Law and Economics Commons^™

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …

Cbs-Viacom And The Effects Of Media Mergers: An Economic Perspective, David Waterman

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …

Copyright And Democracy: A Cautionary Note, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Democratic theories of copyright have become quite the rage in recent years. A growing number of commentators have offered their views on the relationship between copyright law and the process of self-governance.' No scholar has been more committed to developing this perspective than Neil Netanel. In an important series of articles, Netanel has pursued a powerful and innovative project that attempts to reexamine copyright through the lens of democratic theory. His core concern is that the concentration of private wealth and power in communications and mass media is creating unprecedented disparities in the ability to be heard. The ""speech hierarchy"" …

Afterword: Antitrust And American Business Abroad Revisited, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …

Still Preying On Strategic Reputation Models Of Predation, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.