Law and Economics Commons^™

Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the majority of other writers. However, it means different things to different people. For example, some members of the Supreme Court can simultaneously acknowledge the antitrust consumer welfare principle even as they approve practices that result in immediate, obvious, and substantial consumer harm. At the same time, however, a properly defined consumer welfare principle is essential if antitrust is to achieve its statutory purpose, which is to pursue practices that injure competition. The wish to make antitrust a more general social justice statute is understandable: …

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. Mergers can also injure competition in markets where the firms purchase. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases have applied merger law to buyers. This article concerns an even more rarefied subset, and one that has barely been mentioned. Nevertheless, its implications are staggering. Some mergers may be unlawful because they injure competition in the labor market by enabling the post-merger firm anticompetitively to suppress wages or salaries. …

Were The 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?, Alan J. Meese, Sarah L. Stafford

Faculty Publications

This paper examines the impact of the 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines on the stock market prices of publicly traded firms in the United States. We argue that those Guidelines were perceived by the market as a real change in enforcement policy that would result in substantial deregulation of mergers throughout the economy. We conduct an event study of S&P 500 firms to test this hypothesis and find evidence of a significant positive effect on the stock prices of firms in moderately concentrated industries subject to antitrust regulation, the firms for which the 1982 Guidelines articulate a substantially less …

Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

The Communications Act of 1934 created a dual review process in which mergers in the communications industry are reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the antitrust authorities. Commentators have criticized dual review not only as costly and redundant, but also as subject to substantive and procedural abuse. The process of clearing the 2011 Comcast-NBC Universal merger provides a useful case study to examine whether such concerns are justified. A review of the empirical context reveals that the FCC intervened even though the relevant markets were not structured in a way that would ordinarily raise anticompetitive concerns. …

Antitrust Law And Economic Theory: Finding A Balance, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

Over the past forty years, the federal courts have relied more and more on economic theory to inform their antitrust analyses. Economic theory has indeed provided guidance with respect to antitrust issues and assisted the courts in reaching rational outcomes. At the same time, infusion of economic evidence into antitrust cases has made these cases more complex, lengthier, more expensive to litigate, and less predictable.

This Article argues that courts need to restore the balance between facts and economic theory in undertaking antitrust analysis. The problem is not that judges and juries cannot reach good outcomes in antitrust cases, but …

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …

Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …

Decision Theory And Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation For Efficient Enforcement, Ira Horowitz

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust - Standing - State Does Not Have Standing To Sue As Parens Patriae Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act For Damages To The General Economy Attributed To Violations Of The Antitrust Laws, James M. Papada Iii

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Patent-Antitrust Balance: Proposals For Change, N.R. Powers

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hawley: The New Deal And The Monopoly Problem, Arthur D. Austin

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The New Deal and the Monopoly Problem By E. W. Hawley

Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts -- From Economic Theory To Legal Policy, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece

Michigan Law Review

Public control of business in the United States has proceeded, in most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent, private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives.

Boycotts And Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, Richard M. Buxbaum

Michigan Law Review

It is currently a common if still relatively unheralded practice for a "fired" dealer to bring an antitrust action against his former manufacturer-supplier (and perhaps other dealers), alleging that his termination was the result of a boycott. Boycotts-collective efforts to obtain the exclusion of a party from a market-are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus, questions concerning the justification for the boycott or the significance of the offender's market position do not arise.

Oppenheim: Unfair Trade Practices, Cases And Comments, Glen E. Weston

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Unfair Trade Practices, Cases and Comments by S. Chesterfield Oppenheim

The Relativity Of Economic Evidence In Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions Force The Issue, Betty Bock

Michigan Law Review

The following discussion explores the interaction between law and economics as these two disciplines relate to the issues which arise under section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, and examines the correlative problems implicit in the working arrangements between lawyers and economists when they are asked to counsel an enforcement agency or an acquiring or acquired company concerning the potential competitive consequences of a merger.

Antitrust Policy In Distribution, Kendall B. Debevoise

Michigan Law Review

The American genius lies quite as much in distribution as in manufacturing. Other peoples have demonstrated equal or greater creative ability in many fields. And it is debatable whether their talents are any less at mass production given adequate economic demand. But they have nowhere shown the American genius for distribution. It is axiomatic that if you manufacture in Detroit and your potential customer lives in New York, you need mutual friends. We seem to have figured out better ways to provide better friends for this purpose than any other nation.

But manufacturing came first. Someone had to build a …

Regulation Of Business - Proof Of Seller's Costs In Robinson-Patman Act Buyer Proceedings, Arthur M. Wisehart S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The purposes of this comment are to analyze the holding of the Court in the Automatic Canteen case and to relate the language of the opinion to the more general problem of defining the extent of buyer responsibility under section 2(f). As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to examine the pertinent statutory provisions. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful for buyers in interstate commerce" ... knowingly to induce or receive a · discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." In other words, it prohibits buyers from knowingly inducing or receiving the benefit of …