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Articles 901 - 930 of 991
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay
Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp
Michigan Law Review
For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …
An Economic Approach To The Determination Of Injury Under United States Antidumping And Countervailing Duty Law, Michael S. Knoll
An Economic Approach To The Determination Of Injury Under United States Antidumping And Countervailing Duty Law, Michael S. Knoll
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Models Of Market Behaviour And Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing, Marilyn Maccrimmon, Asha Sadanand
Models Of Market Behaviour And Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing, Marilyn Maccrimmon, Asha Sadanand
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
The paper arose out of the authors' belief that economic principles should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the differences between the assumptions of …
The Economics Of The Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward An Exclusionary Theory, Peter Siegelman, Ian Ayres
The Economics Of The Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward An Exclusionary Theory, Peter Siegelman, Ian Ayres
Faculty Articles and Papers
On March 22, 1988, the Attorneys General of eight states filed antitrust actions in state and federal courts' alleging that major insurance and reinsurance companies colluded to boycott specific types of insurance coverage in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The suits suggest that this collusion was responsible for the unprecedented increase in premiums and concomitant erosion of coverage that has come to be known as "the insurance crisis."' The lawsuits have provoked fierce denials by insurance industry participants, including assertions that the suits, which came in an election year, were politically motivated.' The litigation is certain to …
The Antitrust Movement And The Rise Of Industrial Organization, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Antitrust Movement And The Rise Of Industrial Organization, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The modern science of industrial organization grew out of a debate among lawyers and economists in the waning years of the nineteenth century. For Americans, the emergent business "trust" provoked a dialogue about how the law should respond. Many of the formal theories of industrial organization, such as the ruinous competition doctrine, the potential competition doctrine, and the post-classical concern about vertical integration, were actually borrowed from the law.
Anglo-American and European economists disputed the proper domain of theory and description in economic analysis. The British approach was exemplified Alfred and Mary Paley Marshall's Economics of Industry, published in …
Antitrust And The Market For Corporate Control, Edward B. Rock
Antitrust And The Market For Corporate Control, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Recent Developments In Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, Jonathan Baker
Recent Developments In Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Cable Traffic And The First Amendment Must-Carry Under A Diversity Approach And Antitrust As Possible Alternative, Bruno Vandermeulen
Cable Traffic And The First Amendment Must-Carry Under A Diversity Approach And Antitrust As Possible Alternative, Bruno Vandermeulen
LLM Theses and Essays
Recent technological progress in the field of telecommunications has greatly changed the competitive structure between broadcasters, cable operators, and telephone companies. The legal and economic environment for these media participants has shifted, and new problems have arisen. One major problem is the enhanced threat of concentration of media corporations, as corporate bigness becomes desirable and the number of diversified owners of media outlets continues to decrease. This paper analyzes broadcasting regulations and subsequent case law to show the concern by the legislature and regulatory agencies to preserve diversity in opinion and media-ownership through emphasis on “localism” and a “marketplace of …
A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla
A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla
Michigan Law Review
If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how rational, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actually behave. This article attempts to begin that task.
Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on individual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key actors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the …
Antitrust And The Challenge Of Internationalization, David J. Gerber
Antitrust And The Challenge Of Internationalization, David J. Gerber
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Geographic Market Definition In An International Context, George A. Hay, John C. Hilke, Philip B. Nelson
Geographic Market Definition In An International Context, George A. Hay, John C. Hilke, Philip B. Nelson
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Market definition is generally regarded as a key step in antitrust analysis. Market definition has two components. Product market definition seeks to include all products that are meaningful substitutes. Geographic market definition seeks to incorporate all relevant sources of the product in question. This paper is concerned with geographic market definition and, in particular, how geographic markets are defined in situations where competition may, at least to some extent, transcend national boundaries.
The subject of the paper may be of some current interest for two reasons. First, the perception is widespread that, over the past twenty or so years, competition …
Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop
Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop
All Faculty Scholarship
This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.
Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:
(1) the belief or suspicion that …
Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande
Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.
The Free Rider Rationale And Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered, George A. Hay
The Free Rider Rationale And Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Legal Factors In The Acquisition Of A United State Corporation: Litigation By Hostile Targets, Johan E. Droogmans
Legal Factors In The Acquisition Of A United State Corporation: Litigation By Hostile Targets, Johan E. Droogmans
LLM Theses and Essays
Acquisitions of United States corporations have become increasingly complex takeover contests, where bidders and target corporations are forced into offensive and defensive litigation strategies to protect their respective interests. Targets often assert that the bidders have violated federal or state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations, federal and state regulatory systems, and federal anti-racketeering laws. These lawsuits are primarily based on the principal federal regulation of takeovers in section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Williams Act. Target litigation is customary, but entails certain disadvantages; a lawsuit rarely stops an offer, is expensive, …
Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp
Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp
Michigan Law Review
In his essay on Workable Antitrust Policy Judge Easterbrook professes an extraordinary skepticism about economic models in general, and particularly about the ability of courts to use economic models to distinguish the competitive from the anticompetitive. But a profession of skepticism is itself a very powerful rhetorical device; it creates a perception of tough-mindedness, of refusal to yield real-world observations to analytic models or other abstractions, of extreme reluctance to accept any proposition that has not been clearly proven. Further, it is always very easy to be a skeptic, because every position ever taken except perhaps for a few tautologies …
Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook
Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook
Michigan Law Review
One of the schools of thought in the economics of antitrust was called "workable competition." The adherents to this school believed that markets were prone to cartelization and that concentration was death on competition, but that occasionally competition might prove "workable." These scholars were suspicious of almost every industrial practice they saw. One of the manifestations of their work came to be known as the "structure-conduct-performance paradigm." The thesis was that you could tell whether competition was feasible from the structure of the market. If the top four firms had fifty percent or so of the sales, we should abandon …
Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox
Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox
Michigan Law Review
Professor Hovenkamp's article, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, reveals an important truth. Chicago School economics does not provide a superior roadmap to efficiency. I would take the critique one step further and assert: The main gap between Chicago and its critics is not even the design of the roadmap to efficiency. The main gap is social and political philosophy.
An Economic Analysis Of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, John Cirace
An Economic Analysis Of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, John Cirace
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.
Duties To Offset Competitive Advantages, Richard B. Dagen, Michael S. Knoll
Duties To Offset Competitive Advantages, Richard B. Dagen, Michael S. Knoll
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Gray-Market Imports: Causes, Consequences And Responses, Michael S. Knoll
Gray-Market Imports: Causes, Consequences And Responses, Michael S. Knoll
All Faculty Scholarship
This article explores the issue of gray-market imports. The author explains the four causes of gray-market imports and explores the possibility of private remedies in order to stem the flow of these imports. The article then turns to the possibility of protection in the public sector by discussing pertinent statutory provisions and the development of the case law in this area.
The Role Of Efficiency Justifications In U.S.-American And West German Merger Control Law: A Comparison, Christian Westerhausen
The Role Of Efficiency Justifications In U.S.-American And West German Merger Control Law: A Comparison, Christian Westerhausen
LLM Theses and Essays
When merger control laws first emerged in the United States and West Germany in the early 1900s, some businessmen and economists argued that the efficiency of businesses was impeded by antimerger laws. They contended that only very large businesses could realize significant efficiencies, be internationally competitive, and attain technological progress. This paper analyzes the role that these efficiency arguments had on the laws in West Germany and the United States, respectively. German law mainly upheld the idea that preservation of competition was most important for business efficiency, but also included a provision that firms could put forward the social desirability …
Vertical Restraints, George A. Hay
Vertical Restraints, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, George A. Hay
Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. represents the Supreme Court's latest effort to articulate the standards governing vertical restraints of trade under the United States anti-trust law. It is unlikely that this will be the last time the Court addresses this topic. Notwithstanding the many Supreme Court decisions in this area, several issues remain unresolved. Indeed, Monsanto may have created (or resurrected) as many new questions as it answered, a phenomenon characteristic of most prior opinions in this area.
At least part of the reason for this unsettled state is that, from the outset, the Supreme Court …
Anti-Trust And Economic Theory: Some Observations From The Us Experience, George A. Hay
Anti-Trust And Economic Theory: Some Observations From The Us Experience, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of anti-trust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only) relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort out lawful from unlawful conduct. The result has been that while economics has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as …
The Administration's Legislation: The National Cooperative Research Act Of 1984, The National Productivity And Innovation Act Of 1983, 18 J. Marshall L. Rev. 607 (1985), Kelly L. Morron
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This article, which was published in 1985, describes the development of a "Post-Chicago" antitrust policy. The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has made an important and lasting contribution to antitrust policy. The School has placed an emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence that will likely never disappear. At the same time, however, the Chicago School's approach to antitrust is defective for two important reasons. First of all, the notion that public policymaking should be guided exclusively by a notion of efficiency based on the neoclassical market efficiency model is naive. That notion both overstates the ability of the policymaker …
Pigeonholes In Antitrust, George A. Hay
Antitrust Law And Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach, David J. Gerber
Antitrust Law And Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach, David J. Gerber
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.