Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology Commons^™

Improving Spatial Prioritisation For Remote Marine Regions: Optimising Biodiversity Conservation And Sustainable Development Trade-Offs, Cordelai H. Moore, Ben T. Radford, Hugh P. Possingham, Andrew Heyward, Romola R. Stewart, Matthew E. Watts, Jim Prescott, Stephen J. Newman, Euan S. Harvey, Rebecca Fisher, Clay W. Bryce, Ryan J. Lowe, Oliver Berry, Alexis Espinosa- Gayosso, Errol Sporer, Thor Saunders

Fisheries Research Articles

Creating large conservation zones in remote areas, with less intense stakeholder overlap and limited environmental information, requires periodic review to ensure zonation mitigates primary threats and fill gaps in representation, while achieving conservation targets. Follow-up reviews can utilise improved methods and data, potentially identifying new planning options yielding a desirable balance between stakeholder interests. This research explored a marine zoning system in north-west Australia–a biodiverse area with poorly documented biota. Although remote, it is economically significant (i.e. petroleum extraction and fishing). Stakeholder engagement was used to source the best available biodiversity and socio-economic data and advanced spatial analyses produced 765 …

Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.

Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin

Animal Sentience

Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.

Population Dynamics And Genetic Differentiation Of The Threatened Freshwater Mussel Species Fusconaia Askewi, Fusconaia Lananensis, And Pleurobema Riddellii, Edith D. Plants-Paris

Biology Theses

North America has the most diverse freshwater mussel fauna in the world with approximately 300 species; unfortunately, extinction rates for freshwater mussels rivals the rates of many other groups of organisms. Population-level natural life history data is essential in the management of species of conservation concern, yet basic information about freshwater mussel life-history and demographic traits are unknown for many species. To further complicate matters, taxonomic uncertainty exists among some members of the group. The work detailed herein had two goals: to gain further understanding of the taxonomic relationship between Fusconaia lananensis and F. askewi by sequencing genes that had …

Eelgrass Distribution In The Great Bay Estuary For 2014, Frederick T. Short

PREP Reports & Publications

See also: "Eelgrass/Macroalgae Discussion Primer for TAC Activities 2016-2017" http://scholars.unh.edu/prep/355

Eelgrass (Zostera marina L.) is an essential habitat for the Great Bay Estuary (GBE) because it is the basis of an estuarine food web that supports many of the recreationally, commercially and ecologically important species in the estuary and beyond. Eelgrass provides food for ducks, geese and swans, as well as food, nursery habitat, and shelter for juvenile fish and shellfish. Eelgrass filters estuarine waters and improves water clarity, removing both nutrients and suspended sediments from the water column; its roots and rhizomes bind and hold sediments in place, thereby …

To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …

No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.

What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker

Animal Sentience

Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.

A Review Of The Welfare Impact On Pinnipeds Of Plastic Marine Debris, Andrew Butterworth

Reduction and Degradation of Habitat Collection

Uncounted, and usually unobserved, numbers of pinnipeds find themselves entangled in lost fishing gear, monofilament line, nets, rope, plastic packaging in the ocean or on the shoreline. These animals may carry debris wrapped around themselves for long periods, and often die as a result, sometimes from deep chronic wounds. The pinniped species most affected by this modern and manmade phenomenon are fur seals, monk seals, and California sea lions, and to a lesser extent gray, common, and monk seals. Entanglement rates described range up to 7.9% of local populations annually, and the common entangling materials; packing bands, fragments of lost …

Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg

Animal Sentience

Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.

Differential Plant Invasiveness Is Not Always Driven By Host Promiscuity With Bacterial Symbionts, Metha M. Klock, Luke G. Barrett, Peter H. Thrall, Kyle E. Harms

Faculty Publications, Environmental Studies

Identification of mechanisms that allow some species to outcompete others is a fundamental goal in ecology and invasive species management. One useful approach is to examine congeners varying in invasiveness in a comparative framework across native and invaded ranges. Acacia species have been widely introduced outside their native range of Australia, and a subset of these species have become invasive in multiple parts of the world. Within specific regions, the invasive status of these species varies. Our study examined whether a key mechanism in the life history of Acacia species, the legume-rhizobia symbiosis, influences acacia invasiveness on a regional scale. …

Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.

Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens

Animal Sentience

Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.

What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?

Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson

Animal Sentience

A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.

Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of mental life from the orthodox definition but argues that implicit unity of mind is sufficient for conferring personhood. This allows more or all animals to be considered persons. Implicit unity of mind may be a bridge too far for those who endorse the orthodox account of personhood, and for good reasons. More fundamentally, who gets to decide what personhood entails or that personhood per se matters to such other issues as who receives legal or moral status and consideration? Perhaps we should worry less about definitions …

Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye

Animal Sentience

I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron have nothing to say.

Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo

Animal Sentience

King’s How animals grieve beautifully describes several ways in which animals and humans show a similar capacity for grief. Yet this book does not sufficiently emphasise the language-empowered capacity to objectify thinking and sentiments about death, which makes human mourning unique. Here I put this capacity into focus and relate it to the social-normative aspect of human mourning that seems to be missing in other animals.

Insects Join The Consciousness Fray, Bjorn H. Merker

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron's review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect behavior is orchestrated without the benefit of central integrative mechanisms. Given their existence, the authors go on to ask whether these central mechanisms also feature the kind of integrative operations that support sentience, and propose that they do. Along the way they raise a number of conceptual and evidentiary issues of fundamental importance for the neuroscience of consciousness, allowing me to comment favorably on a number of them. I conclude by pointing to ways in which the conception of insect sentience they outline might be tested …