Law and Economics Commons^™

The Limits Of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, Dan Awrey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

From standardized contracts for loans, repurchase agreements, and derivatives, to stock exchanges and alternative trading platforms, to benchmark interest and foreign exchange rates, private market structures play a number of important roles within modern financial markets. These market structures hold out a number of significant benefits. Specifically, by harnessing the powerful incentives of market participants, these market structures can help lower information, agency, coordination, and other transaction costs, enhance the process of price discovery, and promote greater market liquidity. Simultaneously, however, successful market structures are the source of significant and often overlooked market distortions. These distortions--or limits of private ordering--stem …

Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

With the American economy stalled and another federal election campaign season well underway, the “outsourcing” of American jobs is again on the public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that claims for joblessness benefits are up, but also that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled since the last electoral cycle. This year’s political candidates have been quick to take note. In consequence, more than at any time since the early 1990s, continued American participation in the World Trade Organization, in the North American Free Trade Agreement, and in the processes of global economic integration more generally appear …

Market Power In Antitrust, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The concept of market power is at the core of antitrust. Philosophically, antitrust policy is aimed primarily at preventing firms from achieving, retaining, or abusing market power. Operationally, assessing whether a firm or firms have market power or any reasonable prospect for achieving it is often the first (and sometimes, the only) step in performing an antitrust analysis.

Few would dispute that market power should play a prominent role in antitrust analysis. Nevertheless, important questions remain. Some of these questions quite naturally focus on the precise degree of importance given to market power. Is it an essential ingredient in antitrust …

Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Geographic Market Definition In An International Context, George A. Hay, John C. Hilke, Philip B. Nelson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Market definition is generally regarded as a key step in antitrust analysis. Market definition has two components. Product market definition seeks to include all products that are meaningful substitutes. Geographic market definition seeks to incorporate all relevant sources of the product in question. This paper is concerned with geographic market definition and, in particular, how geographic markets are defined in situations where competition may, at least to some extent, transcend national boundaries.

The subject of the paper may be of some current interest for two reasons. First, the perception is widespread that, over the past twenty or so years, competition …

The Free Rider Rationale And Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Vertical Restraints, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. represents the Supreme Court's latest effort to articulate the standards governing vertical restraints of trade under the United States anti-trust law. It is unlikely that this will be the last time the Court addresses this topic. Notwithstanding the many Supreme Court decisions in this area, several issues remain unresolved. Indeed, Monsanto may have created (or resurrected) as many new questions as it answered, a phenomenon characteristic of most prior opinions in this area.

At least part of the reason for this unsettled state is that, from the outset, the Supreme Court …

Anti-Trust And Economic Theory: Some Observations From The Us Experience, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of anti-trust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only) relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort out lawful from unlawful conduct. The result has been that while economics has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as …

Pigeonholes In Antitrust, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Economics Of Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The revival of interest among economists in predatory pricing, spawned by Areeda and Turner's 1975 article, and the tidal wave of literature which has followed, creates a serious problem for the lawyer interested in keeping up with what economists are saying on the subject. Articles appearing in the standard economics journals are often inaccessible, due to the advanced level of mathematics normally employed, and seem of little apparent relevance, due to the detailed but often artificially sounding assumptions used to generate conclusions. The materials appearing in law reviews, while perhaps less technical, is voluminous and not always original, Worst of …

Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories And The Evolution Of Legal Standards, Joseph F. Brodley, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Recent years have witnessed a virtual explosion in the legal and economic literature dealing with predatory pricing. Equally dramatic has been the swift adoption by several courts of policy conclusions derived from this literature—a development that is startling, given the complexity and volume of the literature and the lack of consensus among legal and economic scholars. The result has been to raise an acute problem for lawyers and judges who must assess the validity and applicability of competing economic models, mold stubborn and unruly facts to fit abstract economic theories, translate economic theories into legal doctrines, and resolve puzzling cost …

Subsidies And Countervailing Duties--Analysis And A Proposal, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The author recommends a new scheme for regulating the use of government subsidies and countervailing duties in international trade, an area presently regulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. He contends that these rules should be based to a large extent on principles of free trade and economic efficiency. In addition to setting out proposed regulations, the author analyzes the strength and weaknesses of free trade theory and of the present GATT rules regarding subsidies and countervailing duties.

Diversification Of Ownership In The Regulated Industries – The Folklore Of Regulation, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.