President/Executive Department Commons^™

The Threat To Government Ethics, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

That was quite a week. Over seven days in mid-October:

• President Trump hosted a White House dinner for three dozen super-wealthy individuals and representatives of major corporations who pledged funds for his $300 million ballroom.
• The president commuted the sentence of former Congressman George Santos, who had served less than three months of an 87-month term for corruption, and canceled Santos’s obligation to pay restitution to his victims.
• The president fired, without providing a reason or giving the 30 days’ notice required by law, the Inspector General for the Export-Import Bank.
• We learned the president is demanding the Department of …

Democracy Needs The Administrative State, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

In public debate, the federal bureaucracy is not typically praised for its democratic credentials. Consisting of a wide array of agencies staffed by a permanent civil service and governed by detailed regulations, the administrative state is more likely to be portrayed as a bastion of red tape and unelected power. To hear members of the Supreme Court tell it, for example, the administrative state’s “unaccountable bureaucrats” and “vast power[s]” pose a dire threat to constitutional democracy that only expanded presidential control can solve. President Trump has offered an even darker view, attacking a “deep state” of entrenched government officials as …

Congressional Oversight Reports As Legislative Branch Work Product And Research Resource, Grace A. Moore, David Rapallo, Sean M. Theriault

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy at Wayne State University Law School is in the process of creating the first-ever comprehensive database of congressional oversight reports for all House and Senate Committees since the 106th Congress (1999–2000). In this article, we place these reports into the broader context of the tools Congress has to conduct oversight in service of its many legislative branch responsibilities under the Constitution. We also explain the development of the database. We conclude the article by discussing how the congressional scholars in this special issue use this database to examine how Congress conducts oversight, and …

"Because The President Said So:" Agency Reason Giving And Presidential Statements Of Will, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Reason giving has long been understood to legitimate administrative agency actions by assuring legal, nonarbitrary, stable, and well-considered decisions. It is core to the Administrative Procedure Act's process and judicial review provisions. But the obligation to give reasons is receiving a challenge from the political accountability side, as executive orders skyrocket and the Supreme Court moves towards unitary executive theory in decisions such as Trump v. Slaughter and Seila Law v. CFPB. In striking down independent agencies under Article II, the Court has emphasized that political accountability of agencies to the President is critical. Both the President and executive agencies …

Donald Trump’S Latest Tariffs Are Part Of A New Trade Strategy. The U.S. Has A Much Bigger Target Than Our Wine And Cheese, Barry Appleton

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

Mapping Minority Investigative Powers In Congress, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“Shut down the Senate . . .” “Roll over and play dead . . .” In the first hundred days of President Donald Trump’s second term, these were the rallying cries of two far ends of a debate among Democrats about how to respond to the administration’s unprecedented actions. This debate, which rages on today, has been marked by a lack of specificity about the various oversight tools available to members of the minority party in Congress, particularly when they investigate whether the Executive Branch is faithfully executing the laws Congress passes. Scholarship too has focused little on the full …

Presidential Immunity: Before And After Trump, Thomas P. Schmidt

Faculty Scholarship

“All the officers of government,” the Supreme Court said long ago, “from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” Despite that ringing and categorical language, however, the Court has held that the President — the “highest” and most powerful of all government officers — is “immune” from judicial oversight in several respects. Indeed, when the Court held last Term that former presidents are presumptively immune from criminal prosecution for officials acts, the dissenters warned: “In every use of official power, the President is now a king above the law.”

This Article …

The Supreme Court Under Threat: Early Lessons In Judicial Self-Protection, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores how the U.S. Supreme Court, despite being vulnerable to defiance of its decisions and political retaliation, has developed tools of judicial self-protection to preserve its institutional authority and thus its capacity to sustain the Constitution and the rule of law. Arguing that the Court performs not only a legal role that requires interpretation of the law but also a political one that demands institutional preservation, the Essay examines how the Court has historically navigated political threats by using a range of tools—including avoidance, delay, narrow rulings, strategic dicta, and rhetorical appeals. The Essay focuses on three nineteenth-century …

Some Realism About Constitutional Remedies, Thomas P. Schmidt, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has wavered between two approaches to questions of executive power, which are often labeled institutional formalism and realism. Formalism treats an institution like the presidency as a “black box” to which the Constitution assigns certain powers. In Trump v. Hawaii,  for example, the Supreme Court upheld President Trump’s infamous travel ban by focusing not on the “particular President” and his past call for a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” but rather on “the authority of the Presidency itself.” That is the language of institutional formalism.

Realism, on the other hand, peers into the “black …

The Administrative Law Of Mccarthyism, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article recovers the largely overlooked legal and administrative history of the federal loyalty-security program, and argues that it played a formative role in the development of modern civil service protections and administrative law. During the McCarthy era, the United States Civil Service Commission (CSC), under pressure from Congress, implemented a sweeping loyalty program aimed at rooting out purportedly disloyal federal employees. Though often remembered as a moment of political overreach and civil liberties violations, this Article shows that the loyalty program simultaneously catalyzed a surprising expansion in procedural rights for government workers—both through internal reforms initiated by the CSC …

Communicative Administration: The Administrative State Beyond Legal Administration, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

On many dimensions, the administrative state is at the nadir of its power. The Supreme Court has tightened administrative law controls on agency power, and the Trump Administration has stormed the bureaucracy in an unprecedented blitz designed to kneecap agency capacity and independence. For better or worse, many agencies and their civil servants are being sidelined as meaningful actors in the administration of government. Yet this familiar account doesn’t tell the entire story. At the same time that agencies are being stripped of the power to implement law—what this Article calls “legal administration”— they are steadily accumulating extensive and largely …

The Unitary Executive And The Federal Reserve, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court may soon embrace an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that would significantly expand the power of the president over federal administrators and invalidate key provisions in dozens of federal statutes. A critical question is whether this interpretation — known as the unitary executive theory (UET) — would also render unconstitutional central bank independence (CBI), an arrangement where a country’s monetary policy is formulated by a semiautonomous body of experts insulated from partisan political pressure. Several justices have suggested that it would not, and a growing scholarly literature has proposed ways for the Court to distinguish the …

Plea Bargain Skepticism When Companies Kill People, Peter R. Reilly

Faculty Scholarship

In 2018 and 2019, two Boeing 737 MAX airplanes fell from the sky, killing 346 people—one of the deadliest corporate crimes in U.S. history. Instead of taking the case to trial, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) addressed the matter by using two different alternative dispute resolution vehicles. First, Boeing was given a three-year deferred prosecution agree-ment. That deal was canceled when DOJ determined the company had breached it. Next, Boeing was given a plea bargain. This Article argues that federal courts, which are empowered to approve or reject plea deals, should be skeptical when the government turns to …

Court-Stripping, Court-Packing, And Court Defying: Revisiting The Supreme Court’S Essential Functions, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The "essential functions thesis" is one of the most famous structural arguments in the field of federal courts. The thesis, which has been endorsed by a number of prominent scholars and the executive branch, posits that there are implicit, structural limits on Congress's authority to "strip" the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction. Court-stripping, the thesis contends, is not allowed if it would undermine the essential functions of the Court-in particular, maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal law. In this Article, we revisit that thesis with three goals in mind. First, we aim to show that the structural arguments …

The Justice Department’S Bid To Avoid Accountability, Bruce A. Green, Rebecca Roiphe

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

The Trump Administration’S Theory Of Constitutional War Powers: “The President Could Decide”, Rebecca Ingber

Online Publications

President Donald Trump has launched another unlawful war, this time in the service of regime change in Iran. The administration has been threatening the use of force for weeks, but provided very little public justification, description of what the president hoped to accomplish, or explanation for how the use of force would effectuate such goals. It has also to date presented no legal justification whatsoever. Much of what we know at this moment about how the administration views, and how it lawyers, questions of war powers can be derived from the one legal memorandum the administration has released on the …

Levers Of Default: Can The President Unilaterally Alter The Terms Of The National Debt?, Lev E. Breydo, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

The inviolability of America’s $30 trillion debt is a cornerstone of global markets and the U.S. economy. This Essay identifies a critical loophole: the President’s underappreciated power to dramatically change its legal structure—and argues that Congress should act to prevent a potential catastrophe.

The Essay details, for the first time in the literature, the arcane legal architecture underpinning America’s sovereign borrowings. Our analysis finds that although the President lacks authority to change the terms of outstanding debt retroactively, the President can accomplish similar goals by issuing new debt instruments that embed unprecedented powers. In surprisingly short order, a determined Executive …

Liberal Trade And President Trump: Never The Twain Shall Meet, Joel Adu-Quaye, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

This paper seeks to distinguish between two consequences of the tariff policies enacted by both Trump administrations: (1) their adverse effects on free trade and (2) the existential damage inflicted upon the transnational institutions responsible for enforcing its rules and obligations. Although difficult to quantify the latter, there is an intuitive sense that this is what matters most. The global order appears to be shifting from a rule-based framework to one characterized by increasing disorder and unpredictability. Within this new world order, actions are permissible so long as they align with the, often ill-defined, national interests of powerful nations.

How The Rhetoric Of Borders Justifies The Erosion Of Rights, Richard Sherwin

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

The Missing Constitutional Law Of Executive Conditions, Nicole Huberfeld, Matthew B. Lawrence

Faculty Articles

This Article contributes to the development of the constitutional law of executive conditions. The appropriations presidentialism of the second Trump Administration—the shift from bilateral executive/legislative cooperation and compromise in federal spending to executive unilateralism in defiance of congressional control—has forced courts into the administration of federal spending like never before. As a result, judges have been forced to confront legal questions that remained mostly dormant during the era of executive/legislative cooperation, including questions about the constitutionality of efforts to encourage through spending conditions what the federal government cannot mandate (or has not mandated) directly, like speech or silence on particular …

Regulatory History And Judicial Review, Todd Phillips, Anthony L. Moffa

Faculty Publications

The Administrative Procedure Act requires federal agencies to simply "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose" after they receive comments from the public, and the Supreme Court ruled in Overton Park that courts are to adjudicate whether rules are arbitrary and capricious based on agencies' contemporaneous rationales. Judge-created doctrines incentivize agencies to rely on these "concise" statements to elucidate their rationales, and as a result, rulemaking preambles have ballooned in size as agencies seek to insulate themselves from critical courts.

This article contends that although the APA's statutory requirement is in tension with …

The People, The Branches, And The Pearl Of Independence, Brian C. Murchison

Scholarly Articles

What will be the fate of the independent agencies?  Since 1887, Congress has seen fit to address an array of contemporary issues by creating expert federal agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and others.  The principal officers of these agencies are appointed by the President on advice and consent of the Senate, serve limited staggered terms, are bipartisan in the sense that only a bare majority of the agency’s officers can be members of the same political party, and are “independent” in the sense that the officers are removable only …

A Trusteeship Theory Of Pro Bono: Versions And Perversions, David Luban

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This chapter develops a trusteeship justification of pro bono, arguing that lawyers, as trustees of a public legal system created through democratic self-authorship, have a moral obligation to help address the persistent justice gap affecting persons of limited means. It evaluates multiple forms of pro bono — including voluntary, mandatory, low bono, and state-compelled service — evaluating how well each aligns with the trusteeship model. The chapter contrasts the trusteeship theory with, and criticizes, two alternative justifications for pro bono: presumed lawyer consent rooted in professional tradition and a quid pro quo based on state-authorized privileges. It concludes by distinguishing …

How The Supreme Court’S Inconsistent Approach To Granting Emergency Relief Will Exacerbate, Rather Than Mitigate The Disruption Its Emergency Stay Policy Is Supposed To Address, Harvey L. Reiter

Cardozo Law Review de•novo

The federal government has used the Supreme Court’s emergency or “shadow” docket to great effect this past year, securing stay after stay of lower court rulings that had blocked many of the President’s executive orders. But the Court’s rulings have come, almost invariably, without any explanation of its reasoning. And its opaque and uneven rulings have also come at a potential cost to the Court’s credibility. This Article illustrates the uneven nature of the Court’s rulings by contrasting two lines of cases: (1) the Court’s stays of lower court rulings restoring to their positions FTC, NLRB, EEOC, and MSPB members …

Taking Legality Seriously: What The Major Questions Doctrine Is — And Isn't, Andrea Scoseria Katz, Ofra Bloch

Scholarship@WashULaw

The Major Questions Doctrine (MQD), a controversial recent innovation of the Roberts Court that applies stricter scrutiny to “major” actions taken by federal agencies, has faced criticism for being atextual, unprincipled, and nakedly ideological. But this critique misses the fact that the doctrine has near-exact analogues in many other legal systems, where it is an established tool for reining in executive overreach. This Article argues that, while the MQD reflects valid rule-of-law concerns, as applied, it lacks theoretical clarity, consistency and limits. More importantly, the Court itself lacks a theory of what the MQD is. We provide an answer grounded …

The Library Of Congress At A Crossroads: Executive Overreach And The Future Of Public Knowledge, Leslie A. Street, Amanda M. Runyon

Library Staff Publications

This Article argues that the removal of the Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights exposed a dual vulnerability: a constitutional breach of the separation of powers and a cultural threat to the nation’s knowledge infrastructure. The Library’s structural ambiguity—its simultaneous identity as a legislative library, national library, and copyright agency—has left it vulnerable to executive overreach. By asserting control over an institution designed to serve Congress and safeguard America’s intellectual heritage, the President destabilized a statutory framework that has endured for over two centuries. To protect both constitutional integrity and the Library’s role as custodian of national memory, …

The Executive's Takeover Of Independent Agencies: How Institutional Design Gave Way To Political Will, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

The anticipated demise of the independent agency is a saga that implicates Congress as much as it does the President or the Supreme Court. By capitulating to presidential initiatives and failing to defend their institutional prerogatives, Congress has facilitated presidential control of the administrative state. Indeed, irrespective of whether the Court formally repudiates Humphrey’s Executor, Congress has largely acquiesced to a regime whereby presidents essentially control independent agencies. By highlighting the competing incentives of Congress and the White House, this Essay explains the rise of presidential unilateralism vis-à-vis independent agencies. This Essay also casts light on a critically important but …

The Rhetoric Of Law In Executive Order No. 12,333, Noah C. Chauvin

Faculty Articles

Scholars have long disputed the extent to which Congress may permissibly regulate the nation's foreign intelligence apparatus. Positions in this debate range from the view that Congress and the President share power over intelligence to the opinion that intelligence matters fall within the President's exclusive Article II authority. This Article examines the extent to which the text of Executive Order No. 12,333-the intelligence community's governing charter-supports the most expansive conceptions of presidential authority over intelligence matters. It concludes that the Order is best understood as recognizing Congress's power to pass laws governing the conduct of intelligence-laws that preclude executive refinement …

The Foreign Commerce Power, Kathleen Claussen, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is the first to scrutinize presidential trade authority under the Constitution. The Constitution grants the President no independent power to regulate foreign commerce. That conclusion, while apparent from a straightforward reading of Articles I and II, stands in stark contrast to executive conduct of U.S. trade policy in recent years. This Article traces the roots of this constitutional distortion to a confluence of doctrinal drift and academic oversight. Courts and commentators have increasingly relied on an expansive conception of executive power grounded in a perceived general foreign affairs authority. In doing so, they have blurred the line between …

Reversing Progress: The Political And Legal Ramifications Of The 2025 Dei Policy Rollback, Bridgette Baldwin

Faculty Scholarship

The year 2025 will mark a significant turning point in the landscape of American civil rights policy, as federal executive orders the Trump administration initiated seek to dismantle longstanding diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") initiatives. Rooted in a historical context of civil rights progress, these orders aim to curtail affirmative action programs, eliminate DEI mandates within federal agencies and contractors, and challenge the legal foundations of inclusive policies across the country. This Article explores the evolving landscape of civil rights and DEI in the United States, examining its historical roots, recent legal and political developments, and ongoing challenges. From landmark …