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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker
On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The article explains why regressions of price on HHI should not be used in merger review. Both price and HHI are equilibrium outcomes determined by demand, supply, and the factors that drive them. Thus, a regression of price on the HHI does not recover a causal effect that could inform the likely competitive effects of a merger. Nonetheless, economic theory is consistent with the legal presumption that a merger is likely to have adverse competitive effects if it occurs in a concentrated market and makes that market more concentrated.
Labor, Trade, And Populism: How Ilo-Wto Collaboration Can Save The Global Economic Order, Sungjoon Cho, Cesar F. Rosado-Marzan
Labor, Trade, And Populism: How Ilo-Wto Collaboration Can Save The Global Economic Order, Sungjoon Cho, Cesar F. Rosado-Marzan
American University Law Review
Populists are trying to take down the global economic order and its institutions. While some of those forces might be fueled by racism, they also play to legitimate social concerns that include massive plant closings and deindustrialization, inadequate skills programs, and lack of decent jobs. Some of these problems also concern the Global South, as workers there face exploitation, unhealthy working conditions, and other social ills caused by global capitalism. In light of these problems, this Article argues that the International Labor Organization (ILO) should design new conventions on lead firm liability and mass layoffs. While other scholars and policymakers …
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Economic Commitments, Jonathan Baker
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Economic Commitments, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This article shows how the norm supporting governmental action to protect and foster competitive markets was harmonized with economic rights to contract and property during the 19th century, and with the development of the social safety net during the 20th century. It explains why the Constitution, as understood today, does not check the erosion of the entrenched but threatened national commitment to assuring competitive markets.
Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
$=Euro=Bitcoin, Hilary Allen
$=Euro=Bitcoin, Hilary Allen
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) have the potential to revolutionize the way that payments are processed, but only if they become ubiquitous. This Article argues that if virtual currencies are used at that scale, it would pose threats to the stability of the financial system-threats that have been largely unexplored to date. Such threats will arise because the ability of a virtual currency to function as money is very fragile-Bitcoin can remain money only for so long as people have confidence that bitcoins will be readily accepted by others as a means of payment. Unlike the U.S. dollar, which is …
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
As is well known among financial economists but not previously recognized within the antitrust community, large and diversified institutional investors such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard collectively own roughly two-thirds of the shares of publicly traded U.S. firms overall, up from about one-third in 1980. Recent economic research involving airlines and banking raises the possibility that overlapping ownership of horizontal rivals by diversified financial institutions facilitates anticompetitive conduct throughout the economy, and that the problem has been growing for decades, unnoticed until now. This response to an article by Professor Einer Elhauge, explains why it may be more …
Putting The 'Financial Stability' In Financial Stability Oversight Council, Hilary Allen
Putting The 'Financial Stability' In Financial Stability Oversight Council, Hilary Allen
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial regulation since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there has been little examination of the competing normative goals of financial regulation. Should the financial system be treated as an end in itself such that the efficiency of that system is the primary goal? Or should financial regulation instead treat the financial system as a means to the end of broader economic growth? This Article argues for the latter approach, and stakes out the controversial normative position that financial stability, rather than efficiency, should be the paramount focus of …
Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Economic inequality recently has entered the political discourse in a highly visible way. This political impact is not a surprise. As the U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, economic growth has effectively been appropriated by those already well off, leaving the median household less well off. The serious economic, political and moral issues raised by inequality can be addressed through a panoply of public policies including competition policy, the focus of this article. The article describes the channels through which market power contributes to inequality, and sets forth a range of possible antitrust policy …
What Is 'Financial Stability' -The Need For Some Common Language In International Financial Regulation, Hilary Allen
What Is 'Financial Stability' -The Need For Some Common Language In International Financial Regulation, Hilary Allen
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Post-Crisis international financial regulation is animated by the buzzwords 'financial stability, " but surprisingly little attention has been paid to what these buzzwords actually mean. This Article argues that there are many-largely unexplored- disagreements regarding the meaning of 'financial stability, " and that this lack of consensus has the potential to cause a host of problems. Chief amongst these is that disagreement about the meaning of "financial stability" can thwart harmonized national implementation of international financial stability regulation. To draw attention to this largely-ignored definitional problem, and to start the process of addressing it, this Article proposes a working definition …
Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, Jonathan Baker
Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
A contemporary consensus in antitrust discourse inappropriately places exclusionary conduct at the periphery of competition policy, while putting collusion at the core. Contrary to that common view, exclusion is as important as collusion as a matter of precedent, the structure of doctrinal rules, economics, and sound competition policy. Courts treat exclusionary violations as serious competitive problems. An emerging doctrinal rule for truncated condemnation of “plain” exclusionary conduct (practices foreclosing rivals that lack a plausible efficiency justification) parallels the evolving judicial approach toward “naked” collusion. Exclusion and collusion can be understood within a common economic framework that emphasizes the close relationship …
Economics And Politics: Perspectives On The Goals And Future Of Antitrust, Jonathan Baker
Economics And Politics: Perspectives On The Goals And Future Of Antitrust, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This article examines the roles of economics and politics in U.S. antitrust from several perspectives. It explains why the modern debate over the economic welfare standard that enforcers and courts should pursue is unsatisfying. It connects economics and politics by describing antitrust’s economic goals as the product of a mid-20th century political understanding about the nature of economic regulation that has continued in force to this day. To protect that understanding, it explains, antitrust rules should now be implemented using a qualified consumer welfare standard. The article also identifies contemporary political tensions that threaten to create regulatory gridlock, or even …
Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy Of The Non-Interventionist Challenge To Monopolization Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy Of The Non-Interventionist Challenge To Monopolization Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The antitrust rules governing exclusionary conduct by dominant firms are among the most controversial in U.S. competition policy. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, they were debated in three arenas, involving legal policy, economic policy, and politics. In each arena, the dispute mainly arose as criticism of traditional standards by advocates of less intervention. Viewed through a political economy lens, the controversy can be understood as a potential challenge to an informal political bargain reached during the 1940s by which competition was adopted as national economic policy in preference to regulation or laissez-faire. From this perspective, and applying …
International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn
International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Beyond Schumpeter Vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, Jonathan Baker
Beyond Schumpeter Vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The relationship between competition and innovation is the subject of a familiar controversy in economics, between the Schumpeterian view that monopolies favor innovation and the opposite view, often associated with Kenneth Arrow, that competition favors innovation. Taking their cue from this debate, some commentators reserve judgment as to whether antitrust enforcement is good for innovation. Such misgivings are unnecessary. The modern economic learning about the connection between competition and innovation helps clarify the types of firm conduct and industry settings where antitrust interventions are most likely to foster innovation. Measured against this standard, contemporary competition policy holds up well. Today's …
Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, Jonathan Baker
Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This essay surveys important issues in antitrust market definition. It identifies settings in which market definition is useful, and evaluates methods of defining markets. It considers whether markets should be defined with respect to demand substitution only or whether supply substitution also should count. It addresses practical issues in defining markets, including the probative value of various types of evidence, how much buyer substitution is too much, application of the market definition algorithm of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Cellophane fallacy, and the advantages and disadvantages of defining submarkets. It also evaluates several controversial approaches to market definition, including price …
Introduction To Symposium On Integrating New Economic Learning With Antitrust Doctrine, Jonathan Baker
Introduction To Symposium On Integrating New Economic Learning With Antitrust Doctrine, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Roundtable With Former Directors Of The Bureau Of Economics, Jonathan Baker
Roundtable With Former Directors Of The Bureau Of Economics, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
The roundtable commemorates the 100th anniversary of the FTC's predecessor agency, the Bureau of Corporations. It was sponsored by the FTC's Bureau of Economics (BE) and focused on BE history and contributions of BE and economic analysis to antitrust and consumer protection enforcement, and to research and economic knowledge and policy. BE was featured because the original functions of the Bureau of Corporations were to collect information, to conduct industry and policy research, to prepare reports at the request of the Congress and the President. The panelists for the roundtable consisted of former BE Directors and Acting Directors from the …
Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise Of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment On Klein And Wiley), Jonathan Baker
Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise Of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment On Klein And Wiley), Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
A firm that discriminates in prices faces a downward sloping demand curve, and thus could potentially raise price by reducing output. For this reason, evidence of price discrimination is relevant to assessing the possibility of market power, as antitrust law has long recognized. But price discrimination can be beneficial as well as harmful, and can reasonably be termed competitive if entry is easy. Hence a demonstration that entry is easy rebuts the inference of anticompetitive effect when price discrimination is the basis for proof of market power, breaking the link between market power and anticompetitive effect. Klein and Wiley's proposal …
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
The Problem With Baker Hughes And Syufy: On The Role Of Entry In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
The Problem With Baker Hughes And Syufy: On The Role Of Entry In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
The Factional Foundations Of Competition Policy In America 1888-1992, James May
The Factional Foundations Of Competition Policy In America 1888-1992, James May
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, The Oligopoly Problem, And Contemporary Economic Theory, Jonathan Baker
Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, The Oligopoly Problem, And Contemporary Economic Theory, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Recent Developments In Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, Jonathan Baker
Recent Developments In Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.