Developmental Aspects Of Capacities,
2019
University of Wyoming
Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman suggest that judgments of human superiority underlie our cruelty to animals. It might be useful to examine how such judgments operate within the human community. Children arguably have a potential for developing “superior” capacities but are outperformed on many tasks by animals. There is a continuum of development in children’s capacities. Perhaps there are interspecies evolutionary continua too. This highlights the complexity of reasoning about humans, animals, and moral inclusion.
Across The Great Divide,
2019
WellBeing International
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s target article calls for a reevaluation of claims of human uniqueness and superiority. It also adds to the literature on how species differences, as Darwin noted, are more of degree than kind. The threats to environmental health and species survival are a consequence of excluding nonhuman animals from moral concern and consideration. The theory of intersectionality should include speciesism in the array of discriminatory practices.
“I Am Not An Animal”,
2019
Animal Studies Repository
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.
Phooey On Comparisons,
2019
Vassar College
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for …
Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant,
2019
University of Minho
Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals, cruelty to animals is not justified. Though I agree with their conclusion, I do not think their argument works. Many human beings do have some capacities that animals do not have and are greater in some respects, in the sense of having superior abilities. It is a better argument to deny that any of that is morally relevant. Sentience suffices for moral consideration, and for deriving a moral duty not to harm other animals and to assist them when they are in need.
Unique In Degree Not Kindness,
2019
Oakland University
Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Humans are certainly unique among living species. This is evident in the transformation of human environments and its resulting impact on other animals. However, many of the traits unique to humans are costly as well as adaptive and should certainly not be used to elevate their status above that of other species.
Animal Sentience Is Not Enough To Motivate Conservation,
2019
Harvard University
Animal Sentience Is Not Enough To Motivate Conservation, Irene M. Pepperberg
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman suggest that humans’ views of their own superiority are a source of their callousness toward the environment. I do not disagree but point to a number of other issues that must be addressed for conservation efforts to succeed.
Just Preservation,
2019
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Animal Sentience
We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric …
Reconciling Just Preservation,
2019
University of Calgary
Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s target article can play an important role in reconciling the needs of future generations and non-human animals in conservation. Human capacities are adequate for interpreting and defining many non-human animal needs. Worldviews are more complex, however, and conservation science, like the target article itself, suffers from a lack of diversity and inclusiveness. This may pose practical impediments to realizing just preservation.
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?,
2019
The Technion
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics,
2019
College of William and Mary
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.
The Perfecting Of The Octopus,
2019
independent ethologist
The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
Cephalopods split away from the phylogenetic tree about half a billion years ago, and octopus evolution has been accelerated by an extremely low survival rate. This helps explain why this unusual animal presents qualities found in no other. It has a radially organized nervous system with a processing centre for each of its eight tentacles. Yet, although this might suggest that each tentacle has its own centre of consciousness, it remains just one animal, with one mouth to feed, and one life to lose, and it behaves as if it is centrally controlled. Its capacity for a range of intelligent …
Octopus Experience,
2019
University of Sydney, Australia
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It,
2019
University of Lincoln, UK
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mostly unknown. This should be the starting point of a long process of scientific enquiry about these taxa, which must include discussions on operational definitions first and foremost. Discussing octopus mind might prove fruitless without more basic concepts. Some approaches are suggested here.
Relationship Between Habitat And Barn Owl Prey Delivery Rate And Composition In A Napa Valley Vineyard Agroecosystem,
2019
Humboldt State University
Relationship Between Habitat And Barn Owl Prey Delivery Rate And Composition In A Napa Valley Vineyard Agroecosystem, Dane A. R. St. George
Cal Poly Humboldt theses and projects
The provision of habitat for natural enemies of agricultural pests is common in integrated pest management approaches globally but has rarely been examined for vertebrate predators controlling vertebrate pests. To mitigate the economic and environmental costs of treating for rodent pests, winegrape producers in Napa Valley, California, have installed nest boxes to attract barn owls (Tyto alba) to their properties, but their effectiveness to control rodent pests in vineyards has not been thoroughly tested. A rigorous estimate of the number of rodents barn owls remove from the landscape is a necessary first step, and this study aimed to …
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences,
2019
McGill University
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Animal Sentience
Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrating broad interest in the question. From the breadth of comments, we have identified two recurring themes, which we focus on here. The first is a preponderance of cautionary remarks about evaluating the differences between humans and nonhuman animals. The second concerns whether considering animals as worthy of moral consideration is one of many useful tools for conservationists trying to prevent extinction, habitat destruction, and climate change.
Taking Darwinism Seriously,
2019
University of Agder
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman propose that dropping the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman animals may reduce the atrocious acts of humans towards nonhuman animals, but will it? Taking Darwinism seriously means accepting physical and behavioral continuity across species, including the capacity to feel pain.
Sacrificial Lambs,
2019
University of Queensland, Australia
Sacrificial Lambs, Clive Phillips
Animal Sentience
Sheep evolved from the mouflon as mountain animals, able to escape predation by leaping between rock ledges. Their defense was their agility. Humans brought them to the plains, where the agility was less useful, but their lack of aggression, speed or weaponry against predators made them a prime target to become one of man’s meat providers. A perfect animal in many ways, with extraordinary perceptive powers and some remarkable cognitive skills, they are often treated with complete disregard for their welfare. Yet sheep themselves won’t tell us this, for a sheep that alerted others to its weakness really would be …
Applied Cognition Research To Improve Sheep Welfare,
2019
University of California, Davis
Applied Cognition Research To Improve Sheep Welfare, Kristina Horback
Animal Sentience
If a change is going to occur in the care and management of domestic sheep, there needs to be a collaborative effort across many disciplines. This review by Marino & Merskin of the literature on cognitive processing in domestic sheep is limited by the inherent bias of the authors, including the impracticable goal of eliminating sheep production. Animal welfare concerns about the management of commercial sheep are valid; however, in order to make a difference, we need to develop an application for this knowledge about cognitive abilities in sheep.
Guilty As Charged,
2019
University of Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada
Guilty As Charged, Sergio M. Pellis
Animal Sentience
Sheep have had a bad rap with regard to their behavioral capabilities, and to a large extent, that negative view of sheep has arisen from our failure as human observers to view the world from the perspective of the sheep themselves. Studies sensitive to what sheep identify as of value in the world have revealed a different picture: sheep have cognitive, emotional and social complexity beyond our crude stereotype. Clearly, what we need to do is to evaluate non-human animals on their own terms and not as a reflection of ourselves.
