Zoology Commons^™

To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …

No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.

What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker

Animal Sentience

Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.

Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg

Animal Sentience

Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.

Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.

Effects Of An Electronic, Motion-Activated Scarecrow On Foraging Time In Nocturnal Vertebrate Crop Pets In South Africa, Mallory Clouse

Mahurin Honors College Capstone Experience/Thesis Projects

The normal behaviors of animals can disrupt human activities, resulting in human wildlifeconflict. In South Africa, nocturnal crop raiders are a significant source of human wildlifeconflict for farmers. Major nocturnal pest animals are Cape porcupine (Hystrix africaeaustralis) and bushpig (Potamochoerus larvatus). Although methods of deterring animals from agricultural areas have been explored, nocturnal crop raiding remains difficult to mitigate. Most research studies focus on deterring non-human primates and elephants, but methods that may be successful in deterring such larger mammals are not necessarily effective at discouraging smaller, nocturnal crop raiders. This study examined the efficacy of …

Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens

Animal Sentience

Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.

What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?

Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson

Animal Sentience

A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.

Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of mental life from the orthodox definition but argues that implicit unity of mind is sufficient for conferring personhood. This allows more or all animals to be considered persons. Implicit unity of mind may be a bridge too far for those who endorse the orthodox account of personhood, and for good reasons. More fundamentally, who gets to decide what personhood entails or that personhood per se matters to such other issues as who receives legal or moral status and consideration? Perhaps we should worry less about definitions …

Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye

Animal Sentience

I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron have nothing to say.

Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo

Animal Sentience

King’s How animals grieve beautifully describes several ways in which animals and humans show a similar capacity for grief. Yet this book does not sufficiently emphasise the language-empowered capacity to objectify thinking and sentiments about death, which makes human mourning unique. Here I put this capacity into focus and relate it to the social-normative aspect of human mourning that seems to be missing in other animals.

Insects Join The Consciousness Fray, Bjorn H. Merker

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron's review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect behavior is orchestrated without the benefit of central integrative mechanisms. Given their existence, the authors go on to ask whether these central mechanisms also feature the kind of integrative operations that support sentience, and propose that they do. Along the way they raise a number of conceptual and evidentiary issues of fundamental importance for the neuroscience of consciousness, allowing me to comment favorably on a number of them. I conclude by pointing to ways in which the conception of insect sentience they outline might be tested …

Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding, J. H. Van Hateren

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) argue that insects have sentience because of functional similarities between the insect brain and vertebrate midbrain. Based on a recent theory of agency and consciousness, I argue that the functional similarities merely point to an advanced form of agency. Insects presumably lack the capacity for social bonding that may be required for subjective experiencing.

Rare, Threatened And Endangered Species Of Oregon (2016), James S. Kagan, Sue Vrilakas, John A. Christy, Eleanor P. Gaines, Lindsey Wise, Cameron Pahl, Kathy Howell

Institute for Natural Resources Publications

Extinction is a natural process. Today, however, plant and animal species are disappearing world-wide at an accelerated pace. Based on current trends, half of the species on earth will be extinct within the next 100 years. The major reasons for this are human caused changes to the environment, which continue to increase - in Oregon and throughout the world.

Once lost, a species can never be recovered, and there is no way of knowing how useful it may have been. We do know that human beings and many of their industries depend on plant and animal products. About 50% of …

Efficacy Of A Novel Intranasal Zinc Solution On The Microbiome, Health, And Growth Performance Of High-Risk, Newly Received Stocker Cattle, Makenzie Foster

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

The objective of this study was to determine if using an intranasal zinc (Zn) solution would impact health and growth performance of high-risk stocker cattle. Male beef calves (n = 239; 3 arrival dates [block]; initial BW = 276 ± 2.4 kg) were stratified by arrival gender and BW and assigned to 1 of 2 treatments: 1) treated with 3 ml of a Zn solution containing 36.24 mg of Zn administered intranasally, or 2) control, in which calves were not treated. Calves were observed daily and if exhibiting signs of morbidity and a rectal temperature ≥ 40° C they were …

Evaluation Of Long-Acting Eprinomectin Compared To Conventional Anthelmintics In Cow/Calf Production, Elizabeth Ann Backes

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Experiment 1, 83, newly weaned, fall-born crossbred heifer calves were allocated randomly to 1 of 3 anthelmintic treatments: 1) control (CON); 2) combination pour-on moxidectin and oxfendazole (MO); and 3) long-acting eprinomectin (LAE). Two preplanned orthogonal contrast statements were used: 1) to compare CON to treated cattle; and 2) to compare OXF to LAE. Heifer BW and BCS were greater (P≤0.02) from MO and LAE on d 112, 140, 154, 168, 182 compared to CON. Heifer cyclicity, estrous detection, natural service and overall pregnancy rates were greater (P≤0.02) for MO and LAE compared to CON. Cattle fecal egg counts (FEC) …

Associations Of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms In The Bovine Prolactin, Melatonin Receptor 1a, And Dopamine Receptor D2 Genes With Hair Coat Shedding Scores And Productivity Traits In Beef Cattle, Laura R. Meyer

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Calving rate is a qualitative trait regulated by several genes and is strongly affected by the environment. With the development of biotechnology and gene identification, scientists are able to determine which genes affect these productivity traits to improve accurate selection decisions. Prolactin (PRL) has been associated with reproductive traits, melatonin receptor 1a (MTNR1A) has been associated with meat quality traits, and the dopamine receptor D2 (DRD2) gene has been associated with hair coat score (HCS) in cattle. Our objective was to determine associations between mutations in the PRL, MTNR1A, and DRD2 genes and cow-calf profitability traits. Genomic DNA was extracted …

Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere

Animal Sentience

Insects might have been the first invertebrates to evolve sentience, but cephalopods were the first invertebrates to gain scientific recognition for it.