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Vertical Restraints, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. represents the Supreme Court's latest effort to articulate the standards governing vertical restraints of trade under the United States anti-trust law. It is unlikely that this will be the last time the Court addresses this topic. Notwithstanding the many Supreme Court decisions in this area, several issues remain unresolved. Indeed, Monsanto may have created (or resurrected) as many new questions as it answered, a phenomenon characteristic of most prior opinions in this area.

At least part of the reason for this unsettled state is that, from the outset, the Supreme Court …

Anti-Trust And Economic Theory: Some Observations From The Us Experience, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of anti-trust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only) relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort out lawful from unlawful conduct. The result has been that while economics has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as …

Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This article, which was published in 1985, describes the development of a "Post-Chicago" antitrust policy. The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has made an important and lasting contribution to antitrust policy. The School has placed an emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence that will likely never disappear. At the same time, however, the Chicago School's approach to antitrust is defective for two important reasons. First of all, the notion that public policymaking should be guided exclusively by a notion of efficiency based on the neoclassical market efficiency model is naive. That notion both overstates the ability of the policymaker …

The Administration's Legislation: The National Cooperative Research Act Of 1984, The National Productivity And Innovation Act Of 1983, 18 J. Marshall L. Rev. 607 (1985), Kelly L. Morron

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.