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6,337 full-text articles. Page 145 of 226.

Fish And Plant Sentience: Anesthetized Plants And Fishes Cannot Respond To Stimuli, Ken Yokawa, František Baluška 2018 Utsunomiya University

Fish And Plant Sentience: Anesthetized Plants And Fishes Cannot Respond To Stimuli, Ken Yokawa, František Baluška

Animal Sentience

Recent denial of fish sentience is at variance with the fact that all living organisms need environmental awareness in order to survive in a continuously fluctuating environment. Moreover, fish sentience – like plant sentience – is also strongly supported by the sensitivity of fishes and plants to diverse anesthetics.


If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor 2018 Ripon College

If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor

Animal Sentience

Whereas we have denied the experience of pain to animals, including human babies, the evidence is becoming clearer that animals across a variety of species have the capacity to feel pain (Bellieni, 2012). As converging findings are collected from pain studies and the study of cognition, it is becoming harder to deny that fish are among the species that do feel pain.


Defining Denial And Sentient Seafood, Jennifer Jacquet 2018 New York University

Defining Denial And Sentient Seafood, Jennifer Jacquet

Animal Sentience

Sneddon et al. address the scientists who reject the empirical evidence on fish sentience, calling them “sceptics” and their work “denial”. This is the first article to frame the question of fish sentience in these terms, and it provides an obvious opening for social science and humanities research in the science of fish sentience. It is also worth asking what practical changes in the lives of fish might arise from the mounting evidence of their sentience. I suggest that the relationship between sentience and our sense of moral obligation is not as clear as we often assume.


Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai 2018 University of Toronto

Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai

Animal Sentience

The question of whether fish feel pain is muddied by anthropomorphic thinking. Comparing biological phenomena in two species should be informed by the criteria for good animal models: face validity, construct validity and predictive validity. Viewed through this lens, we argue that fish do feel pain and may possess some level of sentience. Evolutionary relatedness, hence similarities and differences between species (fish and humans in this case), are not about black vs. white but about shades of grey.


Denialism And Muddying The Water Or Organized Skepticism And Clarity? That Is The Question, Ben Diggles, Howard I. Browman 2018 DigsFish Services

Denialism And Muddying The Water Or Organized Skepticism And Clarity? That Is The Question, Ben Diggles, Howard I. Browman

Animal Sentience

The research being commented on here has been criticized and defended in journals. Sneddon et al. (2018) add nothing substantive. We have nothing further to add. Readers are referred to Diggles (2018) and to Browman et al. (2018) for a detailed assessment.


Degrees Of Sentience?, Jonathan Birch 2018 London School of Economics and Political Science

Degrees Of Sentience?, Jonathan Birch

Animal Sentience

I focus on the possibility of sentience in zebrafish larvae. The evidence here prompts two intuitive reactions that are difficult to reconcile: the reaction that larvae, if sentient, should be protected in some way, and the reaction that larvae, if capable of nociception, should be used as replacements for adults. Both reactions are reasonable, but they can be reconciled only by constructing a framework for assigning degrees of protection in proportion to degrees of sentience.


The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti 2018 IULM University

The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti

Animal Sentience

The basis of pain could be the causal nexus between one’s phylogenetic/ontogenetic history and one’s behavior. It might turn out that the neural implementation is immaterial to the instantiation of pain. Widely different neural structures may token the same pain-type, and nearly identical neural structures may token different types.


Time To (Finally) Acknowledge That Fish Have Emotionality And Pain, Konstantin A. Demin, Anton M. Lakstygal, Allan V. Kalueff 2018 Saint-Petersburg State University

Time To (Finally) Acknowledge That Fish Have Emotionality And Pain, Konstantin A. Demin, Anton M. Lakstygal, Allan V. Kalueff

Animal Sentience

The increasing work using fish as a model organism calls for a better understanding of their sentience. While growing evidence suggests that pain and emotionality exist in zebrafish, many deniers continue to ignore the evidence. Here we revisit the main conceptual breakthroughs in the field that argue clearly for pain and emotionality. We call for an end to denial and a focus on studying the mechanisms of fish pain and emotionality, and their translational relevance to human conditions.


Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters 2018 University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston

Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters

Animal Sentience

Sentience is essential to most definitions of pain, including a detailed definition invoked by Sneddon et al. to argue that adult and perhaps larval fish feel pain. Because proving painful sentience in non-human animals is not feasible, multiple lines of indirect evidence are needed to implicate pain. This commentary examines the list of 17 criteria used by Sneddon et al. to conclude that fish have conscious pain. The criteria include tests of nociceptive, motivational, and cognitive properties useful for revealing pain-like states that can be understood biologically and be related evolutionarily to human pain. However, additional research is needed to …


Nocifensive Behavior As Evidence For Sentient Pain In Fish, Marissol Leite da Silva, Caio Maximino, Diógenes Henrique Siqueira-Silva 2018 Universidade Federal Do Sul e Sudeste do Pará

Nocifensive Behavior As Evidence For Sentient Pain In Fish, Marissol Leite Da Silva, Caio Maximino, Diógenes Henrique Siqueira-Silva

Animal Sentience

Fish nocifensive behavior can be studied and understood similarly to the way pain is studied and understood in more advanced vertebrates. Nocifensive behavior is a behavioral and physiological response to a noxious stimulus that leads to the fish avoiding it in the future. This behavioral flexibility is an important criterion for inferring pain sentience in fish. Modulation of the nocifensive behavior by anxiety, fear, or stress has already been demonstrated in zebrafish. The affective experiences of fish will not be identical to those of human beings, clearly. Empirical research will need to ascertain how similar they are.


Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz 2018 New York University

Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz

Animal Sentience

Sneddon et al. rightly point out that the evidence of fish pain is now so strong and comprehensive that arguments against it have become increasingly difficult to defend in balanced academic discourse. But sentience involves more than just pain. Recent research indicates that fish have an impressive range of cognitive capacities, including the capacity for pleasure, in the form of play and other behaviors likely to involve positively valenced experience. Having made the case for pain, research can now focus on other aspects of fish sentience. Doing so will not only provide a more complete picture of the mental lives …


Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown 2018 University of Liverpool

Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown

Animal Sentience

The majority of commentaries are supportive of our position on the scepticism that muddies the waters surrounding fish pain and sentience. There is substantial empirical evidence for pain in fish. Animals’ experience of pain cannot be compared to artificial intelligence (AI) because AI can only mimic responses to nociceptive input on the basis of human observations and programming. Accepting that fish are sentient would not be detrimental to the industries reliant on fish. A more proactive discussion between scientists and stakeholders is needed to improve fish welfare for the benefit of all.


Canine Emotions: Guidelines For Research, Miiamaaria V. Kujala 2018 University of Helsinki

Canine Emotions: Guidelines For Research, Miiamaaria V. Kujala

Animal Sentience

In the target article, I called for a discussion on the nature and extent of dogs’ emotions. The commentators generally agreed on the existence of dog emotions, but the diversity and quality of dog emotions, as well as the influence of human social cognition on perceiving dog emotions, raised more debate. To respond to the stimulating commentaries, I touch briefly on the philosophy of (canine) mind and discuss further the benefits of comparing cognition across species, secondary emotions, and the shaping of canine emotions by evolution, breeding and experience. I conclude with suggestions for future research guidelines on studies of …


Fish Consciousness, David Gamez 2018 Middlesex University, U.K.

Fish Consciousness, David Gamez

Animal Sentience

Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuroanatomy has similarities with the structures in the human brain that support consciousness. (2) The complexity and flexibility of fish behaviour suggest that they are conscious. This commentary will argue that neither the neuroanatomical nor the behavioural argument can provide conclusive evidence for consciousness in fish. We should suspend judgement until we have discovered mathematical theories of consciousness that can reliably map between states of consciousness and states of the physical world.


Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness, Uta Maria Juergens 2018 Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich

Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness, Uta Maria Juergens

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman attack the idea that humans are unique and therefore superior to nonhuman beings. They call on humankind to use their “intellect to change [their] actions.” I am in full accord with their line of thought, which differentiates uniqueness from superiority and enjoins humans to take responsible action. I suggest, however, that humans are unique with regard to cognitive fluidity. The same conclusions can be reached via another argument based on human uniqueness.


Good News: Humans Are Neither Distinct Nor Superior, Anne Benvenuti 2018 University of Winchester

Good News: Humans Are Neither Distinct Nor Superior, Anne Benvenuti

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that to correct our thinking about the supposed superiority of humans over other animals, we must train our reasoned investigation upon ourselves. Their thesis may usefully be viewed from within the general findings of the cognitive revolution in science, particularly findings that speak to the limits of rationality in everyday thought of humans. That we have failed — throughout a long history of scientific and philosophical thought — to ask fundamental questions about animal cognition and emotion is rooted in the fact that much of our thinking, feeling, and behaving is beyond our own immediate grasp. …


Using Anthropocentrism To The Benefit Of Other Species, Vanessa Wilson 2018 German Primate Center

Using Anthropocentrism To The Benefit Of Other Species, Vanessa Wilson

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (2018) argue that we should not consider humans as unique or superior to other animals when we have the chance to explore the diversity of the traits of other species. This is a valid and progressive point in our approach to research, but I suggest that an anthropocentric approach can have animal welfare benefits when it helps us perceive other species – especially distantly related ones such as crustaceans – in a human light.


Individuals In The Wild, Bob Fischer 2018 Texas State University

Individuals In The Wild, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If many wild animals have net negative lives, then we have to consider how likely it is that the good for animals, considered as individuals, aligns with the good for species, or the climate, or the preservation of wild spaces.


How To Foster Respect For Animals? Superiority, Dissimilarity, And Prejudice, Matteo Colombo 2018 Tilburg University

How To Foster Respect For Animals? Superiority, Dissimilarity, And Prejudice, Matteo Colombo

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (C & H) might be taken to argue as follows: Humans may treat animals however they want only if humans are superior to animals. But humans are not superior to animals. Therefore, humans may not treat animals however they want. Whatever its merit, this is not C & H’s actual argument. Their point, instead, is that humans often mistreat animals because they tend to perceive them as inferior. A remedy for animal mistreatment would then be acknowledging the deep similarities between us and animals. But is C & H’s suggested remedy likely to be effective to foster …


Two Fallacies In Comparisons Between Humans And Non-Humans, Don Ross 2018 University College Cork; University of Cape Town; Georgia State University

Two Fallacies In Comparisons Between Humans And Non-Humans, Don Ross

Animal Sentience

The hypothesis that humans are superior to non-humans by virtue of higher cognitive powers is often supported by two recurrent fallacies: (1) that any competence shown by humans but not by our closest living relatives (apes) must be unique to humans; and (2) that grades of intelligence can be inferred from behavior without regard to motivational structures.


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