Anthropomorphism Is The First Step,
2019
Centre d'Eco-Etho Recherche et Education.
Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
Individuals have intentions, beliefs and choices. This sense of “personhood” has been known and used for centuries by those who have dealt professionally with any nonhuman mammal. All mammals have a lot in common physically and mentally. The first step toward understand another species’ point of view is anthropomorphism.
Our Brains Make Us Out To Be Unique In Ways We Are Not,
2019
Montclair State University
Our Brains Make Us Out To Be Unique In Ways We Are Not, Matthew J. Criscione, Julian Paul Keenan
Animal Sentience
Humans have long viewed themselves in a favorable light. This bias is consistent with a general pattern of self-enhancement. Neural systems in the medial prefrontal cortex underlie this way of thinking, which, even when false, may be beneficial for survival. It is hence not surprising that we often disregard contrary evidence in believing ourselves superior.
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration,
2019
University of West Florida
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Animal Sentience
Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.
Humans Have Always Been Unique!,
2019
School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews
Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew
Animal Sentience
Arguments about human uniqueness apply not only to extant species but also to extinct ones, that is, the hominin predecessors of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Thus, unique and superior are doubly relative terms, in past and present. The scope for empirical comparison faces a spectrum of difficulty, from material (e.g., artefacts) to non-material (e.g., concepts) phenomena.
Anthropocentrism: Practical Remedies Needed,
2019
The Hague University of Applied Sciences
Anthropocentrism: Practical Remedies Needed, Helen Kopnina
Animal Sentience
It is true that one of the harmful consequences of creating categories where one group is unique and superior to others is that it justifies discriminating against the inferior groups. And outright abuse of nonhuman animals is indeed morally unjustifiable. But what is to be done about it?
“I Am Not An Animal”,
2019
Animal Studies Repository
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.
The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods,
2019
ECOBIOMAR, Instituto de Investigaciones Marinas (CSIC)
The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra
Animal Sentience
I present a brief overview of the richness of cephalopod behavioral, neural and cognitive traits.
Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes,
2019
Oakland University
Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin review evidence of the complexity of sheep cognition, concluding that researchers ought to feel sheepish about misrepresenting ovine cognitive capacities. However, the failure to situate the data in critical context risks pulling the wool over readers’ eyes.
Sheep In Aesop’S And Phaedrus’S Fables,
2019
Tilburg University
Sheep In Aesop’S And Phaedrus’S Fables, Matteo Colombo, Chiara Raucea
Animal Sentience
Sheep feature in various animal fables. Marino & Merskin suggest that “we” view sheep as “docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid,” but animal fables do not support this view. In Aesop’s and Phaedrus’s fables, sheep are a primary target of injustice; but they are not passive targets. Sheep endure injustice actively and honestly. They are intelligent, aware and outspoken about their own condition.
Debunking Human Prejudice And Blindness,
2019
University of Houston-Downtown
Debunking Human Prejudice And Blindness, Peter J. Li
Animal Sentience
Human prejudice and blindness to animal suffering are shocking. Despite their differences in culture, politics, and religious beliefs, humans have one thing in common. They see nonhuman animals as inferior and have since time immemorial assumed a dominant position in an asymmetrical human-animal relationship. When it comes to human-animal relations, there is no “clash of civilizations.” Human prejudice and blindness are predicated on “common sense assumptions” about the natural world and nonhuman animals in particular. Marino & Merskin’s review is part of the growing effort to debunk the assumptions that have shaped human actions so as to end the injustice …
Applied Cognition Research To Improve Sheep Welfare,
2019
University of California, Davis
Applied Cognition Research To Improve Sheep Welfare, Kristina Horback
Animal Sentience
If a change is going to occur in the care and management of domestic sheep, there needs to be a collaborative effort across many disciplines. This review by Marino & Merskin of the literature on cognitive processing in domestic sheep is limited by the inherent bias of the authors, including the impracticable goal of eliminating sheep production. Animal welfare concerns about the management of commercial sheep are valid; however, in order to make a difference, we need to develop an application for this knowledge about cognitive abilities in sheep.
Complexity Of Wild Ruminants,
2019
None
Complexity Of Wild Ruminants, Ozy Brennan
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin discuss ways that popular culture winds up depicting sheep as meek and unintelligent rather than as the complex, social species they are. I extend their analysis to apply to wild ruminants, particularly deer.
Just Policy Paralysis?,
2019
Texas A & M University - College Station
Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that policy making should include the interests and well-being of present and future generations of humans and nonhumans. There are deep and abiding conflicts of interest both between and within these groups. Trying to factor in so many considerations is likely to generate political gridlock. The authors need to explain how to avoid this.
Animal Sentience Is Not Enough To Motivate Conservation,
2019
Harvard University
Animal Sentience Is Not Enough To Motivate Conservation, Irene M. Pepperberg
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman suggest that humans’ views of their own superiority are a source of their callousness toward the environment. I do not disagree but point to a number of other issues that must be addressed for conservation efforts to succeed.
Are Some Animals Also Moral Agents?,
2019
Trent University
Are Some Animals Also Moral Agents?, Kyle Johannsen
Animal Sentience
Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are unique, but rejected the claim that our uniqueness justifies denying animals moral rights. Humans were thought to be unique specifically because we possess moral agency. In this commentary, I explore the claim that some nonhuman animals are also moral agents, and I take note of its counter-intuitive implications.
Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom,
2019
Petwatch
Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung
Animal Sentience
The difference between a cod and a lizard is not just a quantitative one. The recognition of qualitative differences between species does not imply a moral ranking. Our species’ special abilities to shape the earth mean we have a special responsibility for ensuring a liveable future for all organisms, human and non-human.
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds,
2019
Monash University
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.
Unique In Degree Not Kindness,
2019
Oakland University
Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Humans are certainly unique among living species. This is evident in the transformation of human environments and its resulting impact on other animals. However, many of the traits unique to humans are costly as well as adaptive and should certainly not be used to elevate their status above that of other species.
Mirror Neurons And Humanity’S Dark Side,
2019
University of New England,Armidale,Australia
Mirror Neurons And Humanity’S Dark Side, Gisela Kaplan
Animal Sentience
The last two decades have revealed brain mechanisms in birds and primates showing that, contrary to earlier prejudices, some birds can do things (cognitive and affective) on par with or even better than great apes and humans. The old dichotomies are breaking down; but the dark side is that these insights come at a time in the Anthropocene when humans have caused and continue to cause mass extinctions.
Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant,
2019
University of Minho
Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals, cruelty to animals is not justified. Though I agree with their conclusion, I do not think their argument works. Many human beings do have some capacities that animals do not have and are greater in some respects, in the sense of having superior abilities. It is a better argument to deny that any of that is morally relevant. Sentience suffices for moral consideration, and for deriving a moral duty not to harm other animals and to assist them when they are in need.
