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Articles 8611 - 8640 of 36512

Full-Text Articles in Animal Sciences

Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin Jan 2019

Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin

Animal Sentience

Our Response is centered on five major themes: (1) our presentation of human mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”) as a dimension underlying the way people perceive and treat sheep; (3) whether our review is too anthropocentric or anthropomorphic; (4) animal welfare versus animal rights (abolitionism); and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough to change human attitudes and behavior.

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Taxonomy Of Nocturnal Parasitic Wasps Family Braconidae (Hymenoptera: Ichneumonoidea) In Doi Phu Kha National Park, Thailand, Marisa Raweearamwong Jan 2019

Taxonomy Of Nocturnal Parasitic Wasps Family Braconidae (Hymenoptera: Ichneumonoidea) In Doi Phu Kha National Park, Thailand, Marisa Raweearamwong

Chulalongkorn University Theses and Dissertations (Chula ETD)

Parasitoid wasps of the family Braconidae are classified in the order Hymenoptera, same as bees, ants and other wasps. The Braconidae is one of the most species-rich families in the Insecta. Doi Phu Kha National Park (DPKNP) has highly diverse organisms, both flora and fauna reflecting the great varieties of habitat types, however, there is very little information on the taxonomy of Braconidae in this national park. Therefore, the aim of this research is to establish the taxonomy of nocturnal parasitic wasps in the family Braconidae within the DPKNP using light trapping technique. A total of 846 specimens, 177 morphospecies …

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พฤติกรรมการเรียนรู้และการตอบสนองต่อ 2,4-ไดไนโตรโทลูอีนในผึ้งพันธุ์ Apis Mellifera Linnaeus, 1758 และผึ้งโพรง Apis Cerana Fabricius, 1793, ศิรัช เลิศจินตนากิจ Jan 2019

พฤติกรรมการเรียนรู้และการตอบสนองต่อ 2,4-ไดไนโตรโทลูอีนในผึ้งพันธุ์ Apis Mellifera Linnaeus, 1758 และผึ้งโพรง Apis Cerana Fabricius, 1793, ศิรัช เลิศจินตนากิจ

Chulalongkorn University Theses and Dissertations (Chula ETD)

ผึ้งให้น้ำหวานเป็นสิ่งมีชีวิตต้นแบบสําหรับการศึกษาการตอบสนองต่อกลิ่นโดยใช้วิธีการเรียนรู้แบบมี เงื่อนไข (classical conditioning) ผ่านทางพฤติกรรมการแลบลิ้นหรือ Proboscis Extension Response (PER) ซึ่งมีรายงานอย่างกว้างขวางในผึ้งพันธุ์หรือผึ้งให้น้ำหวานสายพันธุ์ยุโรป (A. mellifera) ในขณะที่การศึกษาในผึ้งโพรงหรือผึ้งให้น้ำหวานสายพันธุ์เอเชีย (A. cerana) กลับยังมีการศึกษาอยู่น้อยมาก ทั้งที่มีความสําคัญในการเป็นแมลงผสมเกสรในภูมิภาคเอเชียและในประเทศไทย ในการศึกษาครั้งนี้ วิธีการ PER ถูกนํามาใช้เพื่อเป็นตัวประเมินความสามารถในการเรียนรู้และตอบสนองต่อสาร 2,4–ไดไนโตรโทลูอีน (DNT, สารตั้งต้นวัตถุระเบิด) โดยทําการเปรียบเทียบความสามารถของการเรียนรู้และตอบสนองระหว่างผึ้งทั้งสองชนิด การศึกษานี้ทดลองในช่วงระหว่างเดือนพฤษภาคม 2561 ถึงเดือนมีนาคม 2563 ผึ้งที่มีหน้าที่หาอาหารจะถูกจับและนําไปฝึกให้เกิดการเรียนรู้แบบมีเงื่อนไขระหว่างสารละลายน้ำตาลซูโครสความเข้มข้น 50% w/v (ใช้เป็นรางวัล) และ DNT ความเข้มข้น 25 มิลลิกรัมต่อลิตร (ใช้เป็นสิ่งเร้าเงื่อนไข) การฝึกให้ผึ้งเกิดการเรียนรู้แบบมีเงื่อนไขนั้นจะทําการฝึกผึ้งทั้งหมด 6 ครั้ง ในช่วงเวลา 13:00–15:00 น. เพื่อที่จะสามารถประเมินได้ว่าผึ้งมีความสามารถในการเรียนรู้และจดจํากลิ่น DNT ได้หรือไม่ ผลการศึกษาแสดงให้เห็นว่า ผึ้งพันธุ์ (N=61) สามารถเกิดการเรียนรู้แบบมีเงื่อนไขระหว่างกลิ่นและน้ำตาลซูโครสได้ โดยมีการแสดงพฤติกรรม PER เพิ่มขึ้นจาก 9.84±3.84% (การฝึกครั้งที่ 1) เป็น 47.54±6.44% (การฝึกครั้งที่ 6) ในขณะที่ผึ้งโพรง (N=36) สามารถเกิดการเรียนรู้แบบมีเงื่อนไขระหว่างกลิ่นและน้ำตาลซูโครสได้เช่นกัน เกิดการแสดงพฤติกรรม PER เพิ่มขึ้นจาก 2.78±2.78% (การฝึกครั้งที่ 1) เป็น 47.22±8.44% (การฝึกครั้งที่ 6) จากผลการศึกษายังระบุอีกว่า ผึ้งพันธุ์มีความสามารถในการเรียนรู้และตอบสนองต่อ DNT (49.18±6.45%) ได้ดีกว่าผึ้งโพรง (16.67±6.30%) ในช่วงที่สองของการฝึก (P<0.01) สําหรับการทดสอบความสามารถในการจดจํา (memory retention test) พบว่า ผึ้งพันธุ์ยังคงสามารถตอบสนองต่อ DNT และแสดงพฤติกรรม PER ได้ 46.00±3.68%, 67.34±4.83% และ 52.03±3.77% ในขณะที่ผึ้งโพรงก็สามารถแสดงพฤติกรรม PER ได้ 55.50±6.10%, 50.50±7.09% และ 44.50±6.37% หลังจากที่เวลาผ่านไป 10 นาที 24 ชั่วโมงและ 48 ชั่วโมงหลังการฝึกตามลําดับ อย่างไรก็ตามความสามารถในการจดจําต่อกลิ่น DNT ของผึ้งทั้งสองชนิดนี้ไม่ได้แตกต่างกันอย่างมีนัยสําคัญทางสถิติ (P>0.05) จากผลการศึกษานี้ ผู้วิจัยพบว่าผึ้งทั้งสองชนิดมีความจําระยะยาว (long-term memory) ที่ยังคงสามารถแสดงพฤติกรรม PER และตอบสนองต่อกลิ่น DNT ได้แม้ว่าเวลาจะผ่านไปแล้ว 48 ชั่วโมงก็ตาม ความสามารถในการเรียนรู้และจดจําที่แตกต่างกันระหว่างผึ้งให้หวานทั้งสองชนิดนี้อาจจะเป็นผลมาจากคัดเลือกทางธรรมชาติเนื่องจากผึ้งทั้งสองชนิดมีถิ่นที่อยู่อาศัยที่มีสภาพภูมิอากาศแตกต่างกัน การศึกษาเพิ่มเติมเพื่อประเมินความสามารถในการเรียนรู้และการจดจําของผึ้งให้น้ําหวานสายพันธุ์เอเชียชนิดอื่น ๆ จะช่วยให้ข้อมูลที่เป็นประโยชน์เพิ่มขึ้นในการศึกษาเชิงเปรียบเทียบระหว่างผึ้งที่อาศัยในเขตอบอุ่นกับในเขตร้อนชื้น

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What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather Jan 2019

What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather

Animal Sentience

It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can make some progress. In the Umwelt or perceptual world of an octopus, what the lateralized monocular eyes perceive is not color but the plane of polarization of light. Information is processed by a bilateral brain but manipulation is done by a radially symmetrical set of eight arms. Octopuses do not self-monitor by vision. Their skin pattern system, used for excellent camouflage, is open loop. The output of the motor system of the eight arms is organized at several levels — brain, …

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Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela Jan 2019

Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela

Animal Sentience

Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues that the octopus has an “Umwelt,” and, thus, a mind. I argue that Umwelt does not provide a conceptual basis for understanding the octopus as having a mind. First, Umwelt does not refer only to an organism’s perceptual abilities. Second, in providing evidence for decentralized control systems that underlie intelligent behaviors, Mather makes a case against an octopus Umwelt. Instead, the octopus is more akin to a collection of systems, or Umwelten, than a single system with an Umwelt.

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Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund Jan 2019

Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund

Animal Sentience

Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.

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A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz Jan 2019

A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, memory, and behavior. Anyone interested in cephalopod cognition and brain organization will find her target article informative and interesting. In this commentary, I challenge the idea that an individual organism must have an individual mind. Given the structure of the octopus brain and their complex behavior, one must consider the possibility that an octopus is a community of minds rather than a single mind.

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The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra Jan 2019

The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra

Animal Sentience

I present a brief overview of the richness of cephalopod behavioral, neural and cognitive traits.

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Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2019

Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Mather’s work has been fundamental in informing scientists of the relatively mysterious behavior and cognition of an understudied group of animals – the cephalopods. This work helps to fill a gap in the comparative literature that has historically sought evidence for complex behavior only in species that are closely related to humans or share important ecological features such as social complexity.

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What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning Jan 2019

What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus.

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The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt Jan 2019

The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) presents convincing evidence that octopuses have minds, but in the first 85% of the target article, the evidence does not come through very clearly because it is hidden by other information and by problems with the paper’s organization. I propose ways to build a tighter argument in the author’s Response to the Commentaries.

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The ‘Thing’ From This World, Sergio M. Pellis Jan 2019

The ‘Thing’ From This World, Sergio M. Pellis

Animal Sentience

Science progresses by making contrasts, and the living world is a gold mine of contrasts. Often disciplines become victims by focusing on too narrow a slice of that diversity, leading to a myopic view of how nature works. The relationships between the brain and behavior have been intensively studied in vertebrates, especially mammals, and we have become complacent in our assumptions about how behavior is constructed. As the target article by Mather (2019) shows, the relationship between the brain and behavior in octopuses forces us to reevaluate some of those assumptions.

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Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee Jan 2019

Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee

Animal Sentience

Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.

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Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken Jan 2019

Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken

Animal Sentience

Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.

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A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam Jan 2019

A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam

Animal Sentience

Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.

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Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran Jan 2019

Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.

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Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino Jan 2019

Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.

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The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher Jan 2019

The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher

Animal Sentience

Cephalopods split away from the phylogenetic tree about half a billion years ago, and octopus evolution has been accelerated by an extremely low survival rate. This helps explain why this unusual animal presents qualities found in no other. It has a radially organized nervous system with a processing centre for each of its eight tentacles. Yet, although this might suggest that each tentacle has its own centre of consciousness, it remains just one animal, with one mouth to feed, and one life to lose, and it behaves as if it is centrally controlled. Its capacity for a range of intelligent …

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‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara Jan 2019

‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara

Animal Sentience

Scientific discussions about the ‘mind’ of an octopus are empirically vacuous and should be confined to folk psychology. This form of labelling is unhelpful for science and should be replaced by specific mechanistic accounts of behavior and associated neural structures, which are amenable to rigorous scientific investigation. Mather provides a detailed review of octopus behavior, but rather than making unquantifiable assumptions about what orchestrates octopus behavior, efforts should focus on investigating cognitive mechanisms that can be measured. In this commentary, we outline two lines of research that include quantifiable methods to facilitate a more robust understanding of cephalopod behaviors and …

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Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith Jan 2019

Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith

Animal Sentience

The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.

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The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith Jan 2019

The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith

Animal Sentience

Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ but stops short of asking what having that mind means for octopus moral standing. One consequence of understanding the octopus mind should be a refusal to subject octopuses to mass production. Octopus farming is in an experimental phase and supported by various countries. We argue that it is unethical because of concerns about animal welfare as well as environmental impacts.

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Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio Jan 2019

Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio

Animal Sentience

Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference that their striking behavioural flexibility is evidence of “complex” cognitive abilities. I discuss alternative explanations — not to deny the possibility of complexity but to point out that current evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions. Only an agnostic approach will lead to the systematic investigation of octopus behaviour and ultimately, greater insights into the cognitive capacities of these fascinating creatures.

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Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard Jan 2019

Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard

Animal Sentience

Mather draws from a lifetime devoted to studying individual octopuses in the wild and in aquaria to combine a natural history account of their actions with an argument from design adopted from second-, often third-hand sources. The 'distributed' [decentralised] nervous system said to contrast with that of vertebrates – a premise largely accepted by Mather’s commentators so far – does not reflect the original literature on motor control, nor the facts of comparative anatomy, functional morphology and morphogenesis. Ontogeny is absent. With the help of some old or little-known illustrations from my own participant-observer experimental investigations, I will try here …

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What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro Jan 2019

What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro

Animal Sentience

Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mostly unknown. This should be the starting point of a long process of scientific enquiry about these taxa, which must include discussions on operational definitions first and foremost. Discussing octopus mind might prove fruitless without more basic concepts. Some approaches are suggested here.

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Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo Jan 2019

Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo

Animal Sentience

An octopus has more neurons in their peripheral nervous system (PNS) than in their brain. PNS neurons could participate in forming cognitive networks with the central brain in the same way that the cerebellum is now thought to contribute to mammalian cognition. However, cephalopods lack myelinated fibres, which might decrease the ability of the PNS to participate in cognitive networks. The lack of myelinated fibres may also select for a less integrated brain, with an increased emphasis on local information processing. Alternatively, integration may still occur across distant neural centers, but proceed more slowly in cephalopods than in mammals.

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Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry Jan 2019

Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry

Animal Sentience

The first question to ask is whether octopuses are sentient, so that, if so, they can be protected. Three consensual criteria to evaluate animal sentience can be applied to the octopus. Octopuses meet all three of them.

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What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather Jan 2019

What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather

Animal Sentience

It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind, though perhaps a mind that is different from those of “higher” vertebrates. It stimulates us to look at the welfare of these animals and challenges us to find better ways to test mindfulness and cognition across animals with widely differing natural histories and sensory and motor capacities.

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Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn Jan 2019

Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn

Animal Sentience

We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric …

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Justice For Nature, Haydn Washington Jan 2019

Justice For Nature, Haydn Washington

Animal Sentience

Eight points are made in this commentary: (1) Ecocentrism is the preferable term. (2) Indigenous societies have long used a kinship ethics. (3) Earth jurisprudence and ecodemocracy should be considered. (4) Assumptions can be better defined. (5) Ethical pluralism is open to question. (6) The ethics of individuals vs. ecosystems needs further discussion. (7) Including justice for nature within social justice may be a serious mistake. (8) Trustees need to be ethically sophisticated.

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Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer Jan 2019

Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

Treves et al. (2019) argue that policy making should include the interests and well-being of present and future generations of humans and nonhumans. There are deep and abiding conflicts of interest both between and within these groups. Trying to factor in so many considerations is likely to generate political gridlock. The authors need to explain how to avoid this.

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