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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor Nov 2002

The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor

Michigan Law Review

Legal scholars have recently advanced a behavioral approach to the law and economics school of thought in an attempt to improve its external validity and predictive power. The hallmark of this new approach is the replacement of the perfectly rational actor with a "boundedly rational" decisionmaker who, apart from being affected by emotion and motivation, has only limited cognitive resources. To function effectively in a complex :world, boundedly rational individuals must rely on cognitive heuristics - simplifying mental shortcuts - that inevitably lead people to make some systematic decision errors; as a result, their behavior necessarily deviates from that predicted …


Teoría General De La Prueba Judicial, Edward Ivan Cueva Jan 2002

Teoría General De La Prueba Judicial, Edward Ivan Cueva

Edward Ivan Cueva

No abstract provided.


It's A Question Of Market Access, Kyle W. Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger, Petros C. Mavroidis Jan 2002

It's A Question Of Market Access, Kyle W. Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, we argue that market access issues associated with the question of the optimal mandate of the World Trade Organization should be separated from nonmarket access issues. We identify race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues and suggest that the WTIO should address these concerns. We then describe ways that WTO principles and procedures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues, we argue that as a general matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while implicit links might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other labor and environmental …


Turning Competition On Its Head: Economic Analysis Of The Ec's Decision To Bar The Ge-Honeywell Merger, Paul Jin Jan 2002

Turning Competition On Its Head: Economic Analysis Of The Ec's Decision To Bar The Ge-Honeywell Merger, Paul Jin

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

On July 3, 2001, the Commission of the European Communities ("Commission") rejected the proposed $45 billion merger between The General Electric Company ("GE") and Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell"), which U.S. antitrust regulators had approved. Of the some 400 mergers involving U.S. companies reviewed by the Commission since 1990, only one had ever been barred. In that instance, however, U.S. authorities had also blocked the proposed transaction. Thus, the failed GE-Honeywell merger marked the first time the Commission had blocked a merger involving U.S. companies that had been approved by U.S. authorities. The Commission's move to block the GE-Honeywell merger brought …


The Electrical Deregulation Fiasco: Looking To Regulatory Federalism To Promote A Balance Between Markets And The Provision Of Public Goods, Jim Rossi Jan 2002

The Electrical Deregulation Fiasco: Looking To Regulatory Federalism To Promote A Balance Between Markets And The Provision Of Public Goods, Jim Rossi

Michigan Law Review

Over the last thirty years, regulators have deregulated just about every regulated industry. In no industry has deregulation raised as much fear and concern as in electric power markets. Even before the Enron debacle, a crisis that is more about the failures of corporate than regulatory law, it was clear that something had gone seriously wrong in the turn towards deregulation of electric power. Recent events in California are illustrative. In early 2000, consumers in California, the first state to deregulate retail power markets on a mass scale, saw repeated months of power interruptions. Many utility customers experienced a risk …


Vertical Integration And Media Regulation In The New Economy, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2002

Vertical Integration And Media Regulation In The New Economy, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent mergers and academic commentary have placed renewed focus on what has long been one of the central issues in media policy: whether media conglomerates can use vertical 'integration to harm competition. This Article seeks to move past previous studies, which have explored limited aspects of this issue, and apply the full sweep of modern economic theory to evaluate the regulation of vertical integration in media-related industries. It does so initially by applying the basic static efficiency analyses of vertical integration developed under the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools of antitrust law and economics to three industries: broadcasting, cable television, and …


Law And Regulatory Competition: Can They Co-Exist?, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2002

Law And Regulatory Competition: Can They Co-Exist?, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

It is possible to read Stephen Choi's article with admiration and enjoyment – until a critical point is reached at its very end. In an analysis that is balanced, nuanced, and thorough, Professor Choi initially reviews the recent debate over the role of law in fostering the development of financial markets. As others have also concluded, he finds a correlation between quality of law and financial development. At a few points, he may accept too easily the claim that the common law is superior to the civil law in fostering economic growth, without adequately considering the problem of multicollinearity that …


Economic Development, Competition Policy, And The World Trade Organization, Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis Jan 2002

Economic Development, Competition Policy, And The World Trade Organization, Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

At the recent WTO ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition, on the basis of explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the 5th WTO ministerial in 2003. Discussions in WTO since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to ‘core principles’ – nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning ‘hard core’ cartels. We argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries while not addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms …