 is fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as its habitat.
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vii. Parabuthus Pocock, 1890 (Buthidae), With Description Of P. Hamar Sp. N. And P. Kajibu Sp. N. From Ethiopia,
2016
Charles University
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vii. Parabuthus Pocock, 1890 (Buthidae), With Description Of P. Hamar Sp. N. And P. Kajibu Sp. N. From Ethiopia, František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, Jana Plíšková, František Šťáhlavský
Euscorpius
All Parabuthus species from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliland were newly collected and are revised for the first time. The complex of Parabuthus liosoma is split into three sibling species with separate areas of distribution: P. abyssinicus Pocock, 1901 (Eritrea, Djibouti, central and north-eastern parts of Ethiopia), P. liosoma (Ehrenberg, 1828) (Yemen and Saudi Arabia), and P. maximus Werner, 1913 (Tanzania and Kenya). P. hamar sp. n. and P. kajibu sp. n., discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016, are described. Information is provided about all Parabuthus species from the Horn of Africa, their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with …
To Bee Or Not To Bee?,
2016
Cornell University
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects,
2016
Bielefeld University
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human,
2016
San Francisco State University
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
Animal Sentience
Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.
