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Articles 1 - 30 of 38
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Antisocial Innovation, Christopher Buccafusco, Samuel N. Weinstein
Antisocial Innovation, Christopher Buccafusco, Samuel N. Weinstein
Faculty Scholarship
Innovation is a form of civic religion in the United States. In the popular imagination, innovators are heroic figures. Thomas Edison, Steve Jobs, and (for a while) Elizabeth Holmes were lauded for their vision and drive and seen to embody the American spirit of invention and improvement. For their part, politicians rarely miss a chance to trumpet their vision for boosting innovative activity. Popular and political culture alike treat innovation as an unalloyed good. And the law is deeply committed to fostering innovation, spending billions of dollars a year to make sure society has enough of it. But this sunny …
A Reputational View Of Antitrust’S Consumer Welfare Standard, Murat C. Mungan, John M. Yun
A Reputational View Of Antitrust’S Consumer Welfare Standard, Murat C. Mungan, John M. Yun
Faculty Scholarship
A reform movement is underway in antitrust. Citing prior enforcement failures, deviations from the original intent of the antitrust laws, and overall rising levels of sector concentration, some are seeking to fundamentally alter or altogether replace the current consumer welfare standard, which has guided courts over the past fifty years. This policy push has sparked an intense debate over the best approach to antitrust law enforcement. In this Article, we examine a previously unexplored potential social cost from moving away from the consumer welfare standard: a loss in the information value to the public from a finding of liability. A …
Amazon's Pricing Paradox, Rory Van Loo, Nikita Aggarwal
Amazon's Pricing Paradox, Rory Van Loo, Nikita Aggarwal
Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust scholars have widely debated the apparent paradox of Amazon seemingly wielding monopoly power while offering low prices to consumers. A single company’s behavior thereby helped spark an intellectual renaissance as scholars debated why Amazon’s prices were so low, whether antitrust enforcers should intervene, and, eventually, how the field should be reformed for the era of large online platforms. One of the few things that all parties have agreed upon amidst those contentious conversations is that Amazon offers low prices. This Article challenges that assumption by demonstrating that Amazon charges higher prices than commonly understood. More importantly, unraveling the disconnect …
A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman
A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman
Faculty Scholarship
Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …
Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?, Anu Bradford, Yun-Chien Chang, Adam S. Chilton, Nuno Garoupa
Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?, Anu Bradford, Yun-Chien Chang, Adam S. Chilton, Nuno Garoupa
Faculty Scholarship
There is a large body of research in economics and law suggesting that the legal origin of a country – that is, whether its legal regime is based on English common law or French, German, or Nordic civil law – profoundly impacts a range of outcomes. However, the exact relationship between legal origin and legal substance has been disputed in the literature and not fully explored with nuanced legal coding. We revisit this debate while leveraging novel cross-country data sets that provide detailed coding of two areas of laws: property and antitrust. We find that having shared legal origins strongly …
Regulating Antitrust Through Trade Agreements, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Regulating Antitrust Through Trade Agreements, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust law is one of the most commonly deployed instruments of economic regulation around the world. To date, over 130 countries have adopted a domestic antitrust law. These countries comprise developed and developing nations alike, and combined produce over 95 percent of the world’s GDP. Most of the countries that have adopted an antitrust law have done so since 1990. This period of significant proliferation of antitrust laws also coincides with a notable expansion of international trade agreements, including the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the negotiation of numerous bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. These …
Error Costs, Ratio Tests, And Patent Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton, Wendy Xu
Error Costs, Ratio Tests, And Patent Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton, Wendy Xu
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the welfare tradeoff between patent and antitrust law. Since patent and antitrust law have contradictory goals, the question that naturally arises is how one should choose between the two in instances where there is a conflict. One sensible approach to choosing between two legal standards, or between proof standards with respect to evidence, is to consider the relative costs of errors. The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to false negatives in patent antitrust. We find that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust is the proportion of the sum …
The Race To The Middle, William Magnuson
The Race To The Middle, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
How does federalism affect the quality of law? It is one of the fundamental questions of our constitutional system. Scholars of federalism generally fall into one of two camps on the question. One camp argues that regulatory competition between states leads to a “race to the bottom,” in which states adopt progressively worse laws in order to pander to powerful constituencies. The other camp, conversely, argues that regulatory competition leads to a “race to the top,” incentivizing states to adopt progressively better laws in the search for more desirable outcomes for their constituencies. Despite their apparent differences, however, both the …
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …
Digital Platforms And Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton
Digital Platforms And Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This Article is about "big data" and antitrust law. Big data, for my purposes, refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of consumer data by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct, but to economies of scale. This Article discusses three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require …
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy And The Law, Tim Wu
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy And The Law, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
Human attention, valuable and limited in supply, is a resource. It has become commonplace, especially in the media and technology industries, to speak of an "attention economy" and of competition in "attention markets.” There is even an attentional currency, the "basic attention token," which purports to serve as a medium of exchange for user attention. Firms like Facebook and Google, which have emerged as two of the most important firms in the global economy, depend nearly exclusively on attention markets as a business model.
Yet despite the well-recognized commercial importance of attention markets, antitrust and consumer protection authorities have struggled …
Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall
Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall
Faculty Scholarship
We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion, including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial colluder, regardless of the apparent …
The Policy Challenge Of Artificial Intelligence, James Bessen
The Policy Challenge Of Artificial Intelligence, James Bessen
Faculty Scholarship
New "artificial intelligence" (AI) technology promises to bring dramatic social and economic changes, demanding major policy changes. In intellectual property and antitrust law, AI will exacerbate a damaging trend: across all major sectors of the economy, proprietary information technology is increasing the market dominance of large firms. This trend might not seem like bad news, but it is evidence of a slowdown in the spread of technical knowledge throughout the economy. The result is rising industry concentration, slower productivity growth and growing wage inequality. The key challenge to IP and antitrust policy will be counter this trend yet maintain innovation …
Market Power And Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution And Its Discontents, Lina M. Khan, Sandeep Vaheesan
Market Power And Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution And Its Discontents, Lina M. Khan, Sandeep Vaheesan
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, economic inequality has become a central topic of public debate in the United States and much of the developed world. The popularity of Thomas Piketty’s nearly 700-page tome, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, is a testament to this newfound focus on economic disparity. As top intellectuals, politicians, and public figures have come to recognize inequality as a major problem that must be addressed, they have offered a range of potential solutions. Frequently mentioned proposals include reforming the tax system, strengthening organized labor, revising international trade and investment agreements, and reducing the size of the financial sector.
One …
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a retailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and expand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e-commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other …
Harmful, Harmless, And Beneficial Uncertainty In Law, Scott Baker, Alex Raskolnikov
Harmful, Harmless, And Beneficial Uncertainty In Law, Scott Baker, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the impact of four types of law-related uncertainty on the utility of risk-neutral agents. We find that greater legal or factual uncertainty makes agents worse off if enforcement is targeted (meaning that greater deviations from what the law demands lead to a greater probability of enforcement), or if sanctions are graduated (meaning that greater deviations from what the law demands result in higher sanctions). In contrast, agents are indifferent to changes in detection uncertainty induced by variation in enforcement resources or to changes in sanction uncertainty arising from legally irrelevant factors. Finally, risk-neutral agents benefit from greater …
Markovits On Defining Monopolization: A Comment, Keith N. Hylton
Markovits On Defining Monopolization: A Comment, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
In this comment I focus on Richard Markovits’s definition of monopolization in his new book, Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law (Springer 2014), and also his assertion that monopolization is distributively unjust. I agree wholeheartedly with his approach to defining monopolization, though I might alter a few details. However, I think the distributive justice effects of monopolization are ambiguous.
"Section 5 And 'Unfair Methods Of Competition': Protecting Competition Or Increasing Uncertainty?", Tim Wu
"Section 5 And 'Unfair Methods Of Competition': Protecting Competition Or Increasing Uncertainty?", Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
Since the late 1980s, Section 5 of the FTC Act has come to center on a certain kind of case, the so-called anticompetitive “scheme” featuring extraordinary and nefarious conduct – like gaming a standards process, rigging industry tests, that sort of thing. Deception, fraud, bad-faith and oppressive action are typical. This kind of self-restraint has, to its credit, yielded a focus on cases where the conduct is extraordinary, an anticompetitive intent is obvious and the harm is substantial. At this point, the self-imposed limits on Section 5 enforcement are extensive enough that a critic could fairly accuse the agency of …
Deterrence And Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, Keith N. Hylton
Deterrence And Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on penalties against two groups of actors for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the violating firm's agents. Here, I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms. My area of application is antitrust, but the argument applies generally to other fields in which the government has the choice of punishing the agent, the firm, or both. This analysis suggests that whenever the firm has an incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively modest punishment for its agents, the firm can almost always induce its …
Markets, Morals, And Limits In The Exchange Of Human Eggs, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Markets, Morals, And Limits In The Exchange Of Human Eggs, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This article modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme.
Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho
Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho
Faculty Scholarship
We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant's activity. The reverse (payment) settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement. We examine the divergence between private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements). The results are applied to competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and antidumping.
A Competition Act By India, For India: The First Three Years Of Enforcement Under The New Competition Act, Dorothy S. Lund
A Competition Act By India, For India: The First Three Years Of Enforcement Under The New Competition Act, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
In 2002, India unveiled its new Competition Act. The Act substantially improves upon the previous competition regime, which regulated and condemned dominance even absent culpable conduct. Despite improvements, provisions of the Act have proven difficult for the fledgling Competition Commission (“the Commission”) to implement. For one, the Act overwhelmingly prefers rule of reason analysis to per se illegality for horizontal and vertical agreements. While this approach gives the Commission the flexibility to conduct a nuanced inquiry, the economic analysis required is challenging. So far, the Commission has struggled when applying basic antitrust economics in the hundred or so orders that …
The Brussels Effect, Anu Bradford
The Brussels Effect, Anu Bradford
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply underestimated global power that the EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that influence to the rest of the world. Without the need to use international institutions or seek other nations' cooperation, the EU has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a notable "Europeanization" of many important aspects of global commerce. The Article identifies the precise conditions for and the specific mechanism through which this externalization of EU's standards …
Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu
Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when "parallel pricing" – adoption of the same price by every firm in a market – should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of "parallel exclusion" – conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be market entrants. Parallel exclusion merits greater attention, for it can be far more harmful than parallel price elevation. Setting a high price leaves the field open for new entrants and may even attract them. In contrast, parallel action that excludes new entrants both …
American And European Monopolization Law: A Doctrinal And Empirical Comparison, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
American And European Monopolization Law: A Doctrinal And Empirical Comparison, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This paper focuses on the differences between Article 82 and Section 2, reflecting largely on the American experience. We start with a discussion of the American experience and use that as a background from which to examine the European law on monopolies. American law is more conservative (less interventionist), reflecting the error cost analysis that is increasingly common in American courts. The second half of this paper provides an empirical comparison of the American and European regimes. Although a preliminary empirical examination suggests that the scope of a country’s monopolization law is inversely related to its degree of trade dependence, …
The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton
The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Monopolization, the restriction of competition by a dominant firm, is regulated in roughly half of the world’s nations. The two most famous laws regulating monopolization are Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in the United States, and Article 82 of the European Community Treaty. Both laws have been understood as prohibiting ‘abuses’ of monopoly power.
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg
The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Before it was uncovered and prosecuted, the international vitamin cartel, known as "Vitamins, Inc." by its perpetrators, was extraordinarily successful. Estimates of cartel profits run as high as $18 billion (in 2003 dollars). In addition to substantial criminal sanctions, cartel members paid over $2 billion to American plaintiffs. When foreign plaintiffs tried to sue the foreign defendants in American courts, however, they encountered resistance. A trial court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA") to restrict the reach of the Sherman Act and preclude foreign purchasers from suing the foreign defendants. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the facts …
State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doctrine, Elizabeth Trujillo
State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doctrine, Elizabeth Trujillo
Faculty Scholarship
The state action antitrust exemption, also known as the state action immunity doctrine, is used by antitrust defendants to shield themselves against antitrust liability in instances where their anticompetitive conduct, if not under the aegis of state policy, would have been deemed a violation of federal antitrust law. Under the Midcal test, a court may grant state action immunity to a defendant if it is proven that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is pursuant to a clearly-articulated state policy and has been actively supervised by the state.
This paper evaluates the role, function, and definition of the state action exemption in …