Neuroscience and Neurobiology Commons^™

The Off-Label Use, Utility And Potential Value Of Tdcs In The Clinical Care Of Particular Neuropsychiatric Conditions, Marom Bikson, Bhaskar Paneri, James Giordano

Publications and Research

No abstract provided.

Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau

Animal Sentience

According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the …

Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.

Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel

Animal Sentience

Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains both hard and problematic.

Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory …

Effects Of Visual-Vestibular Interactions On Navigation Tasks In Virtual Environments, Heather Panic

Link Foundation Modeling, Simulation and Training Fellowship Reports

Virtual environments (VEs) are increasingly used as a safe, cost-effective way to train first responders and military units to search buildings and urban environments. Trainees typically view the VE on a computer screen while seated, although some newer training systems allow the trainee limited mobility within the training room while viewing the VE through a head- mounted display (HMD). In either case, the trainee’s physical movements do not fully match the simulated movements within the VE. The goal of the work during the Link Foundation Fellowship was to determine what effect this mismatch has on a trainee’s ability to navigate …

Principles And Practices Fostering Inclusive Excellence: Lessons From The Howard Hughes Medical Institute’S Capstone Institutions, P. M. Dibartolo, L. Gregg-Jolly, D. Gross, C. A. Manduca, E. Iverson, D. B. Cooke Iii, G. K. Davis, C. Davidson, P. E. Hertz, L. Hibbard, S. K. Ireland, C. Mader, A. Pai, S. Raps, Kathleen King Siwicki, J. E. Swartz

Biology Faculty Works

Best-practices pedagogy in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) aims for inclusive excellence that fosters student persistence. This paper describes principles of inclusivity across 11 primarily undergraduate institutions designated as Capstone Awardees in Howard Hughes Medical Institute’s (HHMI) 2012 competition. The Capstones represent a range of institutional missions, student profiles, and geographical locations. Each successfully directed activities toward persistence of STEM students, especially those from traditionally underrepresented groups, through a set of common elements: mentoring programs to build community; research experiences to strengthen scientific skill/identity; attention to quantitative skills; and outreach/bridge programs to broaden the student pool. This paper grounds …

Active Learning Outside The Classroom: Implementation And Outcomes Of Peer-Led Team-Learning Workshops In Introductory Biology, Philip Kudish, Robin Shores, A. Mcclung, Lisa Smulyan , '76, Elizabeth Ann Vallen, Kathleen King Siwicki

Biology Faculty Works

Study group meetings (SGMs) are voluntary-attendance peer-led team-learning workshops that supplement introductory biology lectures at a selective liberal arts college. While supporting all students’ engagement with lecture material, specific aims are to improve the success of underrepresented minority (URM) students and those with weaker backgrounds in biology. Peer leaders with experience in biology courses and training in science pedagogy facilitate work on faculty-generated challenge problems. During the eight semesters assessed in this study, URM students and those with less preparation attended SGMs with equal or greater frequency than their counterparts. Most agreed that SGMs enhanced their comprehension of biology and …

Synthetic And Biological Exploration Of (+)-Boldine - Identification Of Potential Cns Receptor Ligands, Sujay Joseph

Theses and Dissertations

(+)-Boldine, an aporphine alkaloid, is reported to be biologically active at various Central Nervous System(CNS) receptors. However, only a few Structure Activity Relationship(SAR) studies have been conducted using boldine’s aporphine scaffold. A library of novel analogs was synthesized from boldine to understand the effect of bisbenzylation at C2 and C9 positions on the affinity and selectivity at the serotonin receptors.

If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …

From Sensory Perception To Lexical-Semantic Processing: An Erp Study In Non-Verbal Children With Autism, Chiara Cantiani, Naseem A. Choudhury, Yan H. Yu, Valerie L. Shafer, Richard G. Schwartz, April A. Benasich

Publications and Research

This study examines electrocortical activity associated with visual and auditory sensory perception and lexical-semantic processing in nonverbal (NV) or minimally-verbal (MV) children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Currently, there is no agreement on whether these children comprehend incoming linguistic information and whether their perception is comparable to that of typically developing children. Event-related potentials (ERPs) of 10 NV/MV children with ASD and 10 neurotypical children were recorded during a picture-word matching paradigm. Atypical ERP responses were evident at all levels of processing in children with ASD. Basic perceptual processing was delayed in both visual and auditory domains but overall was …

Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo

Animal Sentience

Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.

An Ultrasensitive Electrogenerated Chemiluminescence-Based Immunoassay For Specific Detection Of Zika Virus, Amber M. Paul, Dhiraj Acharya, Pradip Bastola, Linda Le, Estenfani Fernandez, Michael S. Diamond, Wujian Miao, Fengwei Bai

Publications

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a globally emerging mosquito-transmitted flavivirus that can cause severe fetal abnormalities, including microcephaly. As such, highly sensitive, specific, and cost-effective diagnostic methods are urgently needed. Here, we report a novel electrogenerated chemiluminescence (ECL)-based immunoassay for ultrasensitive and specific detection of ZIKV in human biological fluids. We loaded polystyrene beads (PSB) with a large number of ECL labels and conjugated them with anti-ZIKV monoclonal antibodies to generate anti-ZIKV-PSBs. These anti-ZIKV-PSBs efficiently captured ZIKV in solution forming ZIKV-anti-ZIKV-PSB complexes, which were subjected to measurement of ECL intensity after further magnetic beads separation. Our results show that the anti-ZIKV-PSBs …

Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.

Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin

Animal Sentience

Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.

Social Defeat Stress Induces Depression-Like Behavior And Alters Spine Morphology In The Hippocampus Of Adolescent Male C57bl/6 Mice, Sergio D. Iñiguez, Antonio Aubry, Lace M. Riggs, Jason B. Alipio, Roseanna M. Zanca, Francisco J. Flores-Ramirez, Mirella A. Hernandez, Steven J. Nieto, David Musheyev, Peter Serrano

Publications and Research

Social stress, including bullying during adolescence, is a risk factor for common psychopathologies such as depression. To investigate the neural mechanisms associated with juvenile social stress-induced mood-related endophenotypes, we examined the behavioral, morphological, and biochemical effects of the social defeat stress model of depression on hippocampal dendritic spines within the CA1 stratum radiatum. Adolescent (postnatal day 35) male C57BL/6 mice were subjected to defeat episodes for 10 consecutive days. Twenty-four h later, separate groups of mice were tested on the social interaction and tail suspension tests. Hippocampi were then dissected and Western blots were conducted to quantify protein levels for …

To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …

Voltage-Gated K+ Channels And Hiv-1-Induced Neural Injury: Implications For Pathogenesis Of Hiv-1-Associated Neurocognitive Disorders, Han Liu

Theses & Dissertations

Human immunodeficiency virus-1 (HIV-1)-associated neurocognitive disorder (HAND) is a subcortical disease involving neuronal loss and myelin damage. Myelin is deposited by oligodendrocytes through a complex process including oligodendrocyte progenitor cell (OPC) proliferation and maturation. Oligodendrocytes/OPCs are susceptible to viral proteins such as Tat and that myelin damage is associated with oligodendrocyte number decrease. It has been shown that activation of voltage-gated K⁺ (K_V) channels mediates apoptosis in various cell types. K_V1.3 is the most predominant K_V channel expressed in OPCs/oligodendrocytes and potentially involved in OPC developmental regulation. We studied the involvement of K_{V …}

Molecular Mechanisms Involved In Neurotoxicity Mediated By Hiv Proteins And Drug Abuse, Yu Cai

Theses & Dissertations

While the advancement of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) has transformed the course of HIV/AIDS from a death sentence to a manageable chronic condition, the prevalence of a constellation of neurological disorders collectively termed as HIV-associated neurocognitive disorders (HAND) continues to persist in these patients. HAND is characterized by cognitive dysfunction, depression, impaired memory and/or deficits in motor skills. The underlying factors leading to HAND have been the subject of extensive research and are thought to be associated with HIV infection in the CNS combined with robust immune activation of resident cells of the CNS. In addition, there is a …

What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker

Animal Sentience

Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.

Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg

Animal Sentience

Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.

Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.

The Normative Problem Of Shame, Timothy James Oakberg

Arts & Sciences Graduate Student Theses and Dissertations

What role should shame play in our lives? This is the normative problem of shame, and it is the focus of this dissertation. Through an examination of empirical research on shame and shame-proneness, I argue that shame should have only a very limited role in our lives. More specifically, we ought not cultivate shame, because a substantial amount of empirical literature points to the conclusion that shame-proneness is counterproductive at both an individual and a societal level. Expanding on this general answer to the normative problem of shame, I discuss in detail three proposals regarding shame from the realms of …

Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens

Animal Sentience

Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.

Does Cognitive Impairment Affect Rehabilitation Outcome In Parkinson’S Disease?, Davide Ferrazzoli, Paola Ortelli, Roberto Maestri, Rossana Bera, Nir Giladi, Maria Felice Ghilardi, Gianni Pezzoli, Giusseppe Frazzitta

Publications and Research

Background: The cognitive status is generally considered as a major determinant of rehabilitation outcome in Parkinson’s disease (PD). No studies about the effect of cognitive impairment on motor rehabilitation outcomes in PD have been performed before.

Objective: This study is aimed to evaluate the impact of cognitive decline on rehabilitation outcomes in patients with PD.

Methods: We retrospectively identified 485 patients with PD hospitalized for a 4-week Multidisciplinary Intensive Rehabilitation Treatment (MIRT) between January 2014 and September 2015. According to Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE), patients were divided into: group 1—normal cognition (score 27–30), group 2—mild cognitive …

What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?

Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson

Animal Sentience

A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.

Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of mental life from the orthodox definition but argues that implicit unity of mind is sufficient for conferring personhood. This allows more or all animals to be considered persons. Implicit unity of mind may be a bridge too far for those who endorse the orthodox account of personhood, and for good reasons. More fundamentally, who gets to decide what personhood entails or that personhood per se matters to such other issues as who receives legal or moral status and consideration? Perhaps we should worry less about definitions …

Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye

Animal Sentience

I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron have nothing to say.