Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism,
2016
World Animal Protection
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism, Nancy Clarke
Animal Sentience
Broom’s (2014) book is a well-researched and thoroughly written exploration and evaluation of the journey from the origins of animal welfare science to what we can say we now know and need to consider in relation to animal sentience and welfare. This book will help to counter any skepticism among academics and policy makers.
Is Sentience Only A Nonessential Component Of Animal Welfare?,
2016
[email protected]
Is Sentience Only A Nonessential Component Of Animal Welfare?, Ian J.H. Duncan
Animal Sentience
According to Broom (2014), animal welfare is a concept that can be applied to all animals, including single-celled organisms that are obviously not sentient. Such a stance makes it difficult to draw a connection between welfare and sentience, and that is the book’s downfall. Some excellent points are made about sentience and there are very good discussions on animal welfare. However, unless sentience is considered the essential component of welfare, any attempt to link the two phenomena will be unsuccessful — and that, indeed, is the case with this book.
Sentience And Animal Welfare: New Thoughts And Controversies,
2016
University of Cambridge
Sentience And Animal Welfare: New Thoughts And Controversies, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Sentience involves having some degree of awareness but awareness of self is not as complex as some people believe. Fully functioning vertebrate animals, and some invertebrates, are sentient but neither humans nor non-humans are sentient early in development or if brain-damaged. Feelings are valuable adaptive mechanisms and an important part of welfare but are not all of welfare so the term welfare refers to all animals, not just to sentient animals. We have much to learn about what non-human animals want from us, the functioning of the more complex aspects of their brains and of our brains and how we …
Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong,
2016
University of Berne
Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong, Helmut Segner
Animal Sentience
The response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious perception. According to Key (2016), consciousness — and thus pain perception — depends on a neuronal correlate that has a “unique neural architecture” as realized in the human cortex. On the basis of the “bioengineering principle that structure determines function,” Key (2016) concludes that animal species such as fish, which lack the requisite cortex-like neuroanatomical structure, are unable to feel pain. This commentary argues that the relationship between brain structure and brain function is less straightforward than suggested in Key’s target article.
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?,
2016
DigsFish Services Pty Ltd
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Animal Sentience
Much of the “fish pain debate” relates to how high the bar for pain should be set. The close phylogenetic affinities of teleosts with cartilaginous fishes which appear to lack nociceptors suggests caution should be applied by those who seek to lower the bar, especially given the equivocal and conflicting nature of the experimental data currently available for teleosts. Nevertheless, even if we assume fish “feel pain,” it is difficult to see how current best practice in aquaculture would change. This is because of the need to avoid stress at all stages of the rearing process to optimize health, growth …
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’,
2016
University of San Diego
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish do not experience pain because they lack the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) brain structures and associated functional circuitry to engender such conscious percepts. I propose that fish pain may be dependent on neuroanatomical regions and pathways that are structurally and/or functionally analogous — but not strictly homologous — to well-characterized mammalian substrates of pain. An example is the convergent appearance of the complex, single-compartment eye across invertebrate and vertebrate phylogeny. Structural-functional convergence is ubiquitous in evolution. Comparative inferences and correlative lines of evidence play an important role in building evolutionary arguments. The dismissal of the …
Going Beyond Just-So Stories,
2016
WellBeing International
Going Beyond Just-So Stories, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Colloquial arguments for fish feeling pain are deeply rooted in anthropometric tendencies that confuse escape responses to noxious stimuli with evidence for consciousness. More developed arguments often rely on just-so stories of fish displaying complex behaviours as proof of consciousness. In response to commentaries on the idea that fish do not feel pain, I raise the need to go beyond just-so stories and to rigorously analyse the neural circuitry responsible for specific behaviours using new and emerging technologies in neuroscience. By deciphering the causal relationship between neural information processing and conscious behaviour, it should be possible to assess cogently the …
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering,
2016
Nanyang Technological University
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of living things. Welfare is net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering). Since this necessarily involves feelings, Dawkins (2014) has suggested that animal welfare science may face a paradox, because feelings are very difficult to study. The following paper provides an explanation for how welfare biology could help to reduce this paradox by answering some difficult questions regarding animal welfare. Simple means based on commonsense could reduce animal suffering enormously at low or even negative costs to humans. Ways to increase the influence of animal welfare advocates are also discussed, focusing initially on farmed …
What’S The Common Sense Of Just Some Improvement Of Some Welfare For Some Animals?,
2016
University of Technology Sydney
What’S The Common Sense Of Just Some Improvement Of Some Welfare For Some Animals?, Liv Baker
Animal Sentience
The goal of Animal Welfare Science to reduce animal suffering is commendable but too modest: Suffering animals need and deserve far more.
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage,
2016
Independent researcher
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage, Simon R. B. Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Ng (2016) argues for incremental welfare biology partly because it would be impossible to demonstrate conclusively that animals are sentient. He argues that low cost changes in industrial practices and working collaboratively may be more effective in advancing animal welfare than more adversarial approaches. There is merit in some of Ng’s recommendations but a number of his arguments are, in my view, misdirected. The fact that nonhuman animals feel has already been adequately demonstrated. Cruelty to animals is intrinsic to some industries, so the only way to oppose it is to oppose the industry.
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail,
2016
The Kimmela Center for Animal Advocacy
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Welfarism prioritizes human interests over the needs of nonhuman animals. Despite decades of welfare efforts other animals are mostly worse off than ever before, being subjected to increasingly invasive and harmful treatments, especially in the factory farming and biomedical research areas. A legal rights-based approach is essential in order for other animals to be protected from the varying ethical whims of our species.
End-State Welfarism,
2016
University of New Haven
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
Animal Sentience
Yew-Kwang Ng’s research is the work of an obviously sincere, intelligent, and conscientious animal advocate. But I am unable to accept his starting assumption that animal welfare is an appropriate basis for animal ethics. More specifically I argue that animal welfare as a means to animal liberation is an issue that can be debated, but animal welfare as the ultimate end or goal of animal advocacy is misguided.
Death In The Family,
2016
WellBeing International
Death In The Family, Maria Botero
Animal Sentience
Barbara King presents grief as the result of the capacity of human and non-human animals for social and affectionate bonds. This is a novel approach that provides a context for interpreting behavioral evidence of grief. The book also offers thought-provoking insights into the relationship between emotion and the expression of emotion. The most surprising element of King’s approach is that, throughout the book, her account of non-human animal grief forces us to reassess the way we treat them.
Anticipatory Grief,
2016
Independent Scholar
Anticipatory Grief, Tara Fox Hall
Animal Sentience
This commentary reviews Barbara King’s How Animals Grieve, delving into the controversial topic of the status of animals in our society, as well as the key difference between human and non-human grief: the ability to anticipate death.
The Object Of Grief,
2016
Carnegie Mellon University
The Object Of Grief, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
King’s new book is a wonderful collection of diverse anecdotes illustrating the variety of animal practices that are convincing illustrations of grief. Those who want scientific arguments for that conclusion should, however, read elsewhere.
Understanding Emotional Suffering,
2016
College of William and Mary
Understanding Emotional Suffering, Barbara J. King
Animal Sentience
In responding to insightful commentaries from 7 scholars, for which I am grateful, I offer new thoughts on whether animals can conceptualize and express signs of grief. I also discuss why I included both weak and strong examples of animal mourning, and how this work may help us think about enhanced welfare for animals, including freedom from emotional suffering.
Using Detection Dogs And Rspf Models To Assess Habitat Suitability For Bears In Greater Yellowstone,
2015
Wildlife Conservation Society, North America Program, Bozeman, MT
Using Detection Dogs And Rspf Models To Assess Habitat Suitability For Bears In Greater Yellowstone, Jon P. Beckmann, Lisette P. Waits, Aimee Hurt, Alice Whitelaw, Scott Bergen
Western North American Naturalist
In the northern U.S. Rockies, including the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (GYE), connectivity is a concern because large carnivores have difficulties dispersing successfully between protected areas. One area of high conservation value because of its importance for connecting the GYE to wilderness areas of central Idaho is the Centennial Mountains and surrounding valleys (2500 km2) along the Idaho–Montana border just west of Yellowstone National Park. The current expansion of grizzly bears (Ursus arctos) and other large carnivore populations outside protected areas of Yellowstone National Park and Grand Teton National Park has placed a greater emphasis on potential linkage zones …
Vestigial Serrula In Scorpion Genera Paravaejovis, , Smeringurus And Vejovoidus (Scorpiones: Vaejovidae),
2015
Marshall University
Vestigial Serrula In Scorpion Genera Paravaejovis, , Smeringurus And Vejovoidus (Scorpiones: Vaejovidae), Victor Fet, Michael E. Soleglad, Michael S. Brewer, David P. A. Neff, Michael L. Norton
Euscorpius
The presence of vestigial serrula on the ventral edge of the cheliceral movable finger is established for vaejovid genera Paravaejovis, Paruroctonus, Smeringurus, and Vejovoidus. Detailed descriptions and SEM images illustrating the various manifestations of this interesting cheliceral structure are provided for many species of these four genera. A brief systematic overview of this structure as it exists in Recent scorpions is also presented.
Serrula In Retrospect: A Historical Look At Scorpion Literature (Scorpiones: Orthosterni),
2015
Marshall University
Serrula In Retrospect: A Historical Look At Scorpion Literature (Scorpiones: Orthosterni), Matthew R. Graham, Victor Fet
Euscorpius
Serrula, a small comb-like structure on the ventral aspect of cheliceral movable finger in scorpions, has often been overlooked or ignored. Scorpion genera that are currently known to possess serrula belong to six families: Chactidae, Euscorpiidae, Iuridae, Pseudochactidae, Superstitioniidae, and Vaejovidae. All relevant literature on scorpion serrula is reviewed, and serrula of representative scorpion taxa is illustrated by SEM images. We suggest that the inconsistency in reporting serrula is based on several factors (or combination thereof): (a) serrula tines can quite often be broken off partially or completely, especially in adults; (b) serrula can be vestigial and hardly visible under …
On The Poorly Known Genus Mesotityus González-Sponga, 1981 (Scorpiones: Buthidae),
2015
Marshall University
On The Poorly Known Genus Mesotityus González-Sponga, 1981 (Scorpiones: Buthidae), Luis F. De Armas, Fernando J. M. Rojas-Runjaic
Euscorpius
Examination of new available material (18 females and six males) of the rare Venezuelan scorpion Mesotityus vondangeli González-Sponga, 1981 (Buthidae) demonstrated that there are consistent taxonomic characters to consider it as a genus different from Tityus C. L. Koch, 1836 sensu stricto. Nevertheless, it shares important characters with species of the Tityus clathratus group (=subgenus Archaeotityus Lourenço, 2006). An emended diagnosis of Mesotityus is given, as well as data on natural history, meristic and morphometric variation.
