Neuroscience and Neurobiology Commons^™

Evaluating Competition Between Verbal And Implicit Systems With Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy, Troy A. Schiebel

Honors Undergraduate Theses

In category learning, explicit processes function through the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and implicit processes function through the basal ganglia. Research suggested that these two systems compete with each other. The goal of this study was to shed light on this theory. 15 undergraduate subjects took part in an event-related experiment that required them to categorize computer-generated line-stimuli, which varied in length and/or angle depending on condition. Subjects participated in an explicit "rule-based" (RB) condition and an implicit "information-integration" (II) condition while connected to a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) apparatus, which measured the hemodynamic response (HR) in their PFC. Each condition …

The Effect Of Caffeine On Migraine Headaches, Deborah Shimshoni

Honors Undergraduate Theses

As the most widely consumed drug around the globe, there is a vast array of contradicting research available on caffeine. One of the most debated and researched topics on caffeine is its effect on the brain. Meanwhile, the data on the neurological condition of migraine has information scattered throughout countless research articles and experiments.

Although neither migraine or caffeine are completely understood by the medical world, this analysis attempts to give a more coherent understanding of the relationship between the two. This is done by first understanding the known and theorized mechanisms of caffeine as well as the pathologies of …

The Role Of Sox4 In Regulating Choroid Fissure Closure And Retinal Neurogenesis, Wen Wen

Theses and Dissertations--Biology

The development of the vertebrate eye is tightly controlled by precise genetic regulations. From a single ocular primordium to bilateral eyes with complex structures and cell types, it requires intensive proliferation and migration for cells in both the ectoderm and mesoderm to accomplish ocular morphogenesis, and during this process cell differentiation and interaction takes place to establish the complex composition of ocular cell types and cellular connections. Genetic defects can lead to severe abnormalities in eye morphogenesis and cell differentiation during ocular development. A tremendous amount of work has been done to identify both intrinsic and extrinsic factors that regulate …

The Role Of Astrocytic Calcineurin Activation And Downstream Signaling In Neurodegenerative Diseases, Melanie M. Pleiss

Theses and Dissertations--Pharmacology and Nutritional Sciences

Calcineurin (CN) is a calcium (Ca²⁺)-sensitive serine/threonine protein phosphatase that plays a significant role in several cell signaling pathways, and has been implicated in many neurodegenerative diseases including Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and vascular cognitive impairment and dementia (VCID). Although normally found in neurons, CN also appears at high levels in activated astrocytes under conditions of injury and disease. To elucidate the role of astrocytic calcineurin signaling in neurodegenerative diseases, our lab has used primary rat astrocytes, transgenic and diet-induced mouse models of dementia, and human tissue biospecimens from confirmed AD and VCID cases.

To better understand mechanisms for …

Sensitivity Of Composite Scores To Amyloid Burden In Preclinical Alzheimer's Disease: Introducing The Z-Scores Of Attention, Verbal Fluency, And Episodic Memory For Nondemented Older Adults Composite Score, Yen Ying Lim, Peter J. Snyder, Robert H. Pietrzak, Albulene Ukiqi, Victor L. Villemagne, David Ames, Olivier Salvado, Pierrick Bourgeat, Ralph N. Martins, Colin L. Masters, Christopher C. Rowe, Paul Maruff

Research outputs 2014 to 2021

Introduction:

Cognitive composite scores developed for preclinical Alzheimer's disease (AD) often consist of multiple cognitive domains as they may provide greater sensitivity to detect β-amyloid (Aβ)-related cognitive decline than episodic memory (EM) composite scores alone. However, this has never been empirically tested. We compared the rate of cognitive decline associated with high Aβ (Aβ+) and very high Aβ (Aβ++) in cognitively normal (CN) older adults on three multidomain cognitive composite scores and one single-domain (EM) composite score.

Methods:

CN older adults (n = 423) underwent Aβ neuroimaging and completed neuropsychological assessments at baseline, and at 18-, 36-, 54-, …

Excess Folic Acid As A Potential Competitor Of Glutamate May Interfere With Neural Development, Benjamin Fick

Honors Program Theses

Folic acid, Vitamin B9, is strongly advised as a supplement taken by pregnant woman to maintain the health of the embryo, and deficiency increases the risk of neural tube defects. However, a safe upper limit of folate to consume has not been established, and an excess of dietary folate may interfere with neurodevelopmental metabolism, increasing the risk of adverse outcomes, including autism spectrum disorder (ASD). It has been suggested that folate affects connectivity among neurons as the brain develops. Glutamate is important in the regulation of neural tissue development, as it is a common excitatory neurotransmitter that binds to synaptic …

The Neural Dynamics Of Somatosensory Processing And Adaptation Across Childhood: A High-Density Electrical Mapping Study, Neha Uppal, John J. Foxe, John Butler, Frantzy Acluche, Sophie Molholm

Articles

Young children are often hyperreactive to somatosensory inputs hardly noticed by adults, as exemplified by irritation to seams or labels in clothing. The neurodevelopmental mechanisms underlying changes in sensory reactivity are not well understood. Based on the idea that neurodevelopmental changes in somatosensory processing and/or changes in sensory adaptation might underlie developmental differences in somatosensory reactivity, high-density electroencephalography was used to examine how the nervous system responds and adapts to repeated vibrotactile stimulation over childhood. Participants aged 6–18 yr old were presented with 50-ms vibrotactile stimuli to the right wrist over the median nerve at 5 blocked interstimulus intervals (ranging …

How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering, Yew-Kwang Ng

Animal Sentience

Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of living things. Welfare is net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering). Since this necessarily involves feelings, Dawkins (2014) has suggested that animal welfare science may face a paradox, because feelings are very difficult to study. The following paper provides an explanation for how welfare biology could help to reduce this paradox by answering some difficult questions regarding animal welfare. Simple means based on commonsense could reduce animal suffering enormously at low or even negative costs to humans. Ways to increase the influence of animal welfare advocates are also discussed, focusing initially on farmed …

End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks

Animal Sentience

Yew-Kwang Ng’s research is the work of an obviously sincere, intelligent, and conscientious animal advocate. But I am unable to accept his starting assumption that animal welfare is an appropriate basis for animal ethics. More specifically I argue that animal welfare as a means to animal liberation is an issue that can be debated, but animal welfare as the ultimate end or goal of animal advocacy is misguided.

Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad

Animal Sentience

The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science …

Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability, Marthe Kiley-Worthington

Animal Sentience

Harnad (2016) is mistaken that humans are better at mind-reading than other species. Humans have context-independent language, but nonhuman species, especially mammals, have context-dependent nonverbal skills – perceptual, communicative and social -- that can be much keener than our own.

Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe

Animal Sentience

I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermine Key’s (2016) thesis that fish are unconscious and unable to feel. Lack of a cortex is flimsy grounds for denying pain to fish, for on that criterion we must also then deny it to all non-mammals, including birds, which goes against scientific consensus. Notwithstanding science’s fundamental inability to prove anything, the precautionary principal dictates that we should give the benefit of the doubt to fish, and the state of the oceans dictates that we act on it now.

Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege

Animal Sentience

In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral …

Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown

Animal Sentience

Arguments against the fact that fish feel pain repeatedly appear even in the face of growing evidence that they do. The standards used to judge pain perception keep moving as the hurdles are repeatedly cleared by novel research findings. There is undoubtedly a vested commercial interest in proving that fish do not feel pain, so the topic has a half-life well past its due date. Key (2016) reiterates previous perspectives on this topic characterised by a black-or-white view that is based on the proposed role of the human cortex in pain perception. I argue that this is incongruent with our …

On The Sentience Of Fish, Pentti O. Haikonen

Animal Sentience

Key’s (2016) target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is based on a moralistic fallacy where conclusions about natural conditions are drawn not from research and experiments, but from subjective moral views on how things should be. Moreover, the neurobiological findings purporting to show that fish do not feel pain are insufficient for drawing this conclusion.

Fighting Forms Of Expression, Paul J.B. Hart

Animal Sentience

Even though Key (2016) has done a very thorough job of assembling evidence showing that fish are unlikely to have the neurological capacity to be conscious and feel pain, there will still be a significant number of behavioural biologists who want to continue maintaining that fish do have consciousness and suffer from pain. In this commentary the reasons for people resisting the conclusions of the evidence are discussed. The reasons revolve around three aspects of the debate: the overblown respect humans have for the powers of consciousness in our day-to-day behaviour, the often used assumption that the possession of complex …

No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process, Riccardo Manzotti

Animal Sentience

Key (2016) claims that fish do not feel pain because they lack the neural structures that have a contingent causal role in generating and feeling pain in mammals. I counterargue that no conclusive evidence supports the sufficiency of any mammalian neural structure to produce pain. We cannot move from contingent necessity in mammals to necessity in every organism.

Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective, Yew-Kwang Ng

Animal Sentience

Key’s (2016) target article provides some strong arguments but also makes some logical mistakes. The arguments are not sufficient to support a definite conclusion that fish cannot feel pain. A multi-faceted perspective taking into account brain structure, chemical secretion in brain, animal behavior, and evolutionary biology may be useful and appears, at least in some aspects, to suggest the opposite conclusion from that of the target article.

Lack Of Neocortex Does Not Imply Fish Cannot Feel Pain, Georg Striedter

Animal Sentience

Some contemporary scientists are using comparative neurobiological data to argue that non-mammalian vertebrates have feelings, most notably of pain (e.g., Braithwaite, 2010; Mashour and Alkire, 2012), while Key (2016) uses the same general data to reach the opposite conclusion. In a nutshell, he argues that fish cannot feel pain because fish don’t have a neocortex, which humans need to consciously experience pain. I don’t know how these scientists can look at essentially the same data and reach such disparate conclusions, but I suspect that some of them have strong a priori beliefs and, therefore, view the data through differently tinted …

Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt

Animal Sentience

Key’s (2016) discussion of his claim that fish do not feel pain ignores the history of attempts to study the attribution of mental states to other species. Although willing to accept that mammals feel pain, Key claims that fish lack the mammalian neural mechanisms underlying pain and are unconscious of their experiences. Consequently, we do not need to be overly concerned about fishing practices that would otherwise be viewed as painful. Key uses a flawed anthropomorphic lens. All attributions of mental events to organisms other than oneself involve inferences derived from anthropomorphic processes through which we process physiological and behavioral …

Fish Lack The Brains And The Psychology For Pain, Stuart W.G. Derbyshire

Animal Sentience

Debate about the possibility of fish pain focuses largely on the fish’s lack of the cortex considered necessary for generating pain. That view is appealing because it avoids relatively abstract debate about the nature of pain experience and subjectivity. Unfortunately, however, that debate cannot be entirely avoided. Subcortical circuits in the fish might support an immediate, raw, “pain” experience. The necessity of the cortex only becomes obvious when considering pain as an explicitly felt subjective experience. Attributing pain to fish only seems absurd when pain is considered as a state of explicit knowing.

Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas

Animal Sentience

The evolutionary approach of Key’s (2016) target article, generically comparing humans with fish of all kinds, is simplistic. The author ignores published research on structural and molecular aspects of pain in fish. The target article reads more like a selective polemic against fish welfare than an even-handed analysis.

Drawing The Line On Pain, Bjorn Merker

Animal Sentience

The structure of Key's (2016) argument that fish do not feel pain is flawed, betraying a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of feelings and their role in the brain's functional division of labor. The evidence Key marshals in support of his premature commitment to an exclusively corticocentric view of consciousness in humans is plagued by repeated failures of scholarship.

Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp

Animal Sentience

The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments …

Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose

Animal Sentience

The target article by Key (2016) examines whether fish have brain structures capable of mediating pain perception and consciousness, functions known to depend on the neocortex in humans. He concludes, as others have concluded (Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2014), that such functions are impossible for fish brains. This conclusion has been met with hypothetical assertions by others to the effect that functions of pain and consciousness may well be possible through unknown alternate neural processes. Key's argument would be bolstered by consideration of other neurological as well as behavioral evidence, which shows that sharks and ray are fishes …

Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong, Helmut Segner

Animal Sentience

The response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious perception. According to Key (2016), consciousness — and thus pain perception — depends on a neuronal correlate that has a “unique neural architecture” as realized in the human cortex. On the basis of the “bioengineering principle that structure determines function,” Key (2016) concludes that animal species such as fish, which lack the requisite cortex-like neuroanatomical structure, are unable to feel pain. This commentary argues that the relationship between brain structure and brain function is less straightforward than suggested in Key’s target article.

Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach

Animal Sentience

Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not …

Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens

Animal Sentience

In his excellent target article, Key (2016) develops a mechanistic argument in an attempt to show why it is unlikely that fish can “feel” pain or for that matter, “feel” anything. The topic is controversial and likely to achieve the goal of getting many hits for the inaugural issue of the new journal, Animal Sentience. In my view, the question is unlikely to be answered, for two reasons. First, because the proponents of the “fish feel pain” controversy are untrained and unskilled in the details and jargon of neurophysiology and/or neuroanatomy, and the opponents of the controversy, like Key, …

Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio

Animal Sentience

Evidence from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology suggests that the experience of feelings in humans does not depend exclusively on structures of the cerebral cortex. It does not seem warranted to deny the possibility of feeling in animals on the grounds that their cerebral cortices are not comparable to those of humans.

Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor

Animal Sentience

Key argues that fish cannot experience pain based on (1) brain imaging in humans, (2) consequences of lesions and (3) direct brain stimulation. Imaging indeed shows that pain-relevant signals reach the cortex, but not that they underlie the subjective experience of pain. Lesions and stimulation data are more to the point, but Key paints an idiosyncratic and misleading picture of their effects. S1 and S2 ablation does not eliminate evoked or spontaneous pain, although there may be up- or down-modulation. Likewise, stimulation of pain-associated cortical areas rarely induces pain, and pain almost never occurs at the onset of epileptic seizures. …