President/Executive Department Commons^™

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This model casebook section is concerned with the constitutional law of war powers as developed by the executive and legislative branches, with a limited look at relevant statutes and federal court cases. It is intended for use in Constitutional Law I classes that cover separation of powers. It could also be used for courses in National Security Law or Foreign Relations Law, or for graduate courses in U.S. foreign policy. This is designed to be the reading for one to two classes, and it can supplement or replace standard casebook sections on war powers that are shorter and offer less …

Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang

Faculty Scholarship

Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each ready to issue an injunction. But their injunctions may clash, ordering incompatible actions by the defendant. Each judge has written an opinion justifying her own intended relief, but the need to avoid conflicting injunctions presses her to make a further choice – “Should I issue the injunction or should I stay it for now?” Each must make this decision in anticipation of what the other will do.

This Article analyzes such a judicial coordination problem, drawing on recent examples including the DACA cases and the “sanctuary cities” cases. It then …

Presidential Use Of Force In East Asia: American Constitutional Law And The U.S.-Japan Alliance, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution’s allocation of military authority has adapted over time to major shifts in American power and grand strategy. This paper explains, with a focus on U.S. military actions in East Asia and possible scenarios of special joint concern to the United States and Japan, that the president in practice wields tremendous power and discretion in using military force. Although formal, legal checks on the president’s use of force rarely come into play, Congress nevertheless retains some political power to influence presidential decision-making. The president’s powers are also constrained by interagency processes within the executive branch, and alliance relations …

Executive Underreach, In Pandemics And Otherwise, David E. Pozen, Kim Lane Scheppele

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.

Executive Overreach And Underreach In The Pandemic, Kim Lane Scheppele, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The pandemic that convulsed the globe in 2020 was long foretold but still surprising to many. Within a few months of its appearance, COVID-19 became one of the leading causes of death worldwide. Governments struggled at first to comprehend what was happening – and then reacted in very different ways. Most political leaders followed the advice of epidemiologists. Many declared states of emergency. A few pursued autocratic agendas. And some did almost nothing.

During emergencies, constitutional scholars normally worry about executive aggrandizement at the expense of human rights and democratic values. Emergencies often require national executives to act quickly and …

Brief Of Professors Of Law, Us V. Bergdahl, Joshua E. Kastenberg, Rachel E. Vanlandingham, Geoffrey S. Corn

Faculty Scholarship

When scrutinizing executive actions for unlawful command influence, this Court must account for a president’s immense power over the military. The extant judicial test for unlawful command influence – a violation of due process in the military setting – is a contextual one, and hence must consider the unique and unparalleled authority of the Commander-In-Chief over the military and individual service-members when the president’s actions are at issue. This executive power should also be evaluated in light of its myriad, and historically important, constitutional and statutory constraints – some predating the birth of the United States – that appropriately continue …

Why Robert Mueller's Appointment As Special Counsel Was Unlawful, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

Since 1999, when the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act expired, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has had in place regulations providing for the appointment of “special counsels” who possess “the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.” Appointments under these regulations, such as the May 17, 2017 appointment of Robert S. Mueller to investigate the Trump campaign, are patently unlawful, for three distinct reasons.

First, all federal offices must be “established by Law,” and there is no statute authorizing such an office in the DOJ. We …

Perfecting Singapore’S System Of Political Governance: Privileging Elites In The Quest For Good Governance, Tan K. B. Eugene

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This chapter argues that the office of the Elected President is best understood as an elite institution with eligibility restricted to a select group by a stringent set of criteria for hopefuls from the public and private sectors. The Singapore Constitution provides the Elected President with executive and legislative powers. Since independence in 1965, Singapore has sought to constitutionally engineer a political system that meets its unique needs and aspirations. Any theory of responsible government, undergirded by the separation of powers, will entail some measure of both conflict and cooperation, whether one or the other dominates. Given the particularistic neo-Confucian …

The President And Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, And Process, Mary B. Derosa, Ashley Nicolas

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. In the Cold War, the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation necessitated procedures emphasizing speed and efficiency and placing sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands. In today’s changed threat environment, the legal authorities and process a U.S. president would confront when making this grave decision merit reexamination. This paper serves as a resource in the national discussion about a president’s legal authority and the procedures for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether to update them.

Law School News: Tough Talk On Asylum 11/22/2019, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

New Homeland Security Asylum Rule Allows Removal To Central American Countries That Have Signed Agreements With The U.S., Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Filling The New York Federal District Court Vacancies, Carl Tobias

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

President Donald Trump contends that federal appellate court appointments constitute his foremost success. The president and the United States Senate Grand Old Party (GOP) majority have compiled records by approving forty-eight conservative, young, accomplished, overwhelmingly Caucasian, and predominantly male, appeals court jurists. However, their appointments have exacted a toll, particularly on the ninety-four district courts around the country that must address eighty-seven open judicial positions in 677 posts.

One riveting example is New York’s multiple tribunals, which confront twelve vacancies among fifty-two court slots. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts considers nine of these openings “judicial emergencies,” because …

Judge Issues Temporary Restraining Order Against Proclamation Barring Uninsured Immigrants, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Making The War Colleges Better, Richard A. Lacquement Jr

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

No abstract provided.

Enter At Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum-Seekers, Thomas M. Mcdonnell, Vanessa H. Merton

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

In nearly three years in office, President Donald J. Trump’s war against immigrants and the foreign-born seems only to have intensified. Through a series of Executive Branch actions and policies rather than legislation, the Trump Administration has targeted immigrants and visitors from Muslim-majority countries, imposed quotas on and drastically reduced the independence of Immigration Court Judges, cut the number of refugees admitted by more than 80%, cancelled DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), and stationed Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at state courtrooms to arrest unauthorized immigrants, intimidating them from participating as witnesses and litigants. Although initially saying that …

Rescinding Inclusion In The Administrative State: Adjudicating Daca, The Census, And The Military's Transgender Policy, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Lawyers Weekly Newsmaker Reception : November 20, 2019, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

"When The President Does It": Why Congress Should Take The Lead In Investigations Of Executive Wrongdoing, Andrew B. Pardue

William & Mary Law Review

Asked by British journalist David Frost whether the President of the United States has the ability to authorize illegal acts when he believes such action is justified, Richard Nixon infamously replied: “Well, when the President does it, that means it is not illegal.” A majority of Americans disagreed with the former President’s assessment. But the question remains: If the President is theoretically capable of breaking the law while in office, what is the best way to determine whether a crime has actually been committed? This question has forced lawmakers to attempt to reconcile various investigatory mechanisms—all differing in their independence …

Dismantling Monuments, Richard H. Seamon

Florida Law Review

The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to “declare” certain objects “to be national monuments,” and to “reserve parcels of land” to protect those national monuments. The Act does not expressly authorize the President to reduce or rescind a monument established by a prior President under the Act, and recent actions by President Donald Trump raise the question whether the Act impliedly authorizes such reductions or rescissions. The majority of legal scholars who have studied this question have said no, the Act does not grant such implied authority. This Article takes the contrary position. The President’s authority underthe Antiquities …

President Trump Bars Uninsured Immigrants From The U.S., Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The “National Security” Of Nations: President Trump’S Pretextual Tariff Rationale And How To Overcome It, Jacob Ely

Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review

The note argues that President Trump's use of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act to impose tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles under the pretext of national security constitutes an abuse of executive power. It contends that this action undermines the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate trade and tariffs, raising significant concerns about the separation of powers and the potential for future presidential overreach. The note advocates for legislative reforms to reclaim congressional oversight and ensure that national security justifications for tariffs are genuine and narrowly defined.

Developing A Law School Course On Presidential Impeachment, Gregory S. Crespi

SMU Law Review Forum

This short essay discusses my motivation for and the process that I went through over the past two years developing a law school course on Presidential Impeachment and related topics. I recommend that those law school faculty members who may have only a modest constitutional law background, but who feel as I do that more sustained discussion of the questions that would be presented by an attempt to remove President Trump from office through impeachment are called for, consider also developing and offering such a course.

I found that through reading a few accessible books and supervising a handful of …

When Protest Is The Disaster: Constitutional Implications Of State And Local Emergency Power, Karen Pita Loor

Faculty Scholarship

The President’s use of emergency authority has recently ignited concern among civil rights groups over national executive emergency power. However, state and local emergency authority can also be dangerous and deserves similar attention. This article demonstrates that, just as we watch over the national executive, we must be wary of and check on state and local executives — and their emergency management law enforcement actors — when they react in crisis mode. This paper exposes and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and emergency management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political activity and suggests avenues to counter that abuse. I …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Stays Asylum Injunction: Signal On The Merits Or Procedural Snag?, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Presidential War Powers And Humanitarian Intervention, Michael J. Sherman

Pace Law Review

Does the fact that Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution reserves to Congress the authority to “declare war” mean that the president needs congressional approval before using military force? As this Article discusses, there are a range of answers to this question. The Article examines this debate in the context of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military actions taken, not for purposes of conquest, but instead to stop largescale, serious violations of human rights. If the president wishes to use the military for these purposes, should he have more authority under the Constitution to do so? Less? The same? …

Presidential Responses To Protest: Lessons Jefferson Davis Never Learned, Ashlee Paxton-Turner

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Interpreting Emoluments Today: The Framers’ Intent And The “Present” Problem, Bianca Spinosa

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

"Believe Me," We Do Not Have A Foreign Emoluments Clause Violation, Scotty N. Teal

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

President Trump was sued in New York District Court for allegedly violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause. In its brief, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) alleged that the president's international businesses and real estate holdings positioned him to receive money from foreign governments. These business interests, or entanglements, could "sway" or create an opportunity for negative foreign influence in violation of the Emoluments Clause. CREW states that these "entanglements between American officials and foreign powers could pose a creeping, insidious threat to the Republic." CREW argued that President Trump violated the Emoluments Clause because the clause "cover[s] …